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ABSTRACT
The present dissertation develops some theoretical models which analyze the 
impact on wages of the financial and technological choices operated by firms.
Chapter I considers the effects of technological change on efficiency-wages. We 
adopt Kremer’s (1993) "O-Ring" production function, where technical progress can be 
represented through a change in the number of tasks to be performed in production. 
More complex production processes imply higher wage levels and higher general 
equilibrium unemployment. The model is extended to analyze within-group wage 
dispersion.
In Chapter II, we adopt an alternating-calls strategic bargaining model where the 
incentive to reach an early agreement does not rely on time-preferences, but on intrinsic 
decay in the cake’s size. When outside options remain positive and constant over time 
and the interval between calls shrinks to zero, the solution to this game converges to 
the Nash-solution, where the outside options take the status quo positions. This result 
contrasts with Rubinstein (1982), where outside options can matter only as corner- 
solutions. The model is extended to consider the role of market factors on wage 
determination.
Chapter III considers the strategic role of debt in wage negotiations. Since debt 
provides a "credible threat" in bargaining, the entrepreneur can increase her profits by 
borrowing. Debt, thus, constitutes a (partial) remedy to Grout’s (1984) under-investment 
problem.
Chapter IV extends the model developed in Chapter III to analyze the 
implications that strategic borrowing can have on technological sophistication. We show 
that debt may have positive effects not only on the quantity of investment, but also on 
the degree of sophistication of the chosen projects.
Chapter V (with G. Marini) analyses the role of foreign debt in promoting 
investment in Less Developed Countries that are subject to political risks. We show 
that, when default can trigger trade sanctions, foreign debt reduces the negative effects 
of political uncertainty on capital accumulation.
Chapter VI (with F.Bagliano) contrasts the explanation for mark-up
countercyclicality offered by the "price-war" model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) 
with the alternative explanation, based on "liquidity constraints", proposed by Chevalier 
and Scharfstein (1996).
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INTRODUCTION
The importance of issues such as technological change and capital budgeting is
*
indicated by the attention of both professional economists and public opinion.
Although technological and financial factors invest a huge variety of economic 
aspects, here we will mainly be interested in their effects on a variable of particular 
relevance, the wage. To this purpose, the present dissertation will develop some 
theoretical models which analyse the impact on wages of the financial and technological 
choices operated by firms. As will be argued, the theoretical predictions obtained are 
broadly consistent with the existing empirical evidence.
The effects of technological change on labour market conditions have recently 
generated deep and broad concern. While there have been fears in the general public 
that technological progress may have a devastating impact on employment, academics 
have put greater emphasis on the effects of technical change on wage dispersion.
Chapter I  develops an efficiency-wage model to investigate how technical change 
can affect wage levels and, in particular, wage inequality. Wage dispersion can be 
measured along different dimensions, since workers’ observed characteristics differ in 
terms of education, age/experience, etc. During the Eighties, both the US and the UK 
have experienced increasing wage dispersion among workers of different observed 
quality (between-group wage inequality) as well as among workers of the same observed 
quality (within-group wage inequality). As Levy and Murnane (1992) note, changing 
characteristics in the quality of the labour supply, together with "skill-biased” shifts in 
labour demand, can satisfactorily explain the increasing between-group dispersion that 
has been reported. What remains to be better understood, however, is the part of 
inequality that was growing among workers of similar experience and schooling.
In the model we propose there are two main components, the efficiency wage 
principle and a characterisation of technology based on Kremer’s (1993) "O-Ring" 
production function. The adoption of the efficiency-wage principle puts all the emphasis 
on the labour-demand side. On the other hand, the O-Ring theory of production 
conceives the production process as composed of several tasks, which can be mis­
performed with positive probability. Mis-performance of even a single task leads to 
relevant losses in revenues or, at the extreme, to production failure. In the O-Ring
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approach, the number of tasks required by a production process can be interpreted as 
a measure of its technological sophistication. Since higher sophistication raises the risks 
of production failure for any given level of workers’ effort, firms will have an incentive 
to pay higher wages, so to better motivate their employees and, thus, reduce the 
chances of an incorrect performance.
When we extend the model to analyse the behaviour of firms that adopt 
technologies of different sophistication and hire, at the same time, workers of 
homogeneous quality, between-firm within-group wage differentials arise in equilibrium. 
As a consequence, the wage a worker is paid can just be a matter of luck, depending 
on the firm which hired her. Other models, such as Bulow and Summers (1986) and 
Bertola and Ichino (1995), can also justify the existence of within-group inequality for 
reasons other than differences in the production technology. Those models, however, 
do not investigate the possible causes of the observed changes in wage dispersion. By 
contrast, our approach predicts that when the degree of technological sophistication 
among firms tends to diverge, wage inequality will rise. This conclusion seems quite 
consistent with several features of the evolution that has taken place in American 
industry during the Eighties.
* * *
The second part of the dissertation (from Chapter II to Chapter IV) is based on 
strategic bargaining theory, following the seminal work by Rubinstein (see Rubinstein 
(1982)).
Chapter II considers the issue of outside options in strategic bargaining theory. 
As emphasised by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), when one refers to a 
bargaining model a la Rubinstein (1982), where the driving force leading to an 
agreement depends on players’ "impatience", outside options matter only as corner 
solutions to the game. Then, if the strategic foundations laid down by Rubinstein are 
strictly followed, the outside options levels cannot be interpreted as the status quo 
positions of the Nash-maximand, as commonly assumed in many labour economics 
applications.
In the strategic bargaining model we propose, agents still alternate in making
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proposals to each other. However, the driving force for an agreement is not (or, not 
only) constituted by time-discounting as in Rubinstein. We postulate that, if delay 
occurs, the cake’s size itself intrinsically decays over time. In this perspective, the 
forces that govern the shrinking of the cake need not affect the external options 
available to the players. Our benchmark model, where the players’ discount rate is zero 
and the outside options remain constant over time, generates two main results. The first 
is that the bargaining game has a finite horizon and always gives a unique Perfect 
Equilibrium solution, even for a number of players greater than two. This result can 
be better appreciated by recalling that, when the Rubinstein’s model is applied to a 
game with more than two players, multiple solutions generally arise (see, e.g., Sutton 
(1986)). The second implication of our model is that, when the interval between two 
subsequent calls shrinks to zero, the game solution converges to the Nash solution 
where the status quo's coincide with the outside options. This result, which is in neat 
contrast with the prescriptions that Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) derive 
from Rubinstein (1982), provides thus a theoretical justification to the common practice 
of inserting the players’ outside option levels in Nash-maximands.
In the concluding part of Chapter II, we apply the "decaying cake" model to 
wage negotiations to investigate (i) the effects of multi-union bargaining, (ii) the relation 
between bargained wages and efficiency-wages and, (Hi) the influences that outside 
options have on investment in workforce’s training.
After laying down the basic bargaining model, we consider the role of financial 
factors in wage negotiations (Chapter III to Chapter V). Extensive research has been 
devoted to investigate the determinants of corporate structure (see, e.g., Harris and 
Raviv (1991)). However, the effects of the financing choice on wages have only been 
explored in a small number of papers.
Chapter III analyses the wage bargaining process when an entrepreneur can 
choose whether to finance a project with debt or own-funds (or equity). An analogous 
problem is considered in Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) and Perotti and Spier (1993), 
who find that debt reduces the amount of surplus that workers can appropriate. Similar 
results are also obtained in our framework. The innovation of the model we propose, 
however, is that we explicitly model the event of bankruptcy as a bargaining game. Our
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approach, thus, spells out the precise circumstances that make debt a "credible threat" 
for workers.
The core of the model is based on the idea that, when liquidation is dominated, 
default transfers the property rights of the firm’s physical assets from the entrepreneur 
to lenders. Lenders, then, become entitled to negotiate over the surplus the firm can 
still produce. When both the entrepreneur and the workforce cannot be dispensed with 
in production, default generates a three-party bargaining game among lenders, 
workforce and the entrepreneur herself. By using a simple backward induction 
argument, we show that, in equilibrium, workers will have to bear a fraction of the 
repayments on the debt which has been raised and pocketed by the entrepreneur. In 
other words, firms can borrow to constrain workers’ rent-seeking behaviour.
A relevant corollary to the main result is that the strategic use of debt raises the 
level of investment an entrepreneur is willing to implement. Thus, debt is a (partial) 
remedy to Grout’s (1984) under-investment problem.
Chapter IV  exploits the idea (developed in the previous Chapter) that debt can 
be used as a device to modify the distribution of surplus. The most relevant aspect of 
the model developed here, however, is the explicit analysis of the interactions between 
the entrepreneur’s financing decisions and the degree of technological complexity 
chosen in equilibrium. In fact, in the spirit of Kremer (1993), production can be seen 
as a process where several complementary tasks must be performed.
When firms’ surplus is shared through bargaining, increasing technological 
sophistication has advantages as well as costs. On the one hand, a more complex 
process can deliver goods that sell at higher prices. On the other hand, however, greater 
sophistication generally entails a larger number of tasks which have to be performed by 
additional agents. If these additional agents manage to gain some bargaining power over 
the surplus, there will be an "adverse distributive effect" that may cause under- 
sophistication in the technologies adopted. Indeed, an entrepreneur will generally have 
an incentive to undertake production processes that are less sophisticated than the 
socially optimal ones. We show however that, when the entrepreneur can borrow, the 
adverse distributive effect due to greater sophistication is smaller. In other words, debt 
can reduce both the Grout’s under-investment problem (as we already know from the 
model in Chapter III) and the under-sophistication inefficiency we devise here.
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This model has valuable implications from the viewpoint of the literature relating 
financial development to "growth". As emphasised by King and Levine (1993), financial 
development is a predictor of future growth. This observation is broadly consistent with 
our approach. In fact, since developed financial markets allow entrepreneurs to borrow 
more easily, our model predicts that the aggregate quantity of investment, as well as 
the quality of the projects implemented, are stimulated.
Chapter V contains joint work with Giancarlo Marini (University of Tor 
Vergata, Rome). Here, we focus on foreign debt as a possible incentive for investment 
in Less Developed Countries. Although the basic mechanism at work here is analogous 
to that of Chapter Three, the questions at stake are quite peculiar.
Workers’ rent-seeking behaviour may discourage investment both in developed 
and less-developed countries. What is peculiar to LDCs, however, is that entrepreneurs 
are subject to political risks - such as risks of expropriation or very unfavourable 
taxation - in the event that a populist government comes into office. However, 
entrepreneurs can use foreign debt strategically, so to secure a larger share of 
investment’s surplus. In fact, when foreign debt is implicitly backed by the threat of 
international sanctions (see Bulow and Rogoff (1989)), we show that an entrepreneur 
who borrows abroad can reduce the expected losses from adverse political changes.
This model provides a number of quite relevant implications. We conclude that 
foreign debt stimulates investment, that politically unstable countries may still be able 
to raise large amounts of debt from abroad, that foreign debt is more effective than 
Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate physical capital accumulation. Some of these 
predictions may seem prima facie counterfactual: for example, it has been commonly 
thought that large foreign debt had been detrimental for LDC investment (see, e.g., 
Sachs (1988)). However, some recent evidence reported in Warner (1993) supports the 
view that the large LDC debt had a positive effect on investment.
Finally, the approach we propose seems quite fruitful to explore some quite 
puzzling questions such as, why did the LDCs borrow so much from abroad in the 
past?
*  *  sfe
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Chapter VI is joint work with Fabio Bagliano (University of Turin). In this 
Chapter, we abandon the analysis of wage determinants to deal with a different topic, 
the cyclicality of mark-ups in oligopolistic industries.
We build on Rotemberg and Saloner’s (1986) analysis of implicit collusion 
between oligopolists over the business cycle. While monopoly pricing is likely to be 
sustainable in low-demand states, high-demand states provide greater incentives for an 
oligopolist to undercut rivals. As a consequence, mark-ups in oligopolistic sectors tend 
to move countercyclically.
Differently from Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Chevalier and Scharfstein 
(1996) explain countercyclical mark-ups in a model with capital-market imperfections 
and customer’s switching-costs. When firms need to raise debt, they may default. For 
this reason, firms have less incentive to build market share because they are not sure 
to receive the future benefits of the investment. Thus, since the probability of default 
is particularly high during recessions, capital-market imperfections tend to generate 
countercyclical mark-ups. Chevalier and Scharfstein also claim that the economic 
mechanism they devise is in contrast with the logic of "tacit collusion" exploited by 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986): in fact, if "liquidity constraints" were introduced into 
the model of Rotemberg and Saloner, procyclical mark-ups would arise.
We tackle Chevalier and Scharfstein’s claim explicitly, showing that it is not 
generally correct. The formal argument in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) boils down 
to the assumption that, for a firm, the probability of surviving a period of recession is 
strictly less than one. We adopt this characterisation in the context of Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1986) and find that, depending on the values of parameters, the modified 
model can generate both procyclical and anticyclical mark-ups. In the latter case, we 
also show that mark-ups are more anticyclical than the ones corresponding to the 
original Rotemberg and Saloner’s model.
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Chapter I
EFFICIENCY WAGES WITH O-RING PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS. 
The Effects of Technological Change 
on Unemployment and Within-Group Wage Inequality.
Introduction.
In the last few years, the labour market implications of technological change 
have captured both the public’s and economists’ attention. On the one side, non- 
academic press has put very much emphasis on the apocalyptic views expressed by 
Jeremy Rifkin’s End of Work. According to Rifkin, the pervasive changes brought about 
by technological advancements (especially for what it concerns information technology) 
are going to destroy an unprecedented number of jobs. On the other side, labour 
economists have been concentrating more and more on the increase in wage dispersion 
observed during the eighties and the beginning of the nineties in the U.S. and the U.K. 
(see the OECD Employment Outlook (1996)). This topic has been another relevant 
argument of debate in the American press, since it is closely related to the so-called 
"deindustrialization” process and the much feared vanishing of middle-class jobs.
In this Chapter, we look at the effects of technical change on wage-levels, 
unemployment and wage-differentials by assuming that firms are competitive and set 
wages on the basis of efficiency considerations. The notion of technology we use is 
Kremer’s (1993) "O-Ring" theory of production. Complex technologies require that 
several tasks are performed in the production process. However, the higher the number 
of tasks, the greater the probability that something goes wrong during production and 
output is destroyed. We modify the original Kremer’s approach by assuming that the 
probability that each task is correctly performed depends, through effort, on the wage 
paid to the worker. We can thus look at technological change as a process that makes 
available new production technologies over time. Such new processes entail different 
degrees of complexity. In particular, when technical progress moves exogenously 
towards higher complexity in production, our model predicts that firms will have 
incentive to pay higher wages. Since complicated technologies are relatively more risky, 
higher wages elicit greater effort and, thus, increase the probability that each task will 
be performed successfully. Moreover, assuming that the worker’s effort function is also 
increasing in the rate of unemployment, we show that the higher wage level involved 
by greater complexity in production causes higher unemployment in equilibrium. 
Similar results are obtained when the choice of technological complexity is 
endogeneised and progress affects, for example, the probability of success in 
production: even in this case, firms will have an incentive to adopt more sophisticated 
production process and pay higher wages over time. As a consequence, the
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unemployment rate will increase. Thus, if technological change were to be seen as a 
force that pushes only towards increasing complexity in production (for example, one 
may consider the Challenger spacecraft as a natural evolution of the aircraft industry), 
the fears of those who think that new technologies destroy jobs would be well 
grounded. However, historical experience stands against a positive correlation between 
technical change and unemployment. In contrast with Rifkin’s view, it is also 
implausible to think that the present spread of information technology (computers, 
software and advanced telecommunication systems) is to be seen as a more pervasive 
and traumatic event than was the adoption of steam-engines in the nineteenth century 
or electric-powered machinery in the first two decades of this century.
Since technological change does not seem to imply necessarily higher 
unemployment1, we turn our focus to a different question: is it possible to explain 
wage differentials among workers of the same quality through the relation between 
technology and wages that we devise? The question is a relevant one, both empirically 
and theoretically. As Levy and Murnane (1992) emphasise, there is much empirical 
evidence that stresses the relevance of what is known as within-group inequality: 
workers of the same observed quality in terms of gender, age/experience and education 
receive very different wages depending on the firm, or plant, that employs them (see, 
e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger (1991)). This deviation from what competitive wage theory 
predicts2 has been theoretically justified by the two-sector efficiency wage model 
developed by Bulow and Summers (1986). In that paper, there is a primary sector (say, 
manufacturing) where production processes can only be imperfectly monitored. Primary 
sector wages, thus, must induce workers not to shirk. On the other hand, since workers 
in the secondary sector can be perfectly monitored on the workplace, they are paid the 
competitive wage. Thus, in Bulow and Summers’ paper, between-sector wage 
differentials among workers of the same quality arise simply because of different 
abilities to monitor. Our approach provides a different story. Consider two firms (or 
sectors) characterised by different degrees of complexity in the technology they adopt. 
Even if the ability to monitor is the same in every production process, different wages 
will still be paid to workers of the same quality. In particular, firms adopting less 
sophisticated technologies will pay lower wages: in fact, less complexity ensures a 
reasonably high probability of success in production even when workers provide less 
effort. Also in our model, then, wages do not necessarily reward skills in equilibrium:
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simply, some "lucky" workers get high wages, while other workers of the same ability 
are paid low wages.
Bertola and Ichino (1995) propose a different interpretation for the existing 
within-group wage dispersion in flexible labour markets, such as the American and the 
British ones. Even when workers have homogeneous skills, firms that are subject to 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks are willing to pay different wages. If workers face 
strictly positive costs in moving from "bad" to "good" firms, wage differentials will 
arise in equilibrium. Moreover, when firm-level productivity shocks become less 
persistent (a measure of increasing "turbulence"), wage differentials will become larger.
We believe that our technology-based approach3 may have some advantages 
with respect to Bulow and Summers (1986) and Bertola and Ichino (1995). In reference 
to Bulow and Summers’ paper, we explicitly focus on differences in production 
technologies, rather than different monitoring technologies among firms or sectors. On 
the other hand, it is quite hard to relate Bertola and Ichino’s measure of shock 
persistence, which affects the stability of firms’ labour demand curves, to a precise 
notion of technical change.
Technological change has been one of the main suspects for increased wage 
dispersion during the eighties. A large emphasis has been given, in particular, to the 
impact of "skill-biased technical change" on between-group wage dispersion4. 
However, by a theoretical point of view, the dynamic evolution of within-group wage 
inequality, ever growing from 1963 to 1989 in the U.S.5, is hardly explained. We 
modify our basic model by supposing that the firms in the economy may have 
incentives to implement technologies that entail a diverging degree of sophistication. 
For instance, certain firms may tend to make their products more sophisticated (e.g., 
Ferrari’s or Bentleys), while others may tend to simplify and standardise their product 
(e.g., Fiat or Ford). Under this hypothesis, we show that technological progress implies 
rising inter-firm wage differentials while it has ambiguous effects on the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. These predictions seem to be consistent with U.S. and British data.
In conclusion, we do not directly answer the important question raised by Levy 
and Murnane (1992):
"..why do some firms respond to increasing competitive pressures by out­
sourcing, speeding up production lines, and demanding wage and benefits givebacks 
from unions, while others invest in training and reorganising production so as to 
improve quality and manage costs?" (p. 1374)
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Our model, however, justifies formally the Levy and Murnane’s conjecture on 
the consequences of these market transformations:
"It may be that these different strategies reflect the organisation of the market. 
Some firms may choose to compete for larger shares of standardised products produced 
by low wage workers carrying out relatively simple tasks. Other firms may choose to 
taylor production to a high value-added, high quality product at the upper end of the 
same market. Both strategies may prove successful in generating profits, but with quite 
different consequences for workers’ wages." (p. 1374)
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 develops the basic model, 
relating the wage level to the degree of technological complexity. Section 2 extends the 
basic model to analyse investment in monitoring intensity. Section 3 considers the 
degree of complexity in production as endogenous. Section 4 develops a model with 
heterogeneous firms, in order to analyse the issue of wage differentials. Section 5 
extends the model in Sect.4 to consider the issue of minimum wages. We show that the 
introduction of a wage legislation, while artificially constraining wage dispersion, has 
a theoretically ambiguous impact on the unemployment rate. Section 6 concludes. In 
Appendices I-II-III we give the micro-foundations of the models analysed in Sect. 1 and 
Sect.4 by following the asset-equation approach (see Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)). In 
Appendix V we sketch a simple extension of the model where, for given workers’ 
effort, some tasks have a better chance of success than others. When workers of higher 
quality perform the more difficult tasks, we obtain some interesting predictions about 
between-group wage inequality.
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1. The Basic Model.
In the present model, we treat the worker’s incentive problem by adopting a 
standard formulation for the "effort-function". A worker produces e units of effort 
depending on both the relative wage she receives, w/w0, and the unemployment rate u. 
Thus:
e = e
( w— ,W
wo ,
where w is the real wage paid by the firm considered and w0 is the average wage paid 
in the economy. Workers are willing to produce more effort when they are paid 
relatively better. Higher unemployment induces to work harder and it also reduces the 
wage-effect over effort.6 Appendix I shows in detail that, by adopting an "asset- 
equation" approach of the kind of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), one can derive an effort 
equation which has the same characteristics as those postulated in (1) if, (i) the 
instantaneous utility function of the individual is multiplicative in wage and effort 
disutility (i.e., U=wf(e), mthf(O) = 1 andf’(e)<0) and, (ii) the unemployment benefit 
is proportional to the average wage w0, i.e., the benefit is equal to p-w0, with pE  [0,1).
As far as technology is concerned, we adopt the "O-Ring Production Function", 
discussed in Kremer (1993). This technology characterises the production process 
through the number of tasks, n, that it entails. The parameter n can be interpreted as 
an index of the complexity of the technology adopted. We assume for simplicity that 
each task is performed by a single worker7. However, while Kremer’s analysis is built 
on workers that are characterised by different levels of skills, here each worker has the 
same ability, and the probability that her performance is successful depends positively 
on the level of effort exerted. The probability that the worker’s performance at a task 
i turns out to be successful is measured by ^ 6 (0 ,1 ). qt can be seen as the expected 
fraction of product’s maximum value that is retained when the worker executes the task. 
We thus have that q ^ q fe ) ,  with q{> 0  and q f ’^O, where e is defined in (1). We 
abstract from capital. B denotes the output per worker if all the tasks are performed 
perfectly. Since a firm obtains nB with probability Ufa, the (expected) level of revenues 
for given n is:
12
y  =
i=l
nB (2)
Firms are risk-neutral and competitive.
In Kremer’s problem, the firm chooses the degree of skill of the workers to be 
employed by referring to an (exogenously given) upward sloping wage-skill curve. By 
contrast, here the firm has to pick the wage to be paid to each worker, so to induce the 
optimal level of effort. The profit maximisation problem is then:
max
{w<}
(  n
n w n ; * ) ]
V » = i
\ (  n \
nB  - I > <
/ [i=1 )
(3)
By imposing symmetry (wi=Wj=w for all (if)) on the system of the first order 
conditions relative to problem (3), we obtain the following condition:
_ i = o
wn
(4)
Combining equation (4) with the zero-profit condition qnnB=nw gives:
w
Wr
(5)
Condition (5) corresponds, in the present model, to the "Solow Condition" in 
efficiency wage theory and it implicitly defines the optimal level of the relative wage, 
w*/w0, for given n. Since (5) depends explicitly on n, it allows one to discuss the 
effects of "technical change" (seen as a change in the degree of complexity of the 
technology adopted) on the equilibrium level of wage. This feature is peculiar to our 
model. In fact, when "Hicks-neutral" or "Harrod-neutral" technological progress are 
considered, technical change does not affect the optimal level of wage as derived by the 
standard version of the Solow Condition8.
By differentiation of (5), we obtain the following:
Result 1. For a given level of unemployment u, an increase in the degree of 
technological complexity increases the equilibrium efficiency-wage level, i.e. dw /dn>0.
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The intuition behind Result 1 is rather immediate. For any given level of 
performance q, a more complicated technology adds new tasks that decrease the 
expected fraction <f of production’s maximum value, nB. Thus, the firm finds it 
convenient to raise wages in order to induce higher performance.
Condition (5), which holds at firm-level, can also be used to give a General 
Equilibrium characterisation of the economy. Assuming9 that in general equilibrium 
all firms set the same wage level, w=w0, the equilibrium unemployment level u is 
implicitly defined by the following:
q'[e(l-,u')\ <?„(!;»*) ^  (6)
<?[e(l;«*)] " n
By differentiating (6) we obtain:
Result 2. The equilibrium unemployment level is increasing in the degree of 
technological complexity, i.e. du/dn> 0.
Results 1 and 2 have neat implications. If Kremer’s notion that industrial 
development can be characterised in terms of increasingly more complicated production 
processes, then the (exogenous) growth of n would entail higher wages for a decreasing 
number of employed workers. Many observers have indeed embraced such a pessimistic 
view on technological progress, with particular concern for the spreading of information 
technology. However, "despite a huge investment in computing and so on over the past 
decade, unemployment in the United States, at around 5.5%, is currently no higher than 
it was in the early 1960s" {The Economist, 11 February 1995). We will tackle this 
controversy in Sect.4.
We briefly discuss now the welfare implications of the private effort choice, as 
denoted by e*. For simplicity, we take unemployment benefits to be equal to zero. The 
social planner maximises the representative individual’s expected utility, EU, which is 
equal to (1-u)-wf(e) = (l-u)fq(e)n-Bf(e)J.
There are two possible notions of social optimum to investigate. Under the First- 
Best notion, we suppose that the planner can monitor the individual’s effort choice
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perfectly and, hence, pick e ^  directly. By contrast, under the Second-Best notion (see 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)), we assume that the planner can only monitor individuals 
imperfectly. Then, the second-best effort level e?B will be determined by maximising 
EU with respect to the unemployment rate, subject to the effort function e=e(l,u). The 
solution to this problem gives the "optimal rate of unemployment", u?B.
As remarked by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the privately-chosen level of effort 
is generally inefficient. By using the asset-equation approach developed in Appendix I, 
we show that private choices entail an inefficiently low level of effort, since it holds 
that e*<eSB<eFB (see Appendix II). However, as there is a positive relation between 
effort and unemployment, it also follows that the "natural rate" of unemployment (u )  
is lower than the optimal rate of unemployment {iFB). This result is in contrast with the 
conclusion reached by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), where the natural rate of 
unemployment is inefficiently high. In Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) firms require a fixed 
amount of effort, while here higher effort always raises expected returns. Nonetheless, 
each firm has rather limited incentives to pay higher wages, since part of the benefits 
from it would be captured by workers through a higher utility level10. Thus, as firms 
are satisfied with a relatively low level of effort, the "natural rate" of unemployment 
in the decentralised (symmetric) equilibrium is relatively low.
In the next section we test the robustness of the results obtained so far by 
allowing for endogenous monitoring.
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2. Endogenously-determined Monitoring Intensity.
Our model can be easily extended to consider the firm’s monitoring choice. 
There are two considerations that make monitoring relevant. First, monitoring, or more 
in general "supervision", is empirically relevant11. Second, the simple model 
developed above neglects the possibility that, when the degree of complexity in 
production increases, the firm may increase its monitoring intensity instead of raising 
the wage.
We assume that the firm can decide to monitor the worker appointed to the zth 
task with intensity mi at a cost given by > 0, with M ’>0  and M ” >0. Since more 
intense monitoring induces a worker to produce more effort, we now have that the zth- 
worker’s effort function takes the form:
et =  * > (e w’e rr)> ®’ (e ww>e mn)<®  ^
For given «, the profit-maximisation problem becomes:
/  n \  (  n n
max n Q[e{w/ wo’mi>u)\nB - (8)
V,=i / i=l i=l
Solving problem (8) and imposing symmetry (w ^W j^w  and mi=mj=m1 for all 
(z,y) = l,..,n ) gives the optimal combination between w and m:
ew w o (9)
e m M'(m)
In order to make the argument more intuitive, we provide an example.
Example. Consider the following performance function: q=[e-s]^, with # > 0 for 
e> s and q = 0 otherwise; s is a strictly positive constant ensuring that the function q is 
concave only locally, while the parameter <f> lies in the interval (0,1). The effort 
function is a Cobb-Douglas: e=(wi/w(J a(mj) 1~af(u), where oE  (0,1) and f(u) is an 
increasing function of the unemployment rate u. The monitoring cost is taken to be 
linear in the monitoring intensity, M(m) =nmh p> 0. After solving for the optimum and 
imposing symmetry {rn =m and wt=w for all z), it turns out that the ratio between wage 
level and monitoring intensity is constant in equilibrium:
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— = = const. (10)
m l - o
Thus, an increase of n will have a positive effect both on w and m, so to leave 
their ratio unaltered.
Wage and monitoring are the "inputs" through which firms increase workers’ 
performance. As shown by the example, the explicit consideration of monitoring does 
not generally eliminate wage increases when more sophisticated technologies are 
adopted (Result 1). For this reason, we will abstract from the monitoring investment 
choice in what follows.
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3. Endogenous Choice of n.
The discussion above considered n, the degree of technological complexity, as 
exogenous. However, entrepreneurs may often choose among currently available 
production processes that have different sophistication. In this case, the maximum 
problem in (3) is to be solved also with respect to n .12 We assume that the term B is 
increasing in n (see Kremer (1993,p.561)): in particular, B=B(n), with B ’> 0 and 
B ” < 0. Exploiting symmetry, the maximand can be rewritten as follows:
max q\e(wlw0;u} 1" nB(n) -  nw  (11)
w/t
Since zero-profit implies w=qnB, the first-order condition for n can be given the
form:
— —- = -log# (12)
Bin)
As in Kremer (1993,p.562), equation (12) entails a positive relation between n and q. 
Hence, equation (12), like the efficiency-wage condition (5), implies that n is increasing 
in wage w. As shown in Figure 1, equation (5) is steeper than equation (12) at the 
equilibrium levels (w*,n*)12,u.
We next try to investigate which are the exogenous forces that may lead to 
technological change.
3.1. What does drive Technological Change over Time?
According to (12), firms choose the optimal degree of technological complexity 
n* from a given menu of possibilities defined in [nmin, Thus, whenever n* is an 
internal solution (i.e., «mt>l<7i*</iiW/4X), what can modify the economic incentive to 
adopt technologies of different complexity over time?
By referring to equation (12), there are two possibilities for representing the role 
of time on the optimal choice of n. We can first suppose that the ratio B ’(n)/B(n) is a 
positive function of time. In this case, the incremental gains associated to more complex 
technologies increase relatively fast over time. This presumption might be justified in 
terms of tougher competition from Less Developed Countries15. Alternatively, we can 
suppose that the performance function q(e) is increasing over time for any given level
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of effort. This would be the case when "experience" gives the firm greater chances to 
prevent mistakes in production.
By referring to Figure 1, consider first the case when the ratio B ’(n)/B(n) grows 
over time16: in this case, the curve representing equation (12) shifts upwards17, 
while the curve relative to equation (5) does not move. As a consequence, an increasing 
(B’/B) ratio implies higher wage levels, higher technological complexity and, as we 
know from Result 2, a higher unemployment rate over time.
Consider now the case when q is increasing in time and the ratio q ’/q in (5) is 
time-independent18. By increasing the level of q for any given wage level, the curve 
(12) will shift upwards over time. Again, wages, technological complexity and 
unemployment will rise over time.
Hence, by making plausible assumptions on the way time may affect technical 
progress, our model can justify the presence of a secular trend towards the adoption of 
processes that increase unemployment, as feared by modern "technophobics". Time 
becomes the driving force leading to changes in n and, hence, to changes in wage level 
and unemployment. The question, however, is: can technical change only be 
characterised through "increasing sophistication", as Kremer (1993) seems to hint? In 
many cases, change can also be seen as "increasing simplification" of production 
processes. For example, "Fordism" made car production a great deal easier than the 
craftsmanship methods of the twenties’ automobile industry. From a more formal 
viewpoint, we can look at technical change by removing the assumption that optimal 
technologies can be characterised as internal solutions of equation (12). In what follows, 
we will consider what happens when different firms are constrained to adopt comer 
technologies. For instance, some firms’ "ideal", but still unavailable, technology may 
be more complex than the currently adopted one (formally, it holds that (B7B)>- 
log(q)). On the other hand, some firms’ "ideal" technology may be simpler than the 
available one (for those firms, it holds that (B7B) < -log(q)). As we are going to show 
in the next paragraph, this simple characterisation allows us to relate technical change 
(seen as a two-sided broadening of the boundaries of the currently available techniques, 
[nmin,nMAXJ) to vi&gz-differentials and unemployment rate.
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4. A Model with Heterogeneous Firms.
The model developed above can be extended to analyse within-group wage 
inequality. As we will show, between-firm differences in technologies generate within- 
group wage differentials in equilibrium. In what follows, we will mainly refer to 
heterogeneous firms in the same industry: such differences can be justified by "market 
segmentation" caused by vertical differentiation of the goods produced. The same 
model, however, can also be used to look at between-'m&ustry or between-sector 
differences (e.g., manufacturing vs. services sector)19.
Assume that, for some reason20, some firms (indexed by h) adopt technologies 
that are relatively sophisticated, while other firms (indexed by /) adopt technologies that 
are relatively simple. Formally, we have that ril>nl. Since the number of tasks is 
exogenously given, the economy can be simply described in terms of two efficiency- 
wage conditions relative to the types of firms (h,l) we consider. Thus, each h-type firm 
must respect the optimizing rule:
firm), relative to a measure of the average wages paid outside, w0. Also, effort is 
increasing in the unemployment rate (Appendix III provides an asset-equation 
foundation of the model developed here). We postulate that:
firms. The parameter /3E (0,1) represents the proportion of workers who are employed 
by "high-tech" firms.
Equations (13)-(14) hold at firm-level. In symmetric General Equilibrium, we
q'-eJw^WpU) ( w *\ i (13)
while the corresponding rule for a /-type firm is:
(14)
As before, the effort function is increasing in the wage vf1 (m/) paid by a h-firm (/-
w0 = pw* + (1-P)w0' (15)
where w0h and w0l are, respectively, the wage levels paid on average by h and /-type
impose that vt/*= w0h and m/= w01. The wage ratio wVw/, measuring wage-dispersion,
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is defined as A. We can then rewrite (13) and (14) respectively as:
<?/gw /  A 1 (16)
q PA +(1-P) n k
P A + ( 1 - P )
1
n
1 (17)
For given technological parameters the system (16)-(17) is composed of two
equations in two unknowns: the equilibrium wage ratio A, and the equilibrium 
unemployment rate u. The following result holds:
different complexity, there are inter-firm wage differentials in equilibrium.21
As in the models of Bertola and Ichino (1995) and Bulow and Summers (1986), 
similar workers receive different wages in equilibrium, depending on the employer’s 
type. Here, as well as in Bulow and Summer (1986), wages are set by firms on the 
basis of efficiency consideration. Indeed, high-tech firms will reject the bid of a worker 
who offers her labour services for less than the efficiency-wage level. Thus, even in the 
absence of productivity shocks of the kind advocated by Bertola and Ichino (1995), the 
amount a worker is paid may simply be a matter of "luck”. Note also that, since n is 
likely to be correlated with plant-size, our model is consistent with the positive relation 
observed between plant-size and wages. Also, according to Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1991,p. 173), plant-size accounted for 40% of the rise in between-plant wage dispersion 
for production workers between 1963 and 1980: as we are going to show, this 
observation is consistent with the present approach. In fact, our simple model can be 
immediately used to generate some results on the dynamics of the wage differential and 
the unemployment rate. The ensuing discussion on the forces that may lead to 
increasing wage dispersion is based on the following result:
Result 4. Suppose that nh> nl, so that A> 1. When technological progress is 
represented through changes in the levels o f rt1 and nl, the wage ratio A* and the
Result 3. When T^>nl, A* >1 holds: if firms adopt production process of
21
unemployment rate u* will vary as follows: dA*/dnh>0, dA*/dnl<0, and du*/dnh>0, 
du*/dnl> 0 22
The relevance of Result 4 can be better appreciated in the light of the following 
observations. Relative to the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s have been marked by deep 
changes in the characteristics of both the technologies adopted23 and the product 
markets. As conjectured by Levy and Murnane (1992), "the variation in competitive 
strategies among firms in particular industries...may reflect a stable approach to an 
increasingly segmented product market” that turns out to produce "low wage strategies 
or high wage strategies" (p. 1369). We do not try here to provide a theoretical 
justification as why markets have become increasingly segmented since the 1970s. We 
simply suppose that, in a given industry, greater market segmentation will push some 
firms (possibly those that target high-quality products) to adopt more sophisticated 
technologies, while other firms (possibly those that target lower-quality products) are 
seeking to adopt simpler technologies. Many examples can be found. While 
McDonald’s in Oxford Street might be willing to adopt automatic devices to flip 
hamburgers, "San Lorenzo" restaurant in Knightsbridge (Lady Diana’s favourite) might 
like to have more people preparing food in the kitchen, so to provide more variety in 
its menu. Similarly, while Airbus aircraft company might like to introduce more and 
more sophisticated automatic flight equipment (so to have a quality edge with respect 
to Boeing airplanes), tourist aircraft producer Cessna might like to produce cheaper and 
less sophisticated airplanes for amatorial pilots. Then, we can suppose that some firms 
would like to adopt processes which, if they were available at present, would imply 
more tasks than the ones performed under the current technology: in the notation used 
above, we may think of these firms as h-type ones. On the other side, other firms might 
like to adopt simpler processes, in terms of tasks, than the ones currently used: these 
firms can be thought of as I-type ones. In this perspective, (exogenous) technical change 
is a force that makes available over time both more and less sophisticated production 
processes. This view is consistent with Levy and Murnane’s (1992,p. 1369) observation 
about the trends of U.S. manufacturing in the last twenty-five years:
"Some manufacturing firms...have increased out-sourcing, thereby reducing the 
need for production workers, and have used electronic based technology to simplify 
jobs, and increase monitoring...These responses are consistent with low wage levels. 
Other firms have reorganised production and retrained workers to make greater use of
22
workers’ knowledge in increasing quality levels and lowering costs...These responses 
are consistent with high wage levels".
We can now appreciate the implications of Result 4. To fix ideas, consider the 
case when nh=nl, implying that the wage-ratio A is initially equal to one. According 
to our notion of technological change time makes available new technologies, some 
more and some less sophisticated than the existing ones24. In periods of increasing 
product market segmentation, certain firms will have an incentive to adopt processes 
that involve a greater number of tasks (nh rises), while other firms will utilise processes 
involving a smaller number of tasks (nl falls). From this viewpoint, Result 4 has two 
main consequences, which are consistent with the labour market developments that have 
been observed during the 1970s and the 1980s. First, our notion of technological 
progress can explain the increasing wage dispersion in equilibrium, due both to the 
increase in nl1 and the decline in rt. The second consequence is that technological 
progress has ambiguous effects on the equilibrium unemployment rate. While the 
increase in ri1 pushes towards higher unemployment, the decrease in ri has the opposite 
effect: as a consequence, the aggregate effect on u is a priori uncertain. Hence, the 
present model is consistent with the view that technical progress has not to entail, as 
many fear, an increasingly higher level of unemployment. At the same time, however, 
technological change may be the main force leading to rising wage differentials among 
workers who have the same characteristics in terms of age, education, etc.
The increasing technological heterogeneity among firms, as well as the high 
degree of market segmentation which have been observed since the 1970s are not 
necessarily, however, an irreversible trend. By an historical point of view for example, 
the U.S. experience of the 1960s was characterised by constant (if not decreasing) 
within-group wage dispersion (see, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992)). In the same period 
many industries, such as the automobile business, were heading for mass-production 
methods that routinised several tasks of the production process. In general, when 
innovative technologies become mature over time, sophisticated firms will have the 
chance to adopt more standardised techniques that reduce aggregate riskiness in 
production: in our model, this implies that nh may fall relative to ri. It can thus be 
argued that some historical periods, such as the Industrial Revolution, are characterised 
by big technological innovations that increase the degree of heterogeneity among 
sectors, industries or firms {jforl rises). For these periods, our model unambiguously
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predicts increasing wage inequality. However, big technological changes tend to be 
followed by periods in which the new technologies are eventually automated or 
routinised. In these phases, the degree of technological heterogeneity among firms may 
decrease {rP/n1 falls), so to reduce wage dispersion.
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5. Minimum Wage Legislation.
We finally sketch the consequences of minimum wage legislation in our model. 
As emphasised by Bertola and Ichino (1995), labour markets in most developed 
countries can be divided into "flexible" and "rigid" ones. The U.S. and British labour 
markets belong to the first group: in those markets, the role of institutions (minimum 
wage regulations, job-security provisions, unions, etc.) is very limited. By contrast, 
European countries such as France have collective bargaining systems and minimum 
wage regulations (see Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (1995)). In Italy, the 
mechanism of the scala mobile was such as to compress wage dispersion (see Erickson 
and Ichino (1995)). As commonly observed25, "flexible" labour markets tend to 
generate high and increasing wage dispersion coupled with a relatively low 
unemployment rate. On the other side, "rigid" labour markets severely constrain wage- 
inequality at the cost of high unemployment.
Minimum wage regulations are generally considered a relevant source of 
"rigidity" in labour markets. However, the presumption that minimum wages have 
negative effects on employment is, both theoretically26 and empirically, far from 
being uncontroversial. As Machin and Manning (1995,p .667) put it, "quite a lot of 
empirical evidence has been accumulated in recent years that fails to find any evidence 
of job loss associated to minimum wages". The model developed in Sect.4 can be easily 
used to address this issue. Figure 2 represents the Solow-conditions relative to high and 
low-tech firms (equations (16)-(17)): their intersection at (u*,A*) represents the 
equilibrium attained in the absence of wage regulations. Consider now the impact of a 
minimum wage legislation as an artificial compression of the wage differential, i.e., 
A0<A*. Assume, in particular, that low wages must not be smaller than a fraction 
a E  (0,1) of high wages, i.e., min{\^}=a\^1. When binding, such a legislation has two 
effects: it raises low wages (wVw0) and it reduces high wages (\^/w 0) with respect to 
their respective equilibrium levels27. Thus, it will hold that:
(18)
and
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g / g w {  )  <  ±
q p +(l-P)oe J
(19)
Expression (18) implies that high-tech firms pay wages that are inadequately low, 
relatively to the complexity of the technology they currently adopt {ri1). Conversely, 
according to (19), low-tech firms pay wages that are too high with respect to the 
technology used (nl). Thus, when wage differentials are artificially reduced to A0, wage 
regulations are bound to have an impact on the equilibrium choice of technology itself. 
Consistently with the analysis of Sect.4, suppose that the technologies adopted by high- 
tech firms and low-tech firms are such that B ’(nh)/B(nh) > -log(q) and B ’(nl)/B(nl)< -  
log(q), respectively. An artificial reduction of wage differentials has opposite effects on 
the two types of firms. By decreasing q in the high-tech firms, a lower differential 
incentivates the choice of relatively less sophisticated technologies. By contrast, the 
higher level of q in low-tech firms makes simpler technologies less profitable. As a 
consequence, ri1 tends to decrease, while ri tends to rise in the new "minimum-wage” 
equilibrium. In terms of the Solow-conditions (16)-(17) represented in Figure 2, a 
decrease in ri\ together with an increase in ri, imply a downward shift for both curves 
(see Figure 3), where A0 marks the maximum level of wage dispersion that legislation 
can tolerate. In conclusion, the final effect of a minimum wage legislation on 
unemployment is a priori ambiguous28, even if the model still predicts that countries 
with wage regulations will exhibit less wage-inequality. Note also that heterogeneous 
firms that are subject to wage regulation will tend to adopt technologies which are 
relatively more similar in terms of sophistication.
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6. Concluding Remarks.
The simple model we developed builds upon two main components: Kremer’s 
(1993) "O-Ring" production function and the efficiency-wage principle. We showed that 
when a firm adopts a more sophisticated technology, it will have an incentive to pay 
higher wages, to reduce the probability of workers’ mis-performance. Elaborating on 
this basic result, we obtained predictions which are quite consistent with the empirical 
facts observed for the U.S. and British labour markets, especially for what it concerns 
within-group wage inequality. Within-group wage inequality and its dynamics over the 
last decades are both an extremely relevant empirical phenomenon and a theoretical 
problem in labour economics. Our model, as Bulow and Summers (1986) and Bertola 
and Ichino (1995), is able to provide a reason for the presence of within-group wage 
dispersion in equilibrium and gives some possible suggestions as far as the causes of 
increasing wage dispersion are concerned.
There is a very common critique to models of wage dispersion that are based on 
homogeneous workers. In fact, the supporters of competitive wage theory argue that, 
if two workers receive different wages, they must have different skills. In reality, those 
who are defined as "within-group" employees are a very composite aggregate of 
different workers that the existing data-sets, like the U.S. Current Population Survey, 
cannot appropriately sort out. As Murphy (1995) argues:
"..what we call within-group wage and employment variation is not variation in 
labor-market outcomes for identical workers. Rather, all of our observed groups are 
very heterogeneous collections of workers with various skills and talents" (p.57).
As a consequence, if workers’ unmeasured attributes could be correctly 
accounted for, the residual variation captured by "within-group" dispersion would be 
drastically reduced. Such a line of argument obviously contains some validity and it 
may help understanding why within-group inequality has not received very much 
attention by labour economists. However, a better measurement of the workers’ actual 
characteristics might still not be sufficient to settle the controversy in favour of the 
competitive wage theory. Consider the following example, based on the logic of our 
model. Suppose that, ex-ante, there are two perfectly identical workers in terms of 
skills and talents. One of them is lucky and is hired by a high-wage company which 
adopts very sophisticated production processes. The other is unlucky and is hired by a
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low-wage company that uses unsophisticated technologies. If those workers’ skills were 
measured after some time that they have been employed, it would be quite unsurprising 
to discover that, ex-post, they have developed different abilities. It is quite plausible, 
in fact, that the lucky worker has learned quite a lot from being exposed to more 
sophisticated production methods requiring more intensive effort. On the other hand, 
the unlucky worker might have learned much less, or even forgot, since she was 
exposed to a much less demanding environment. Hence, finding that different skills are 
paid different wages may still not be conclusive evidence in favour of the competitive 
view on wage determination.
Finally, we believe that our model can be fruitfully exploited to analyse wage 
differentials among workers of different quality {between-gxoup wage inequality). 
Appendix V sketches a simple extension of the model in this direction.
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Appendix I
Asset-Equation foundation of the Effort-Function
The individual worker’s instantaneous utility is taken to be multiplicative in 
wage and effort disutility f(e), which is U(w,e)=wf(e), where f(0 )= l and f ’(e)<0. As 
in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we denote by b and r, respectively, the exogenous 
turnover rate of workers per unit time and the discount rate. The probability of being 
caught and fired when shirking is ir. We define VE as the expected lifetime utility of 
an employed shirker, as the expected lifetime utility of a worker who does not 
shirk, and Vv  as the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed.
For a shirker, we have that:
/•Kj = + (A1-l)
while for a non-shirker it holds that:
rV% = w f i e ) +b(vu-V%) (A1-2)
By imposing the no-shirking condition (NSC) >  VES, one obtains that the 
wage the firm has to pay in equilibrium is:
rn  V,
vv. = u (A1.3)
1 /(e.)(r+&+ir)-(r+&)
Assuming that the unemployment benefit is a constant fraction p E [0,1) of the 
average wage paid in the economy, w0, the asset equation for Vv  is given by:
rVv  = p w0+a(v°E- V v) (Al-4)
where a denotes the job acquisition rate. VE° is the average expected utility of an 
employed worker when the average effort level and the average wage paid in 
equilibrium in the economy are, respectively, e0 and w0. Thus, similarly to (A1.2), we 
obtain that VE°=[w(f(e0)+bVuJ/(r+b). By substituting VE° into (A 1.4), and using the 
result to substitute for Vv  in (A 1.3), we obtain that:
= rc [p( r+ f r)+a / feo)3 
w0 (r+b+a) [fe^r+b+Ti) -(r+b)]
which yields an expression for the relative wage (w/Wq). From (A 1.5) we can
29
immediately derive the effort function:
-  /-iet = / (r+b+n)
-l (wa it[p  (r+b)+afie,)\ VI— •-------------------- — + (r+fc)
w. (r+b+a)
(A1.6)
where denotes the inverse of function f(.). By noting that in steady-state 
equilibrium it holds that a=b[(l-u)/u], it can be readily checked that the effort function 
in (A 1.6) satisfies to the conditions that we postulated for equation (1) in the text: in 
particular, effort is a function of the relative wage (w/w0), and bei/bwi>0, dejbu>0, 
d2ei/dwi2 < 0, d2ei/du2 < 0, d2ei/(dwldu) < 0.
30
Appendix n
Inefficiency of the Private Effort Choice
The social efficiency of the private effort choice is analysed by exploiting the 
results found in Appendix I. For simplicity, we set the level of unemployment benefits 
to zero (p= 0). When one re-considers the wage choice laid down in problem (3), 
subject to the effort equation (A 1.6), private optimality implies the respect of the 
following first-order condition:
Since (fB= w  and, in general equilibrium, w=w0 and e=e0, the effort level induced by 
private choices (e*) solves:
One can assess the efficiency of the private effort choice by comparing it with 
the solution to the central planner’s problem. We distinguish between two possible 
notions of efficiency: the First-Best solution, when the planner is able to pick effort 
directly, and the Second-Best solution, when the planner can only induce the desired 
level of effort through the choice of the optimal rate of unemployment.
First-Best Solution. When the benevolent social planner can monitor workers 
perfectly, he can pick the desired level of effort directly, and the first-best solution ^  
maximises the representative worker’s expected utility:
Since the r.h.s. of (A2.4) is smaller than the r.h.s. of (A2.2) for any given level of e,
Second-Best Solution (Optimal Rate o f Unemployment). When even a central 
planner cannot perfectly monitor workers, the first-best effort level can not be enforced.
yf1 (r+b+n)(r+b+a)
(A2A)
nSL = ~ /(g) (r+b+Tt)(r+b+d)
q < ffp) i an
(A2.2)
max (1 -u) [q(e)n B -fie)] (A2.3)
e
The first-order condition relative to (A2.3) can be rearranged to give:
(A2.4)
q { M  }
the first-best effort level is greater than the privately optimal one, which is, eFB>e*.
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Suppose however that, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the planner can choose the 
unemployment rate level so as to maximise the representative worker’s expected utility. 
Under symmetry (w=w0,^=e0), effort incentives only depend on the unemployment rate 
through the steady-state flow condition a=b[(l-u)/u]. In particular, the effort function 
(A 1.6) takes the following form:
By solving problem (A2.3), subject to (A2.5), with respect to u, one obtains, 
after some manipulations:
Compare the r.h.s. of (A2.6) with the r.h.s. of (A2.2). After some trivial calculations,
one, e*. In particular, it holds that e*<eSB<eFB. Moreover, since there is a positive 
relation between effort and unemployment, the socially optimal level of unemployment 
u?B is higher than the "natural" rate u*.
r+a+b (A2.5)
71 —
S i  = ' -f(e)-(r+b+a+n)2-b + ' -f(e )  
q { an (a+b) J { fie) ,
(A2.6)
it can be shown that the second-best effort level e?B is higher than the privately-optimal
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Appendix in
Asset-Equation Foundation of the Model with Heterogeneous Firms
The Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) approach can be extended to the case where 
heterogeneous firms (h-type and /-type firms) pay efficiency wages. We assume that the 
monitoring ability (i.e., tc) and the exogenous separation rate b are the same in every 
type of firm.
Workers (of the same quality) can be hired either by a h-firm, or by a /-firm. 
Consider a representative worker indexed by j .  Once this worker takes the job, she can 
either shirk or work. In equilibrium, each firm in the economy will pay a wage that 
satisfies the no-shirking condition. Thus, for /z-firms and /-firms respectively, it must 
hold that:
=  w / V f r / )  +  b vu =  w f  +  (fe + r c ) Vv (A3 1 }
Eh «  Eh *r+o r+fc+Tt
=  w]flej)+bVu =  wJ‘ + (b+iz)Vu (A3 2)
El «  El ir+b r+b+ic
Hence, when worker j  is hired by a h-f\irm, the wage she receives is:
h rn  Vj,
w f  = — ---v-   (A3.3)
fies )(r+b+n)-(r+b)
while the wage paid when the worker is hired by a /-firm is:
/ rn  V,jw = ----------------- 2-----  (A3.4)
flej)(r+b+Tz)-(r+b)
Note that, when ehj > elj, it holds that > vtA, since f '<  0. Moreover, it is 
straightforward to derive from (A3.3)-(A3.4) that viA > Wy implies that the instantaneous 
utility of a worker hired by a h-firm, Uhj= w hjf(ehj), is greater than the utility that she 
obtains when hired by a /-firm, Ulj=Wjf(elj). The last result also implies that the 
lifetime utility of a h-firm worker (VEh) is greater than the lifetime utility of a /-firm 
worker (VEl).
We now characterise the value of Vv  (under the assumption that unemployment 
benefits are zero). By ruling out on-the-job search (an individual can search only if
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currently unemployed), we have that:
rV v  = + (1 (A3-5)
where at1 and d  are, respectively, the hiring rates of h and /-firms and V°Eh and V°El 
define, respectively, the average lifetime values of being employed in /z-firms and /- 
firms:
yO = h + b V "  (A3 6)
Eh jr+b
t/o _ wi f i e o ) +l>Vu  (A3 7)Y — j  —  -
a  r+b
where (w0 , e0 ) and (w0,eg) are, respectively, the average wage and effort levels set 
by h and /-firms.
Expression (A3.5) needs some further explanation. When an
individual will prefer to work in a h-firm, rather than in an /-firm: thus, an unemployed 
who is offered a job by a /-firm (prob. =al) will accept it only when she does not 
receive a better offer (prob. = (1-ct1)). The same individual will remain unemployed with 
probability (l-djfl-af1). Note also that in (A3.5) we implicitly assumed that an 
unemployed will prefer to take up a job in a /-firm, rather than remaining unemployed 
(which is VEl°> Vv  : this condition is satisfied when [(r+b) +cfl]wJf(eJ)>(Jlw0hf(eJ1)). 
By substituting expressions (A3.6)-(A3.7) into (A3.5), one obtains the following:
= o) + aKl-ah)WoAeb (A3.8)
U (r+b)+ah+ a \ l - a k)
In steady-state equilibrium it holds that b[l-z-u]=ahu and bz=alu, where z represents 
the fraction of the labour force employed by /-firms. It can be easily shown that 
dVv/du< 0 (the value of being unemployed is decreasing in the unemployment rate). 
Thus, once Vv  is substituted away, expressions (A3.3)-(A3.4) implicitly define effort 
in h and /-firms as a function of the firm’s wage, the average wages paid outside, and 
the unemployment rate u.
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Appendix IV
Derivation o f Result 4 
Refer to the system given by eqs.(16)-(17). By differentiation, we obtain the 
following system in matrix form:
-1 0
A B dA
(71 A)2- dnh +
-1
C D du V )2.0
where:
A < 0  is given by the partial derivative of the l.h.s. of eq.(16) with respect to 
(wh/\V() =[A/((3A+(1-I3))] (which is negative by Second-Order conditions) multiplied by 
d[A/(!3A+ (l-(3))]/dA > 0.
J5 < 0 is given by the partial derivative of the l.h.s. of eq.(16) with respect to u 
(recall that # '> 0 , q ” < 0, eM>0, ^ < 0 ) .
0 0  is given by the partial derivative of the l.h.s. of eq.(17) with respect to 
(w/ wq) =[l/fl3A+ (!-&))] (which is negative by Second-Order conditions) multiplied by 
d[l/(&A+ (l-@))J/dA < 0.
D < 0  is given by the partial derivative of the l.h.s. of eq.(17) with respect to 
u (again, q ’> 0 , q ”< 0 , eM>0, ^ < 0 ) .
Note that the determinant (AD-CB) is positive. The application of Cramer’s Rule 
to system (A4.1) gives Result 4.
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Appendix V
Tasks o f different Difficulty and Between-Group Inequality 
In the model developed above, we assumed, as in Kremer (1993), that all the 
tasks performed during the production process are equally relevant for the final success 
of the production process. However, when taken at face-value, this assumption may 
sound as hardly realistic. For instance, cleaning office blocks and taking crucial 
marketing decisions are two distinct tasks in the production process: there is little 
doubt, however, that sloppy decision-making may have much more dramatic 
consequences on the value of production. In what follows, we will show that a more 
general model does not alter the flavour of the results reached in the text.
Consider a production process that has two sets of tasks: there are m "easy” 
tasks, and (n-m) "hard" tasks. Easy tasks are assumed to be perfectly monitorable 
(similarly to secondary sector jobs in Bulow and Summers (1986)) and succeed with 
probability one. For these tasks, employers do not need to pay efficiency wages, since 
mistakes (or shirking) can be immediately detected and remedied. By contrast, difficult 
tasks generally require greater discretion and can be imperfectly monitored. Moreover, 
mis-performance is likely to be very costly for the firm. Then, an employer will try to 
increase the probability qE (0 ,l)  that a hard task is successfully performed by paying 
the efficiency wage.
We can give some additional meaning to the case we consider here by supposing 
that, within each firm, there is skill-segregation among workers of different observed 
ability (education, experience, etc.). Segregation may be motivated in several ways. For 
instance, workers who have low education (high-school education) are generally 
considered not eligible for delicate decision-making responsibilities. Low-skill workers, 
then, will only be hired to perform simple tasks and their labour market clears at the 
competitive wage W°. Conversely, if highly educated workers (college educated) have 
a reservation wage greater than Wc, they will prefer to opt for unemployment and 
search for a good job, rather than accept a low-paid job. Under this assumption, there 
are two separate labour markets: one for the high-skilled and one for the low-skilled. 
High-skilled workers are assumed to have an effort function like the one in equation (1) 
(here, w0 is the wage paid on average to the high-quality workers in the economy and 
u is the unemployment rate on the labour market for the skilled).
Under these assumptions, the profit-maximisation problem for a firm with both
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easy and difficult tasks becomes:
max it = nB(n) -  m W c -  £  w.
n n (A5.1)
By calculating the first-order condition relative to wi and imposing symmetry in wages 
(wt=w for all 0, one obtains:
X ,  the analog of Result 1  holds true: for given x, an increase in n raises the equilibrium 
wage w paid by the firm. Under symmetric General Equilibrium (w=w0), condition 
(A5.2) above becomes:
A greater n (given x) tends to imply an increase in the wage-ratio wfW0, due to the rise 
in w. Similarly, a higher ratio between hard and easy tasks (higher x_i, given n) raises 
the wage paid to the high-skilled: thus, the higher the proportion of high-skilled workers 
in the production process, the higher the wage-ratio w/Wc. This result is consistent with 
some of the evidence reported in Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) for U.S. manufacturing. 
The striking rise in the demand for college educated workers, relative to high-school 
educated ones, attributed to skill-biased technical change seems to have been a main 
cause of the increasing skill-differential in wages. In fact, a large part of the production 
activities that once were typically performed by the less educated workers have been 
transferred abroad, "leaving in the U.S. only the marketing and financial activities 
traditionally carried out by college educated workers" (Levy and Murnane 
(1992,p. 1363)).
The present version of the model also provides the analog of the conclusions 
reached in Result 2. Consider the problem (A5.1) when there is symmetry in wages 
(w=w/). The first-order condition with respect to n is then:
nB(ri)q’- m-lq ,ew—  = 1
Wn
n-m -l  _ / (A5.2)
Using the zero-profit condition nB(n)qn~m=rnWc + (n-m)w and defining the ratio m/n as
(A5.3)
B(ri)qn~m + nB l(ri)qn m + nB(ri)qn wlog(q) -  w = 0 (A5.4)
Under symmetric General Equilibrium (w=w/=w0), the success probability q depends
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only on u. When we can replace w in (A5.4) with the expression for w0 derived from 
(A5.2), equation (A5.4) can be rewritten as:
B(n) + nB'in) + nB(n)log(q) -  nB(n) —  ew = 0 (A5.5)
<1
Equation (A5.5) defines the equilibrium relation between u, the unemployment rate on 
the high-quality workers market, and n. By differentiation, one obtains that du/dn>0. 
Then, if Kremer’s notion is correct (i.e., if technological development entails the 
adoption of increasingly sophisticated production processes), this result can justify the 
fear that technical progress can destroy "middle-class" jobs.
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Figure 1
eq.(12)
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Figure 2
eq.(16)
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Notes
1. Mortensen and Pissarides (1995) consider a matching model where, due to 
technological progress, jobs are simultaneously destroyed and created. Firms that adopt 
old technologies are forced by external competition to pay higher wages over time: at 
a certain date, then, such firms become unprofitable and their jobs are destroyed. On 
the other hand, firms that adopt new technologies create new jobs because higher 
productivity raises their demand for labour. This model does not give clear-cut 
predictions about the effects of the (exogenous) rate of productivity growth on 
unemployment.
2. In principle, "compensating wage-differentials" for different working conditions 
might be the answer. This explanation, however, is quite implausible, since strong 
within-group wage inequality is observed among firms or plants in the same industry.
3. By assuming competitive wages, Kremer and Maskin (1996) develop an O-Ring 
production model to analyse the matching among workers of different quality inside 
plants. They find that changes in labour-supply characteristics can induce firms to hire 
either high-quality workers only, or low-quality workers only: thus, workers’ 
segregation would also be responsible for the high level of wage inequality observed 
between plants. Although explanations based on changing labour-supply characteristics 
(such as educational attainments) are clearly relevant for the analysis of wage 
inequality, some observed facts (such as increasing within-group wage inequality) are 
driven by changes in labour-demand characteristics.
4. According to Katz and Murphy (1992), by favouring more experienced and more 
educated workers, "skill-biased technical change" has considerably increased overall 
wage inequality over the 1980s. Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (1995) also document 
skill-driven labour demand shifts, both within and between industry, for the U.S., 
Britain and France. This notion is captured by the efficiency-wage model developed by 
Agenor and Aizenman (1997), where primary sector firms employ both skilled and 
unskilled workers and the relative productivity of the skilled grows over time. As Katz 
and Murphy (1992) note, however, factors that drive between-group wage inequality 
(such as skill-biased technological change) account for only a third of observed wage 
variability. Also, as noted by Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), plant characteristics seem 
to be more relevant than worker characteristics in explaining wage inequality.
5. See, for the U.S., Levy and Murnane (1992) and Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower 
(1995). As documented by Schmitt (1995) and, again, by Katz, Loveman and 
Blanchflower (1995), within-group wage inequality has been rising dramatically since 
1979 also in the U.K.
6. Layard et al. (1991,p. 151), Phelps (1992) and Hahn (1987) adopt similar effort 
functions. Although we do not denote it explicitly in equation (1), effort will also be 
a function of other variables, such as unemployment benefits, monitoring ability, 
turnover rate, etc., which we take as exogenous.
7. See Kremer (1993,p.553).
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8. Define x=eN  as labour in efficiency units. It is immediate to verify that the standard 
Solow Condition, i.e. ew(wAv^=e, is neither affected by the technological progress 
component A (t) iw\\zny=A(t)f(x) (Hicks-neutral), nor when y =f[A (t)xj (Harrod-neutral). 
On this point, see also Layard et al. (1991,p. 152).
9. See, e.g., Layard et al. (1991,p. 151) and Manning (1995). Note also that the 
General Equilibrium wage level can still be derived by the zero-profit condition, which 
is,
10. As shown in Appendix III, when a firm obtains higher effort by raising the wage 
level (so to satisfy the no-shirking condition), the worker’s lifetime utility level, V, 
increases.
11. As noted by Bulow and Summers (1986), a large fraction of the US employees is 
involved in supervision, rather than direct production of goods and services.
12. As in Kremer (1993), we abstract from integer constraints.
13. To show that equ.(5) is steeper than equ.(12) in the space (w,ri) at the equilibrium 
point (w*,n*), we first define equ.(5) as t w(w,ji)=0 and equ.(12) as Tn(w,n)=0. The 
(positive) slopes of (5) and (12) are, respectively, d n /dw \^= -tKwJ fKvm and 
dn/dw | (i2)=~Tn*/irnn- Since the Second-order conditions for a maximum associated to 
the system (5)-(12) require that the Hessian determinant \H \= TwwTcnn-Twn'irnw be 
positive, it then follows that dn/dw \ (5) > dn/dw | (12).
14. When the social planner maximises individual welfare with respect to n, the 
efficient level of complexity in technology solves a condition that has the same form as 
(12), the private rule. Note also that equ.(12) defines a positive relation between n and 
q and, hence, between n and e. As a consequence, recalling that e *<eSB<eFB (see 
Sect.l and Appendix II), it holds that also the private choice of n is inefficiently low: 
in particular, where nSB and nFB are the levels of complexity
corresponding to the Second-Best and First-Best effort levels, respectively.
15. On the role of trade competition from the Third World, see Wood (1994).
16. This is the case when, by explicitly defining B as function of time, B(n,t)=b(n)1. 
Notice instead that, if B(n,t)=b(n)iB, time does not affect the ratio B ’/B.
17. In reference to equation (12), note that, for any given level of n, an increase in 
(B’/B) forces a growth in (-logq) and, hence, a smaller value of q (and w).
18. Consider, for example, the following specification: q(e;t)=q(e)-fl, 0<  1. When also 
the ratio q ’/q is subject to changes over time, the position of curve (5) in Figure 1 is 
subject to shifts that, together with the movements of curve (12), generate ambiguous 
results on the equilibrium levels of (w*,n*).
19. As Levy and Mumane (1992,p. 1347) recall, a relevant role for increasing wage 
inequality has often been attributed to "deindustrialization in which labor was forced to 
shift from manufacturing, with many middle class jobs, to the service sector, with a few
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high paying jobs and many low paying jobs”. As these authors note, however, firm- 
specificities appear to be even more important than sectoral differences to explain 
within-group wage inequality.
20. A theoretical example as why different firms can coexist in the same sector is given 
by Shaked and Sutton’s (1983) model of vertical differentiation in product markets.
21. From (13)-(14) and Result 1 above it follows that, when nh>nl, it must hold that 
(w^ /Wq) > (W/Wf). Hence, in symmetric General Equilibrium, it also holds that A> 1.
22. The proof of Result 4 is given in Appendix IV.
23. Davis and Haltiwanger (1991 ,p. 116) observe that since the late 1960s there have 
been ”striking changes in the distribution of observable plant characteristics". Such 
changes were largely responsible for the increase of between-plant wage inequality.
24. In more formal terms, suppose that the old technology requires n0 tasks and the new 
available technology requires n2 tasks. It can either be that n0<n1 (progress entails 
more sophistication), or that«0> « i (progress entails less sophistication). In either case, 
we assume that the loss from not adopting the new technology, L=ir(n1)-ir(n0), is 
positive and greater than the adoption cost k > 0. Note that L can be approximated 
(through a Taylor’s expansion around n0) by [n fiin^c/10] [ B ’tnJ/BtriQ) +  logqjfnr  
n j .  Hence, when L> k, each firm was adopting a technology, n0, that was either "too 
much" sophisticated {B'in^/Bin^K-logq & n ^ n ^ ,  or "too little" sophisticated 
(B’(n0)/B(n0)>-logq & n1>n() 1 with respect to the new level, n2.
25. See the OECD Employment Outlook (1996) and the references cited in Bertola and 
Ichino (1995). According to the OECD, wage inequality has continued to grow also 
during the nineties in those countries (Australia, Britain, New Zealand and the United 
States) where governments have been pursuing further labour market deregulation.
26. Manning (1995) develops two simple models, one based on efficiency wages, the 
other based on monopsonistic labour markets, where minimum wages may actually 
reduce unemployment.
27. Since binding minimum wages imply that \J= aW l (i.e.,A0= / / a <  A*), then 
(v^ /w ^= l/[p+ (l‘p)aJ<A/[pA+(l-p)J and (uf/w j =a/[(3+(l-(3)a]>l/[t3A+(l-(3)].
28. The net effect on the unemployment rate of the changes in (n^nf1) depends on 
((du/dnl)-(du/dnh)): for instance, it can be shown that when the fraction of workers 
employed in the low-tech sector (1-$) is relatively high, the introduction of a minimum 
wage legislation is likely to increase the unemployment rate (through an increase in nl).
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Chapter II
OUTSIDE OPTIONS IN A BARGAINING MODEL WITH "INTRINSIC DECAY". 
A Strategic Framework and some Implications for Wage Negotiations.
Introduction.
The determinants of bargaining power are still rather controversial. When one 
considers in particular the role of "outside options", the theoretical predictions are often 
at variance with what intuition and empirical observation would seem to suggest. These 
problems have a special relevance for the analysis of wage negotiations. In this Chapter, 
we address these and related issues by developing a simple strategic model of 
bargaining.
The main implications of the Nash’s and Rubinstein’s approaches to bargaining 
can be summarised as follows. Consider two agents who have to share a cake of size 
C. When the Nash-axiomatic approach is adopted, agent I and agent II face the 
following program:
Maximise (S1-s1°)(S2-s20) with respect to (S1, S2), subject to SJ+S2<C,
which yields the solution:
S 1 = j  (C+s°- 4 ) ,  S1 = | ( C  +i® -s,°) (N)
where S1 and S2 represent, respectively, agent I’s and agent II’s shares of the cake C, 
while the parameters (sJ0,s2°) define their status-quo points.
An agent’s status-quo is a relevant measure of bargaining power: the higher 
agent I’s status-quo, Sj°t the higher her payoff S1. Similarly, the higher s2 , the higher 
S2. The interpretation of the status-quo's is however quite ambiguous. As noted by 
Shaked and Sutton (1984b), the Nash-axiomatic approach is unable, perse , to give the 
status-quo's a precise content unless the underlying game is specified.
In spite of this neat remark, it has often been common practice, especially in 
labour economics1, to identify the status-quo points in the Nash solution (N) with the 
players’ outside options, which we define here as s} and s2: in this case, the modeller 
postulates that (s1°,s2°)=(s1,s2).
A player’s outside option (or breakdown point: see Binmore, Shaked and Sutton
(1989)) is the level of utility that this player would obtain by leaving the negotiation 
table for good. Consider the example of wage negotiations, where an entrepreneur and
46
his workforce have to share the firm’s returns. The entrepreneur’s outside option can 
be thought of as the liquidation value of the firm, or as the level of profits available by 
firing the current workforce and hiring a new one (in the latter case, his outside option 
will depend negatively on hiring and firing costs). On the other hand, the workers’ 
outside option depends (positively) on the level of unemployment benefits and on the 
general conditions of the labour market: for example, a higher average wage and a 
lower unemployment rate will improve workers’ outside alternatives. In the case of 
wage negotiations then, identifying the status-quo points with the outside options makes 
the firm-level wage determination depend directly on the aggregate conditions of the 
economy.
However, as emphasised by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), the 
common practice of interpreting the status quo's as the outside option levels is 
theoretically inconsistent with the strategic representation of bargaining formulated in 
the seminal work of Rubinstein (see Rubinstein (1982)).
In the original Rubinstein (1982) model the players alternate in issuing proposals 
over the division of a cake of given size until an agreement is found. What drives the 
players to agree is their "impatience": future incomes are discounted at a positive rate 
(see also Sutton (1986)). The success of Rubinstein’s model as a standard reference for 
applied bargaining problems is due to its property that, when the interval between two 
subsequent calls tends to zero, its unique Perfect Equilibrium solution converges to the 
Nash bargaining solution (N).
In the context of the Rubinstein (1982) strategic model, Binmore, Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky (1986) show that the status-quo points in (N) coincide with the so-called 
impasse points, which we denote by The pair (o-; ,<r2) is defined as player I’s
and player II’s utility levels during disagreement, that is, when bargaining continues 
without an agreement being reached or negotiations being abandoned (see Binmore 
Shaked and Sutton (1989, p.754)). Using again the example of wage negotiations that 
we mentioned above, a main determinant of the size of workforce’s impasse point 
during the negotiation process is constituted by the availability of union strike-funds2. 
In what follows, we normalise the impasse points to zero, which is, (a1,af)=(Q,Q).
When there are mutual gains from an agreement (i.e., when the size of the cake 
is greater than what the players can obtain by taking their outside alternatives,
47
C>s1+s2), the bargaining outcome predicted by the Rubinstein model with outside 
options is:
(SpC-Sj), i f  C/2<s1
(R)(C -s2,s2), i f  C/2<s2(S \S 2) =
(C/2, C/2), otherwise
The Outside Option Principle* applies: the outside option available to a player 
is relevant only when it is bigger than the half o f the pie, C/2.
Consider, for instance, the consequences of the Outside Option Principle for 
wage negotiation outcomes. In contrast to what is frequently assumed in several labour 
economics applications, Rubinstein (1982) implies that the wage bargained at firm level 
can not depend, at the same time, on "inside" factors, such as the firm’s returns (here, 
Q , as well as on own "external" factors, such as the labour market conditions (which 
determine the workers’ outside option).
The Outside Option Principle has, however, an unattractive feature. Consider 
the following example: if C/2=Q.5>s1, the equilibrium payoff for agent I will be 
SI=  0.5, regardless of whether her outside option is worth ^ = 0 .4 9  or 5i =0.01. In this 
case, the "external environment", determining the outside option levels, does not affect 
bargaining power at all. On the contrary, when Cl2<slt external conditions count even 
"too much", since S2=Sj.
The main aim of the present Chapter is to show that the Outside Option 
Principle is not robust to a simple modification of Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model. 
As emphasised by Sutton (1986), the Principle depends on the assumptions that (i) the 
agents have positive discount rates, and (ii) the size of the cake to be shared, as well 
as the sizes of the parties’ outside options stay constant over time. The bargaining thus 
takes place in an infinite horizon, with a stationary structure (each player faces the same 
game when calling at different dates): if an agreement is not reached, the same cake of 
the same size will be available in the future. The only cost of disagreement is 
psychological, being due to "impatience".
However, if for some reason the cake decays "intrinsically" over time, delay in 
agreement will impose a further cost, beyond time-discounting. Our "intrinsic decay"
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hypothesis has a straightforward economic appeal4. In many situation of practical 
importance, it is indeed reasonable to posit a greater rate of shrinkage in the cake 
relative to outside options. In wage bargaining, for example, delays in production may 
involve a progressive physical decay of production opportunities over time (e.g., due 
to machinery depreciation in industrial firms for the lack of maintenance, or, in 
agricultural firms, due to delays in harvesting, with adverse consequences for the 
quantity and quality of products). Delays in production may also narrow the firm’s 
market opportunities, if they impose waiting costs on customers who can switch to 
competitors. These factors tend to affect negatively the firm's condition, while the 
parties outside options may remain unaffected.
In what follows, we analyze a simple modification to the basic Rubinstein’s 
alternating calls bargaining game in which, due to some intrinsic (i.e., non- 
psychological) decaying factor, the cake shrinks faster than the outside options. As a 
consequence, the bargaining game is non-stationary: its time-horizon is finite5, since 
there exists a point in time at which the amount to be shared equals the sum of the 
outside options (no net gains from an agreement can be obtained afterwards). By taking 
the discount rate equal to zero, we show the central results of the Chapter: in the game 
described, for a given order of calls, there is a unique Perfect Equilibrium solution; 
when the time interval between a call and the following one shrinks to zero, this 
solution coincides with the " sp 1 it-the-d i fference" outcome (Sutton, 1986), which can be 
obtained from a simple Nash-maximand where the "status-quo" positions are shifted to 
the outside option levels (see Sect.l).
The results found in Sect.l extend immediately to the case of three-party 
bargaining (see Sect.2): the Perfect Equilibrium solution is still unique and, when 
subsequent calls tend to be very close, the three-party version of the "split-the- 
difference" outcome is obtained. Our simple model thus avoids the problem emphasised 
by the "Shaked’s example", showing that the application of the Rubinstein model to a 
game with N > 2  players gives indeterminacy in the Perfect Equilibrium payoffs (see 
Sutton (1986) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)).
In Sect.3 we allow for strictly positive discount rates, together with intrinsic 
decay in the cake. Although the main results remain qualitatively unaltered, we show 
that the presence of discounting reduces the weight of the players’ outside options in 
the bargaining outcome.
49
In Sect.4, we apply the models developed in Sects. 1-2 to wage negotiations. 
Since our model gives a unique solution also for a number of players greater than two, 
we can obtain neat predictions about the consequences of multiple unionism on wage 
levels. Further, we analyse the relation between efficiency wages and bargaining by 
introducing "effort" and imperfect monitoring. Finally, by exploiting the result that 
outside options always matter, we consider the problems raised by bargaining for 
investment in workforce training.
The main results are summarised in Section 5.
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1. The Basic Model.
In this Section, we analyse the simplest two-party problem without discounting.
At t —0, players I and II face the problem of sharing a cake of size C; their 
outside options are (sp sf), respectively, and such that 0 and s2 +s2< C (i.e.,
mutual gains from agreement are available). As in Rubinstein (1982), offers alternate. 
We consider an extensive form of the game in which a player can opt out only after 
rejecting the other's proposal (analogously to the game in Osborne and Rubinstein 
(1990,par.3.12.1)). We assume however that (i) both players have a discount rate equal 
to zero, (ii) the cake size "decays” over time by a factor 06(0 ,1), so that the cake size 
at t is jS'-C, and (Hi) the size of the outside options stays constant over time. The second 
assumption provides the incentive to an early agreement which is an alternative to 
Rubinstein’s time preferences mechanism, ruled out by (i). The role of assumption (Hi) 
is that of simplifying the argument, provided that in the more general case the cake still 
shrinks faster than the outside opportunities available to the parties.
The modifications introduced above imply a non-stationary bargaining 
framework: the constancy over time of the sum of the outside options limits the horizon 
in which mutual gains from an agreement can be obtained to a certain date, t=T*. This 
date is defined as function of the parameters (C,(3,sp s2) by
(1)
r :  pr C=51+52
Defining A > 0 as the time passing between each offer and the subsequent one, 
the last call will take place at t=Ty where T<T* and T*-T< A. Thus we have that:
PTC = sx +s2+e, with e =e(A) ^ 0,
such th a t p t+a C < s 1+s2
Note that the ratio 77A is the maximum positive integer in (0,7*/A].
In order to obtain the main result, contained in Proposition 1, we show the 
following:
Lemma 1. For any given order o f calls (player I  first/not first caller and last/not 
last caller), there is a unique Perfect Equilibrium solution to the agents ’ payoff.
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The result is proved for the case in which player I is both last (at t=T) and first 
(at r=0) caller. The computation of agent Fs (unique) payoffs in the three remaining 
cases is quite straightforward and will be omitted. Uniqueness is shown by construction.
Proof. Let S(t) denote the payoff of the agent who is making the offer at t=r.
At t —T, when player I is calling, the size of the cake is &TC=&T*C+e. In case 
of refusal of I’s offer, player II can get at most s2. Then, s2 is the minimum acceptable 
offer player I has to make, and constitutes her unique optimal offer to player II (as 
usual, we assume that when an agent is indifferent between accepting or not, she 
accepts). It follows that the unique Perfect Equilibrium (P.E.) payoff obtained by player 
I at t= T  is
(^7) = $TC ~s2
Player II calls at t=T-A, when the cake size is (3T~AC. To make his proposal 
accepted, II must offer at least S(T) to player I; again, S ^  is the unique optimal offer 
for the caller (player II) at this stage. Player II’s unique P.E. payoff at t=T-A is then
^(7-A) = P7 A C —
Applying the same argument, at t=T-2Ay player I obtains
S(r-2A) = P r' 2 A c " V a> = P J- 2A( 1 - P A+ P 2A) C - s2
In general, player I calls at each t-T -2kA , with £=0,1,..,£*; k* defines player 
Fs call closest to £=0 (either at t = 0 or t= A: since we assume here that I calls at t= 0, 
k* solves T-2k*A=0). Player I obtains
v m * ) = p r-2*A( i - P 4 +. .+ p2“ ) c - s 2 = p ^ ; ; v ,  o )
Recalling that at each stage of the game the caller’s optimal offer is unique and equal 
to the unique P.E. payoff the other can obtain when calling in the following stage, 
expression (3) describes the unique P.E. payoff that can be obtained by player I at each 
stage of the game. ■
Noting that S^_2kA) is increasing in k, an early agreement (at t —0) will be
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reached. Since player I was assumed to be calling at f=0, her unique Perfect 
Equilibrium payoff for the game described is S ^ ,  obtained by setting T-2kA=Q in (3)6:
S(0)= U ^ C-S2 (4)
®  1 +P 2
The P.E. payoff of player II is C-S(0). (The pair of strategies supporting this 
solution are described in Shaked and Sutton (1984a)).
Note also that player I’s payoff in expression (4) can be rewritten (taking, 
without loss in generality, e=0) as:
S(0) = C ( l-p A)(l+p2A+p4A+...+pr~2A) +sx
which is the sum of the shrinkages occurring after player I’s calls up to t-T -2A  plus 
I’s outside option sL. This representation underlines a key feature of the result: the 
game ends with each player taking up the outside option.
Remark 1. In the game above, we assumed that a player can opt out only after 
rejecting the other’s proposal. Consider now an extensive form of the game in which 
a player can opt out only when his own offer is rejected (refer to the game in Osborne 
and Rubinstein (1990, par.3.12.2)): in infinite horizon bargaining games, multiplicity 
problems would arise. In our model, however, the present modification to the opting 
out procedure will still deliver the unique Perfect Equilibrium solution (S(0), C-S(0)) 
found above7.
We are now ready to state the following:
Proposition 1. When the time interval between two subsequent shrinks to zero 
(A-+0+), the unique Perfect Equilibrium solution to the bargaining games considered 
in Lemma 1 collapses in the same limit payoff vector8, regardless the order o f the calls. 
This limit payoff vector is the nsplit-the-differencen outcome.
Proof. Taking the limit of expression (4), we obtain
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15111
A -0+ ^  ^
by noticing that, for A-*0+, T-+T* (e(A)-*0) and using (1).
(5)
As well known, player I’s "split-the-difference" payoff given by (5) can be 
obtained as solution to the following problem, where S1 and S2 are I’s and II’s payoffs:
max (iS1 - s x) (iS2 - s 2), s.t. S 1+S2zC  (6)
i.e., a Nash-maximand in which the status-quo positions are shifted to the outside 
options levels. This clearcut result partly derives from assumption (i): here, the discount 
rate is equal to zero. The case with a strictly positive discount rate is analysed in 
Sect. 3.
In the next Section we extend the main results to the case of three-party 
bargaining.
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2. Three-Party Bargaining with Intrinsic Decay.
When the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model is extended to the problem of 
sharing a cake of given size among N > 2 players, the perfectness argument is, in 
general, not sufficient to ensure uniqueness. This conclusion holds true for games in 
which the structure of the replies to a given proposal is either sequential (as in the 
original "Shaked’s example"), ox simultaneous (see Haller (1986)). Hence, unless very 
particular game structures are examined (see, e.g., in Chae and Yang (1988)) or 
restrictions on strategies are assumed, any partition of the cake can be supported as a 
Perfect Equilibrium (see, e.g., Herrero (1985), Sutton (1986), Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990)).
Consider the extension of the model developed in Sect.l to a three-party 
bargaining game. Again, /?E(0,1) and players’ common discount rate is zero. Suppose 
that, at t=Q, agent I proposes a partition of the cake, say (a1, a2, a2), such that a*>0 
and Li(/=C: agents II and III reply (either in turn or simultaneously: the conclusion 
does not change); if both II and III agree, the game ends. If either (or both) disagrees, 
agent II makes a proposal at t= A, etc. The game continues with I, II, III making offers 
in turn until: either an agreement is reached at some t< T  or the parties
separate and take up their outside options (respectively, sp s2, s3). Analogously to the 
two-party model developed in Sect.l, given {C,fi,s1,s2,s3,A), we define
r :  pr C=i1+sJ+53 C7)
and
T: pr C = sx +s2 +s3 + e, with e = e(A) ^ 0
(8)
such that pr+A C < sx +s2 +s3
Under these assumptions, we state the following:
Lemma 2. For any given order o f calls, there is a unique Perfect Equilibrium 
solution to the agents' payoff triple.
Proof See Appendix I.
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Since an agreement will be reached at £=0, we state the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. When the interval between two subsequent calls shrinks to zero 
(A-*0+), the unique Perfect Equilibrium solution to the three-party bargaining game 
collapses into the same limit partition, regardless o f the order o f the calls. This limit 
partition can be obtained as solution to the Nash problem
3 3
max Q = J J  (S1 - s s . t .  ^ S l <.C
i=l 1=1
where (S1, S2, S3) are respectively agent Vs, IPs, Ill's shares o f the cake C.
Proof. See Appendix I.
In contrast with Rubinstein (1982), the results found for the two-party game 
extend immediately to a N> 2 party game without any further qualification.
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3. Strictly Positive Discount Rates.
In what follows, we extend the two-party model developed in Sect.l to analyse 
the case when the players have strictly positive (and common) discount rates. Similarly 
to Rubinstein (1982), player I and II have utility U(x,t)=8tx , where x  denotes income 
and 8 < 1 is the discount factor.
Let the upper limit to the bargaining horizon be given by 7, as defined by 
C(3t =Sj + s2. Suppose that player I issues a proposal at each date T-(2k+l)A, while 
player II calls at each t-T-2kA  (k—0,1,2,..). Assuming that max{8AS(T_2kA),SJ  ls eclual 
to 8AS(T_2kA), player I will have to offer player II the amount 8AS(T_2kA) at t=(T-2kA)-A. 
Player I’s payoff is thus given by:
•W -D A ) = C p7' 0**1*4 {l - 8 ApA +.. + (8AP4)2*} -  = (9)
_ f l  +(6APA)
\  1 + 8AP'
A ftA \2*+l I
-
Similarly, if max{&AS(T_<2k+i)A)’si } = ^S(r-(2ii+i)A)’ player II will have to offer 
A^^ (T-(2k+nA) when calling at t=T-(2k+l)A-A, obtaining:
S(X-2kA) = Cpr-2tA{ l - 8 Ap4 + . . - ( 8 APA)2*-1} + 8<“ -1)as2 =
= C p r -a fa t f t  - ( 5^PA)2t|  + aO *-D A ^
Suppose that player I calls at t= 0. By setting T-(2k+l)A=0  and using 
expression (9), we obtain
sm = C 1 + p r s r  -  8r-A52 (11)
(0> l  + pA8 2
and, consequently, player II’s payoff is
(12>C - S (0, = 8 S (4)
Note that (0A,5A)-*(1,1) for A-*0. By making use of C(3t=Sj +s2, one obtains that:
C bT (13>S1 = ^ + - ^ ( 5l-s2)
A -o 2 2
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r  kt (14)
52 s = - + y ( s 2-^ )
The Perfect Equilibrium payoffs (S1, S2) in (13)-(14) solve the following Nash-problem:
max (51- 5 rff1)(5i2- f ir5,2), s.t. S 1+S2zC  
is'js2)
Furthermore, when the discount rate approaches zero, the discount factor 5 tends to one 
and the equilibrium payoffs converge to the payoffs obtained from problem (6).
The main conclusion drawn in Sect.l still remains valid: the outside option 
levels of player I and II always enter the Perfect Equilibrium solution to the game 
described. However, time-preferences imply that the outside alternatives are weighted 
by <5r , which is decreasing in T. The closer 13 is to one, the higher is T: thus, when the 
forces leading to "intrinsic decay" are relatively weak, the role of the outside options 
in determining the partition of the cake tends to be less relevant.
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4. Applications to Wage-Bargaining.
We can apply the model developed in Sect. 1 to the following bilateral bargaining 
situation9: a firm and its labour force (of given size, say 1) have to find an agreement 
on the sharing of the returns R obtainable from a production process taking place at 
t=0. We denote the worker’s and firm’s payoffs and outside options, respectively, as 
(W,II) and (W*,II*). According to the "intrinsic decay" hypothesis, disagreement will 
imply a decay (by a factor /?) of the returns R to be shared over time.
Proposition 1 suggests that the parties will agree at t=0, yielding the worker a
payoff
(16)
2 2
The worker’s payoff W can then be obtained by solving the following Nash-problem:
Max Cl = (R -W -TT)(W -W *) (17)
(W)
A feature of the present model, which is necessary to the result, is that the sum 
of the outside options exceeds, after some date, the value of the firm. In other words, 
we are assuming a context in which delays in bargaining will eventually lead to the 
dissolution of the firm as the parties take up their outside options. In such an 
environment, equation (16) gives a formal justification for the "shifting of the status-quo 
points" to the outside option levels. This observation reduces the destructive impact of 
the criticism about the mistreatment of the outside options in labour economics, where 
an improper use of Rubinstein’s model is often justified on empirical grounds10 (see 
Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989) and, in particular, Binmore, Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky (1986)). Although fully justified within the basic Rubinstein (1982) 
framework, this criticism does not survive in the kind of context suggested here.
The actual relevance of outside options in/zrm-level wage equations is, however, 
an empirical issue. Indeed, the theoretical predictions of the bargaining models that we 
contrasted depend on the structure of the underlying game that one assumes. 
Scaramozzino (1991) provides a noticeable attempt to test the Outside Option Principle 
in reference to wage bargaining. There, the Principle generates the following empirical
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prediction: for those firms where outside options do not "bite” as comer solutions, all 
the variables that characterise the external labour market conditions must not be 
significant in the wage equation. The Principle is only partially supported by the 
evidence: while the "outside” (industry) average wage level is not significant, the 
change in the industry unemployment level (measuring labour market "tightness") is 
strongly significant.
In the following paragraphs, we exploit the properties of our model to 
investigate three issues: the effects of multi-unionism on wage determination, the role 
of effort with imperfect monitoring, and investment in workforce’s training.
4.1. Multi-Unionism and Wage Bargaining.
The presence of multiple unions, competing over the sharing of the firm’s 
revenues, has been considered by the theoretical models in Horn and Wolinsky (1988) 
and Jun (1989). Horn and Wolinsky (1988) show that when workers are substitutable, 
they are better off by negotiating through a single union. By contrast, when the firm’s 
workers are complementary, they are better off by creating separate unions which act 
as single bargaining units. In the latter case, a N-party bargaining game arises. As 
mentioned in Sect.2 however, a N>  2 game suffers indeterminacy unless stringent 
assumptions (such as stationarity in strategies) are made (see, e.g., Sutton (1986)).
The problem with multiple unions can be easily dealt with here. We suppose that 
there are two unions and that each union can halt the production process in case of 
disagreement. The wage negotiation process can be represented as a three-party 
bargaining game among the entrepreneur, union 1 and union 2. The triple (II*, W*, W2*) 
defines the players’ outside options. Intrinsic decay implies the existence of a terminal 
date, say T \  defined by Rfi7'=11*+W*+W2*. For A-*0 the equilibrium payoffs 
converge to:
(n, Wv W2) =
= f | +|(2n,-^1’-^ 2')> | +-|(2r2*-n*-wO
Then, when multiple unions participate in the bargaining process, the firm has 
to concede a larger wage bill than in the single union case: in fact, W1+W2 is greater
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than W, as defined in (16). This prediction is empirically supported by Machin, Stewart 
and Van Reenen (1993), who find that the participation in wage negotiations of multiple 
recognised unions as separate bargaining units actually leads to higher wages11.
It must be recalled, however, that the presence of active trade unions is not
models do provide a natural solution to any bilateral-monopoly situation between worker 
and firm due, e.g., to matching problems as in Pissarides’ (1987) search model.
4.2. The Role o f Effort.
We now consider a simple model with "effort", in order to investigate the 
relation between bargaining and efficiency-wage theory. According to the argument that 
we are going to develop, it emerges that the borderline between models of wage 
determination based on bilateral-monopoly power and models based on effort and 
incentive problems may be more blurred than what common wisdom may suggest.
We assume, after Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)13, that the firm’s revenue 
function R(e;t) is a discontinuous function of "effort”, e:
Thus, if the effort level is below e*, returns drop to zero. The worker has utility 
U(W,e)=W-e and her outside option is worth U°> 0. If the worker shirks, she has a 
probability # > 0  of being caught and fired without pay. The minimum wage level
(l-q)W+qU°. Hence, the minimum level of wage the firm has to pay in order to 
guarantee positive returns is:
The bargaining horizon of the worker-entrepreneur wage game is limited by the 
firm’s ability to pay at least W6. As already mentioned, when W< W , returns drop to 
zero: in this case, the parties are better off by separating and taking up their outside 
alternatives. The final date of the bargaining game, say T°t is thus implicitly defined
necessary to justify the plausibility of a bargaining approach12. Indeed, bargaining
(19)
consistent with no shirking W  must be such that the worker’s utility when working hard 
(e=e*) is not smaller than her expected utility when shirking (e=0), which is, W-e*>
W* = —  + U° > U°
q
(20)
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by R(3T°-n*=W6. By backward induction, we obtain that the Perfect Equilibrium wage 
level is given by:
w = - ( i t - n * + ir )  = - ( f l - n * + — +u°) (21)
2 2 q
Wage equation (21) encompasses different approaches to wage determination. 
Hence, it may not be surprising to find that the merits of competing wage theories are 
difficult to assess empirically. According to (21), inter-firm wage differentials are 
explained by, (i) the set of variables affecting "efficiency" (e.g., the effectiveness of 
monitoring), (ii) the firm’s "ability to pay" R, and (in) the parties’ outside options, U° 
and II*.
By an empirical point of view, Leonard’s (1987) test raises some doubts about 
efficiency-wage theories based on monitoring and turnover. However, technological 
factors seem to be relevant in explaining the observed wage structures. According to 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991,p. 167), this fact is mostly consistent with 
efficiency-wage theories (see also Chapter I). On the other hand, firms’ "ability to pay" 
(R, here) has wide empirical support as determinant of wage differentials, both at firm 
and industry level (see, e.g., Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers 
(1987)). This finding is fully consistent with the wage-bargaining model, as well as with 
efficiency-wage theories such as Akerlof s (1982) "gift exchange" principle.
4.3. Under-Investment in Workforce Training.
We abstract here from effort considerations and analyse a firm which can 
increase its revenues by investing in workforce’s training, H. The revenue function is 
given by R(H;t) =R(H)(3l, with ^ > 0  and Rjjh<0.
Although training at firm’s level tends to be mainly firm-specific (think, for 
example, of the "Me Donald’s University"), it may also have some positive spill-over 
on the worker’s human capital. In general, the worker’s value on the external labour 
market will be a positive function of the amount of training received. In our model, 
then, the worker’s outside option is increasing in H: W*=W*(H), W*’(H)>0.
As we are going to show, our approach generates a new mechanism leading to 
sub-optimal investment in training, beyond the mechanism emphasised by the seminal
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paper of Grout (1984). Grout (1984) concentrates on the physical investment. When the 
workforce can bargain over returns once the investment cost has been sunk, under­
investment arises in equilibrium (this issue will be extensively examined in Chapter III). 
However, if investment in training H  is considered, the degree of inefficiency will be 
even more severe than in Grout’s model.
Denote the unit cost of training as r> 0 . Efficient investment in workforce’s 
training would require that Rh =t. However, as in Grout (1984), the workforce cannot 
commit not to bargain over wages once the training cost H t has been sunk. Then, since 
the entrepreneur’s share is given by Vi(R-W*+11*) and W*’(H)> 0, the privately optimal 
choice of H  will solve the first order condition 1A(Rh-W*’(H))=t , implying that 
Rh =W *’(H)+2t > t . Being J ^ c O ,  private investment in training will be lower than 
the socially efficient level.
There are two forces leading to sub-optimality. The first one corresponds to the 
traditional Grout-effect: when bargaining occurs ex-post, the entrepreneur will only be 
able to appropriate half of the marginal benefit (RH) from his investment. In our model, 
however, there is also a second effect contributing to under-investment. Whenever 
training increases the worker’s value outside the firm (W*’(H)> 0), the entrepreneur 
will be in a weaker position when negotiating over the surplus: in other words, the 
entrepreneur’s investment also contributes to strengthen his counterpart’s bargaining 
power. This effect is peculiar to our model, since the "intrinsic decay" hypothesis 
implies that outside options always constitute a determinant of bargaining power. These 
observations give a new motivation for the desirability of policy interventions aimed at 
supporting training programs. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) advocate public 
training schemes in order to reduce the degree of mis-match in labour markets. In the 
perspective of the present model, public intervention can also reduce the distortions 
deriving from rent-seeking behaviour. Publicly supported training could be implemented 
by incentivating firms to train their own employees under specific programs (through 
subsidies or tax bonuses), or by directly providing schemes that enhance the skills of 
the unemployed, so to reduce the costs of hiring.
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5. Conclusions.
We have analysed a simple Rubinstein-type bargaining model in which the cake 
to be shared decays over time at a positive rate. As a consequence, outside options 
enter players’ unique Perfect Equilibrium payoffs. Further, when the interval between 
two subsequent calls shrinks to zero, the payoffs take the "split-the-difference" form. 
These results generalise to the case of three-party bargaining. Our model can thus 
justify the common practice of deriving wage-equation expressions from Nash- 
maximands where the status-quo points are identified with the outside option levels.
With regard to wage-bargaining, we used our basic model to consider the 
distributive implications of multiple unionism. We also analysed workers’ effort choice, 
so to investigate the relation between wage bargaining and efficiency wages. Finally, 
we examined the issue of workers’ training, showing that entrepreneurs’ choice may be 
severely inefficient.
In the next Chapter, we utilise the results from the strategic bargaining model 
developed here to analyse the role of financial decisions on the distribution of surplus 
between entrepreneurs and workers.
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Appendix I
Proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2.
Proof o f Lemma 2. Refer to expressions (7) and (8) in the text (Sect.2). Let S(t) 
be the payoff of the agent calling at t=r. Consider the case in which (C,(3,sp s2,s3, A)
proposed by I at this stage is vetoed, II and III can get at most (s2,s3), respectively. 
Then, (s2,s3) are the minimum acceptable offers for II and III, and it is I’s unique 
optimal offer to II and III. The unique Perfect Equilibrium partition at t= T  is then 
(S(t),s2,s3) where
Notice that the Perfect Equilibrium partition is the same with sequentiality in replies (II 
replies first: if he does not accept, the agents will take up their respective outside 
options; if he accepts, it is II’s turn to reply: if he accepts, the proposed partition is 
enforced) or simultaneity in replies.
Agent III calls at t=T-A, the size of the cake being /?r"AC. To make his proposal 
accepted, he must offer I and II at least (S ^ s f) ,  respectively; again, (S(T),s2) are the 
unique optimal offers for the caller at this stage. The unique P.E. partition at t - T - A 
is then {S ^ ,s2> where
Analogous argument holds for II’s call at t=T-2A. The P.E. partition at this 
stage is ( S ^ S ^ ^ S ^ ) ,  where
Recalling that what agent II can receive at t=T-(2+3h)A in P.E. is equal to what he 
will be offered by I and III when they call at t=T-(2-\-3h)A-A and t=T-(2+3h)A-2A
are such that agent I calls at t —T, when the size of the cake is fiTC. If the partition
S2 S3
In general, agent II calls at each t=T-(2+3h)A, ft=0,1,..,/**, obtaining
(r-(2+3A)A) = ( l - p A)p r_(2+3A)A(l+P3A+p6A+.. + p3AA)C+s2 =
(A l.l)
_ pr-(2+3ft)A l - p 3(A*1)A 
1+PA+P
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respectively (t> 0), expression (A 1.1) characterizes the unique P.E. payoff obtained by 
II at each stage of the game. Analogous conclusions hold for III, calling at each t=T- 
(l+3h)A, /i=0,l,..,/i*, and receiving
i  rt3(A+l)A
S(T n+3AU, =  c  (A1.2)
(T-iU ihW  r  1 +  p A + p2A 3
Note that the result claimed in Lemma 2 holds either with simultaneity or with 
sequentiality in the reply structure of the calls and it is independent of changes in the 
order of calls. ■
An agreement will be reached at t=Q. Refer to expression (A l.l). Given the 
order of calls we assumed, II calls at t= A: h* solves T-(2+3h*)A=A and II’s unique 
P.E. payoff at t —0 is
5..> = P4— 1 -p r  C+s, (A1.3)
(A) l +pA+p2A 2
Since III calls at t=2A, his unique P.E. payoff at t= 0 is
5 ..., = P2A— 1 -Pr  C+s, (A1.4)
w  l +pA+p2A 3
The unique P.E. partition at t=0 is then (S(0) = C-S(A)-S(2A), S(A), S(2A)). We can
now give the following:
Proof o f Proposition 2. (We omit the proof of the proposition for different 
orders of calls). Let (a1, a2, a3) =  (S(0), S(A), S@A)), where (S(A),S(2Aj) are defined by 
(A1.3) and (A1.4). Taking the limit of (a1, a2, a3) for A->0+, using (8) in the text, and 
noticing that e->0 and (/3A,/32A)-K1,1),
1 O 1 3l i m  a* =  A c  + - s . - - V s . ,  i =  1 , 2 , 3
^  'i  i  'l  r  9 9
A -0+ 3 3 3 j =1
0*0
Therefore, limA_^0+(oJ, a2, o3)=(SI, S2, S3), where the triple (S1, S2, S3) solves the 
Nash problem written in Proposition 2. ■
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Notes
1. See, among many others, McDonald and Solow (1981), Grout (1984), Pissarides 
(1987), Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) and Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991).
2. See, e.g., Barth (1992).
3. See also Shaked and Sutton (1984), Sutton (1986) and Binmore, Shaked and Sutton 
(1989).
4. Hart (1989) provides similar arguments to justify decay. His paper, however, 
abstracts from outside options.
5. Finiteness in alternating calls models is,perse , nothing new: it has been considered 
in Binmore (1987) to provide an alternative proof for uniqueness and was used in 
Stahl’s pioneering work on bargaining (see St£hl (1972),(1988)).
6. Notice that if we assumed I calling at t= A, then S(A), obtained imposing T-2kA—A 
in (3), would be the unique Perfect Equilibrium payoff for I at t= 0.
7. While uniqueness is generated by the finiteness in the horizon of the game, the 
reason for the coincidence of payoffs in both game structures is the absence of 
discounting.
8. We omit the proof of this result for each of the three possible cases remaining; 
notice however that, having I calling both at t —0 and t=T, we gave her the greatest 
advantage possible: this advantage is shown to disappear for A-O, a standard result in 
Rubinstein bargaining theory (see Sutton(1986), Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 
(1984)).
9.In what follows, we simplify the argument by taking 5=1 (no discounting).
10. The significance of the coefficients of the outside option characterisations in 
empirical wage-equations estimated on aggregate data does not serve to discriminate 
between the "Outside Option Principle" and the "shift in the status-quo" since, even 
under the former, the fact that some firms will be "close to" the constraint implies that 
the outside options will affect the outcome in the aggregate (for a theoretical example, 
see Shaked and Sutton (1984b)).
11. The respect of inequality W1+W2> W implies that R > n*+W*, which is always true 
(we take W/*+W2*=W*). Let (L,LPL2) denote respectively the firm’s employees, the 
firm’s employees who are members of union 1, and the firm’s employees who are 
members of union 2. Since Lj+L2=L, the per-capita wage workers obtain under 
separate unions, (Wi +W2)/(Li +L2), is greater than the per-capita wage obtained under 
a single union, W/L.
12. Gosling and Machin (1993) find evidence that the reduction in union coverage in 
UK establishments during the 1980s has worsened the relative position of semi-skilled 
workers, relative to skilled workers: this supports the view that unions mostly increase
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the bargaining power of weaker workers.
13. Similar implications would be obtained using the "morale" or "fairness" efficiency- 
wage principle (see, e.g., Akerlof and Yellen (1990)).
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Chapter m
THE ROLE OF DEBT IN WAGE NEGOTIATIONS:
A STRATEGIC BARGAINING MODEL WITH BANKRUPTCY.
Introduction.
As Grout (1984) has asserted, the inability of labour unions to make wage 
commitments creates an under-investment problem. When wages can be negotiated after 
investment has been sunk, workers are able to bargain over the gross returns the project 
can generate. Then, the entrepreneur will correctly anticipate that, after paying the full 
cost of investment, he will appropriate only a fraction of the surplus. As a consequence, 
the privately optimal choice turns out to be inefficiently low by a social point of view.
This Chapter reconsiders Grout’s under-investment problem by concentrating on 
the role of debt in wage bargaining when long-term labour contracts cannot be 
written1. The impossibility of writing long-term complete contracts can be justified in 
terms of "transaction costs" (due to contingencies that are either unforeseeable or hard 
to describe, costly legal enforcement of contracts, etc.) after Williamson (1975). As we 
show through an explicit analysis of the "threat" of bankruptcy, the extent of under­
investment depends on whether leverage can influence the distribution of surplus 
between wages and profits.
We analyse the relation between debt and wages in a strategic bargaining 
framework, assuming that delays in agreement will reduce the surplus to be shared (see 
Chapter II). We further assume that the workers and the entrepreneur are indispensable 
in production due to their specific skills. We show that if the parties fail to reach an 
agreement for a sufficiently long time, the firm will default on its debt obligations. In 
this model debt allocates the control rights over the firm ex-post. A similar approach 
has been taken by Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and Moore (1994). When 
bankruptcy occurs, ownership is transferred to lenders, who can decide whether to 
liquidate or maintain the firm as a "going concern". Similarly to Hart and Moore 
(1994), we assume that in the event of bankruptcy lenders will come to bargain over 
the surplus the firm can still generate (under the assumptions made, it turns out that 
liquidation is never profitable). What is peculiar to our model is that bankruptcy will 
trigger a three-party bargaining game among the lenders, the workers and the 
entrepreneur in order to split the available surplus. While the workforce and the 
entrepreneur are assumed to be indispensable in production, lenders derive their 
bargaining power from the newly-acquired control of physical capital2.
Bankruptcy never occurs in equilibrium in the present non-stochastic context.
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However, the "threat" of bankruptcy reduces the workers’ bargaining power in the 
bilateral bargaining game with the entrepreneur. By issuing £1 of debt on a competitive 
financial market, the entrepreneur can cash this amount today and reduce, by the same 
amount, the available surplus to be shared tomorrow with the workers. As a 
consequence, the entrepreneur always wants to issue as much debt as possible and, in 
some cases the amount of funds raised even exceeds the sheer cost of investment {over­
borrowing).
The way debt financing works explains why the "hold-up" problem can be 
reduced, although not eliminated. By borrowing, the entrepreneur obtains a higher share 
of surplus which enhances his investment incentives. The amount of funds that the 
entrepreneur can raise in equilibrium is limited, however, since he is unable to 
precommit not to repudiate the debt contract whenever he finds it convenient. This 
observation has two main consequences. First, even if debt is a powerful instrument to 
constrain wages, workers still remain able to share part of the firm’s surplus. Second, 
the limit imposed on the firm’s debt capacity may imply that wealth-constrained 
entrepreneurs cannot borrow enough money to fund profitable projects.
Other papers have analysed the role of debt on wage negotiations3, without 
providing an explicit analysis of bankruptcy. Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) adopt a 
Nash-bargaining approach and find a negative wage-debt relation by making the extreme 
assumption that disagreement in wage bargaining leads to liquidation4. However, our 
view that financial distress is more likely to be dealt with by negotiations is supported 
by the observation that, for the US "financial distress is often resolved through private 
workouts or legal reorganisation under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Only 
much more rarely are distressed firms liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Code" (Wruck, 
1990, p.425).
Bronars and Deere’s (1991) Nash-bargaining model with exogenous bankruptcy 
costs generates very similar results. Their results hinge on the assumption that 
bankruptcy costs are increasing in the size of debt. Higher debt tends to increase the 
number of creditors, raising the cost of "resolving competing claims" in case of 
default5. Such costs, however, are more likely to hit creditors (due, e.g., to legal 
expenses), rather than workers (on this issue, see Webb (1987)).
Perotti and Spier (1993) analyse investment and financial choices as means to
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elicit wage reductions. In their model, shareholders may credibly threaten not to 
undertake new investment unless workers make concessions on the existing wage 
contracts. There are, however, some main differences between that model and ours. 
First, since they implicitly assume that workers cannot bargain over wages after that 
investment is sunk, they reach the conclusion that the investment level is always the 
efficient one, independently of the choice of leverage. Our reconsideration of Grout’s 
problem leads to different conclusions, suggesting that under-investment cannot be 
eliminated, even if debt may improve efficiency (a similar result is also obtained by 
Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993)). Moreover, while Perotti and Spier argue that 
shareholders may extract the whole surplus through strategic debt issues, in our model 
workers are still able to appropriate part of the rents generated by investment. Finally, 
the conclusion that financial decisions "are a crucial factor in the ex-post allocation of 
the firm value" (Perotti and Spier, 1993, p. 1132) depends crucially in our model on the 
indispensability of the entrepreneur in production. As we demonstrate, when the 
entrepreneur can be replaced costlessly, debt does not affect the wage level. This result 
distinguishes our model from the rest of the literature on debt and wages.
The Chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1, we describe the model, 
analyse the bankruptcy process and derive the wage as a function of debt. Section 2 
illustrates the optimal choice of debt, discusses the theoretical implications, and 
examines the empirical predictions of the model. The efficiency implications of the 
model are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we explore the case when the firm is 
able to issue equity contracts. Section 5 concludes.
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1. The Model.
We present a simple deterministic6 model in which all agents have symmetric 
information and utility U(x)=:t, where x  is income. We assume that the parties cannot 
write long-term contracts. The investment project considered costs I0> 0 and generates 
a return equal to R > I0. Both the workers and the entrepreneur have bargaining power 
over R: neither of them can be replaced, due to their indispensability in production. The 
workers’ outside option, W0> 0, is what they can obtain by leaving the negotiation table 
for good. Lo>0 is the liquidation value of the project. As in the bargaining model 
developed in Chapter II, we assume that delays in production cause decay of returns 
over time: R(t)=fitR, with 0E  (0,1), for any t>0. Thus, R(t) is the total return that can 
be obtained if production takes place at date t. There are net gains from production until 
the terminal date £ = r> 0 , defined by R (t) = W0+L0. After t , the parties find it mutually 
convenient to abandon the project (that is liquidated) and to take up their outside 
options, rather than to produce. Similarly to Chapter II, the assumption of decaying 
returns can be justified as follows. A strike, by causing delays in production, is likely 
to worsen the firm 's position (due to lost market opportunities, physical decay of 
machinery, etc.). By contrast, disagreement is unlikely to affect the parties’ outside 
options, which mainly depend on market conditions.
The amount borrowed by the entrepreneur from a competitive financial market 
(the net interest rate is, for simplicity, zero) is denoted by D > 0.
The model is structured in two subsequent games (see Figure 1):
- Workforce-Entrepreneur bargaining. At £=0, the debt contract is written and 
the investment cost, /0, is sunk. A bargaining game with alternating calls starts between 
the workers and the entrepreneur. If an agreement is reached immediately, production 
takes place, returns are shared, and debt is repaid. On the other hand, if disagreement 
persists (and neither player leaves the negotiation table) workers and entrepreneur go 
on issuing proposals, unless bankruptcy occurs at date7 t —T.
Bankruptcy can be triggered by either party. As in Hart and Moore (1994), the 
entrepreneur always has the possibility of repudiating debt. On the other side, workers 
may drive the firm into default through a strike which, by preventing production, 
precludes debt repayment.
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- Bankruptcy game. If bankruptcy occurs, the unfulfilled debt contract, requiring 
D  as repayment, is cancelled. Lenders receive the property rights over the firm’s
liquidate, a three-party bargaining over the residual return, R(t) with tE[T,T], starts. 
The workers and the entrepreneur take part in negotiations, since they are indispensable 
in production, while lenders derive bargaining power from their ability to foreclose the 
use of firm’s capital.
The bargaining framework adopted is based on the model developed in Sections 
1-2 of Chapter II. When (i) the firm’s returns decay over time at a given rate, (ii) the 
sum of the agents’ outside options is positive and constant, (iii) the discount rate is zero 
and, (iv) the calls alternate at intervals shrinking to zero, a dynamic game with N>2 
agents, starting at date t, yields the following unique Perfect Equilibrium payoffs8
where 5* and st are, respectively, agent Vs share of the pie, Z(t), and Vs outside option. 
Mutual gains from an agreement require that Z(t)>HNi=1si> 0.
The model is solved by backward induction. We first solve the bargaining 
problem under bankruptcy and then specify the conditions which may lead to 
bankruptcy, analysing the implications for the entrepreneur-workforce game.
1.1 Distribution under Bankruptcy.
When at date t —T bankruptcy occurs, lenders come to control the firm’s 
physical assets and trilateral negotiations start, unless the firm is liquidated. Since 
liquidation remains available, L0 is the lenders’ outside option. The entrepreneur’s 
outside option is zero.
In equilibrium, using (1) for N= 3, Z(t)=R(t) and t=T, the payoffs on which 
workers, entrepreneur and lenders agree are, respectively:
physical assets and decide whether to liquidate (which gives L0) or not. If they do not
(1)
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K  = \ ( R ( D - L 0+2Wa) (2)
<7, = \{R (J )-L 0-W 0) (3)
L*> = |( i ? ( 7 ) - * V 2 I 0) (4)
The players’ payoffs, (W ^ , 11^^, Ld^ ) ,  are not smaller than the corresponding 
outside alternatives, (W0, 0, L0), if and only if R(T) > R ( t) ,  that is, if and only if T< t. 
The condition T < t  must hold in equilibrium, otherwise it would be mutually 
convenient to liquidate the firm before reaching date T. Hence, when bankruptcy occurs 
at T, liquidation is dominated (since T< r  implies that Ld^  >L 0, lenders will prefer to 
find an agreement over R(T), rather than liquidate).
Using equations (2)-(4), we can evaluate what the entrepreneur and the 
workforce would obtain in bankruptcy9. We derive next the backward-induction 
solution to the workforce-entrepreneur bargaining game, as a function of ( W ^ ,I I ^ )  
and debt repayment D.
1.2 The Workers-Entrepreneur Bargaining Game.
At r=0, the loan is granted and investment is implemented. Competitive lenders 
are willing to finance (or re-finance) the firm as long as they expect to break-even on 
the debt contract they offer. As in Hart and Moore (1994), creditors must take into 
account that the entrepreneur can deliberately default on debt whenever she finds it 
convenient.
In order to analyse the role of debt on wage bargaining, we distinguish between 
the cases of D > L0 and D < L0.
- Consider first the case when the level of debt repayment, D, is greater than 
the firm’s liquidation value, L0. If, at r=0, the entrepreneur and the workers find an 
agreement over the sharing of R-D, production takes place and debt is repaid. If there 
is disagreement, however, production does not occur and debt cannot be repaid. In this
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case, bankruptcy can only be avoided by rolling over debt from the current to the next 
period, provided that lenders are willing to do so. If lenders refuse to roll over debt, 
the firm is declared bankrupt.
The following Lemma gives the conditions under which debt roll-over is 
feasible:
Lemma 1. Suppose that D > L0. Define T as the date which solves Ld^= D . I f  
workers and entrepreneur disagree during wage bargaining, lenders are willing to roll 
over debt until date T is reached, but not beyond.
Proof. Recall that the lenders’ bankruptcy payoff, Ld^ = 1A[R(t)-W0-\-2L0l , is 
monotonically decreasing over time: lenders do not make losses when rolling over debt 
up to a date t< T, since Ld^> D  (should bankruptcy occur at date t, lenders would 
obtain at least D, the amount lent).
Moreover, debt is never rolled over beyond T. When t> T , Ld(t)<D: the 
entrepreneur would rather repudiate her debt, forcing lenders to accept Ld^ ,  than repay 
D (by doing this, the entrepreneur would be able to share D-Ld the lenders’ loss, with 
the workers). ■
Hence, before T  is reached, disagreement in wage bargaining need not imply 
bankruptcy. Moreover, the entrepreneur will roll over debt up to any t< T , in case of 
disagreement with the workers10.
Since Ld^  is monotonically decreasing in TE (0,t], the maximum level of 
credit available to the firm, D*, is given by Ld 0^), where Ld(0) denotes Ld^  calculated 
for T  arbitrarily close to zero. Hence:
Lemma 2. The firm*s debt capacity is:
D ' = |  [R-W0+2L0) (5)
Notice that D*>L0, since R-Wo-Lo>0. When D* is chosen, disagreement between the 
workers and the entrepreneur forces immediately the firm into bankruptcy negotiations.
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It is now possible to characterise the Perfect Equilibrium payoffs of this 
bargaining game, defined for tE[0,T) over R(t)-D, when D > L 0.
Since >  W0 and IT ^ > 0 , neither party will ever quit the firm before date 
T  is reached. The workers’ and the entrepreneur’s bankruptcy payoffs become the 
economically relevant alternatives to an earlier agreement on R(t)-D. Thus, evaluating
(1) for N = 2, Z(t)=R(t)-D and t - 0, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 3. Suppose that D E  (L^D*]. In equilibrium, the workforce's and the
entrepreneur's payoffs are given by, respectively
while the payoff o f the lenders is D (the amount lent).
Both the entrepreneur’s and the workers’ shares bear the burden of debt 
repayment. With D >L0, should disagreement last long enough to cause bankruptcy, the 
entrepreneur would lose control over the firm. Bankruptcy involves the cancellation of 
debt D but triggers, at the same time, the participation of lenders in negotiations. Thus, 
the workforce and the entrepreneur are unable to eschew their part of debt repayments, 
since in equilibrium it holds that D=Ld^ .
- We analyse now the case for L0>D. When the liquidation value of the firm 
is not smaller than the contractual debt repayment, rolling over D is never a problem 
since, in bankruptcy, lenders can obtain their money back just by liquidating the firm. 
The bargaining process between the workers and the entrepreneur, whose outside option 
is now L0-D >  0, takes place in tE[0 ,t]  over R(t)-D. Evaluating (1) for Z(t) =R(t)-D and 
t=0, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 4. Suppose that L0>D. In equilibrium, the payoffs o f the workers and 
the entrepreneur are, respectively:
11
n w .  = \ ( R - D  + Wa-(L0-D)) = ± ( R - L 0 + W0) (8)
“ L a ,  = -  \ {R+h-Wa)-D
while the payoff of the lenders is D.
The whole burden of debt is borne by the entrepreneur’s share. With L0>D, the 
entrepreneur always finds it convenient to repay debt, in order to keep control over the 
firm’s physical assets: using (3) and (9), it is immediate to verify that, over the 
bargaining horizon rE/0,r7, entrepreneur’s voluntary repudiation is sub-optimal. In 
fact, repudiation at t would be convenient if (1 /2)[R(t)-Wq+LJ-D  < (l/3)[R(t)-W0-L0j, 
which never holds, since L0>D and R(t)-W0-L0>0.
Since the possibility of bankruptcy is ruled out when L0>D, lenders will never 
come to compete with workers over the sharing of the rents.
Notice finally that bankruptcy never occurs in equilibrium: forward-looking 
agents can infer the consequences of financial distress without provoking it.
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2. The Optimal Choice of Debt and its Implications.
The strategic financial choice of an entrepreneur who is indispensable in 
production can now be analysed. We assume that the cost of the investment project, I0, 
is greater than its liquidation value, L0. A level of debt D  greater than I0 is also 
possible: the entrepreneur may use borrowed funds for activities which are unrelated 
to the production process, such as perquisites consumption, acquisition of assets, etc.
The level of debt, D, is chosen to maximise the profit expression
U  = R - W - I 0 (10)
The following statement characterises the entrepreneur’s optimal choice:
Proposition 1. The entrepreneur's optimal choice o f debt in [0,D*] is D*: the 
entrepreneur borrows up to the firm's debt capacity, defined in (5).
Proof. For D < L0, the wage is defined by W\D<tLo in (8): since this wage level 
is unaffected by debt, profits are independent of D. For D > L 0, the wage is W\D>Lo, 
as defined in (6): since profits, calculated for W=W\D>Loi are monotonically increasing 
in D, M  is maximised for D=D*, as defined in (5). It remains to be shown that R- 
W\ D^ Lo~I0— (1/2) (R+L0-W()-I0 is smaller than the corresponding expression calculated 
for D=D*, i.e., R-W\d>Lo-I0=(1/2)(R+D*-Wq)-I0: this is always true, since 
D*>L0. m
For D=D*, the wage and the profit levels are, respectively 
W(D') = i ( t f -D *  + wg = \ { R - L 0+2W0) (11)
The wage expression (11) is explained as follows. When D* is chosen, the 
workforce is indifferent between: (i) disagreeing and trigger a bankruptcy process with 
three party bargaining over R(T), which is arbitrarily close to R(0) (T  is arbitrarily close
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to zero, when D=D*), and (ii) accepting a deal over R-D*, according to the rules in 
(6)-(7). Since "conflict" brings no gain to the workers, an agreement over R-D* is 
immediately found. On the other side, the entrepreneur cashes the entire amount D*, 
while the repayment of D* itself is equally borne by W\D>Lo and^\\D>Lo, defined by 
(6)-(7). Borrowed funds can thus be strategically used to divert part of the rents away 
from the workforce. However, a noticeable feature of the present model is that, since 
the entrepreneur’s ability to manipulate the firm’s capital structure is limited by the debt 
capacity D *, workers are still able to share part of firm’s surplus. In other words, wage 
W(D*) is greater than W0, its "market" alternative11.
Another relevant implication of the model is that the strategic use of debt can 
also generate over-borrowing:
Corollary. When D*>Iq, the firm borrows D* and uses the amount D*-I0 to 
finance activities not related to the production process.
Even if unrelated to production needs, this use of financial resources is not per 
se wasteful, being just a side-effect of the distributional role of debt.
Notice that the results we have obtained so far are crucially based on the 
assumption that the entrepreneur is indispensable in production. Under the extreme 
assumption that the entrepreneur can be costlessly replaced, bargaining in bankruptcy 
will reduce to a two-party game between lenders and workers. In fact, an entrepreneur 
who is not indispensable in production derives his bargaining power only from physical 
assets’ ownership, which is lost in case of bankruptcy. Also, the firm’s credit capacity 
is equal to (1/2)[R+L0-WqI  and is greater than D*, defined in (5): should bankruptcy 
occur, lenders could exclude the entrepreneur, bargain only with the workforce and 
obtain a larger share of returns. In this case however, as shown by the following 
Proposition, debt cannot be used to affect the workers’ bargaining position.
Proposition 2. I f  the entrepreneur is dispensable and can be replaced costlessly 
in production, debt can not effect the wage level.
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Proof. Take D > L0. If the entrepreneur is dispensable for production, the 
bankruptcy payoffs are IT ^ = 0 , WI r^) = (l/2)[R(T)-\-W0-L(J  and Ld^  = (l/2)[R(T)- 
Wq+ LJ. Since D=Ld bilateral bargaining between entrepreneur and workers over 
R(t)-D in tE[0,T) gives them, respectively, II =(l/2)[(R-D)-Wd^J =  (1/2)[R-W0-\-LqJ-D 
and W= (1/2)[(R-D)+ Wd(j)]= (1/2)[R+Wq-LJ. Notice also that Wand II coincide with 
(8)-(9). ■
The results obtained in Proposition 1 and 2 are encompassed by a model where 
the entrepreneur turns out to be indispensable with probability a E [0 ,l] , should 
bankruptcy occur. In Appendix I we show that the entrepreneur will still choose to 
borrow up to full debt capacity as far as a > 0.
Our results have some empirical implications. In general12, firms with a 
specialised, or unionised, workforce will tend to exhibit higher leverage than firms with 
non-specialised (or non-unionised) workers. This prediction is consistent with the 
findings of Bronars and Deere (1991) and Machin and Scaramozzino (1993). Bronars 
and Deere (1991) find a positive and significant relation between unionisation and 
leverage for a sample of U.S. firms. This finding is not directly confirmed by Machin 
and Scaramozzino (1993) for a panel of U.K. firms. They find, however, a positive and 
significant relation between the proportion of skilled workers in the firm and the debt- 
equity ratio. Their interpretation is that the proportion of skilled workers is likely to 
measure bargaining power over the firm’s rents: high debt would then be a device to 
constrain wages.
Moreover, the result that firms tend to raise more debt than required by 
investment costs (as predicted by the Corollary) seems to be empirically supported. As 
reported by Hart and Moore (1994,p .864-5), "there is some evidence that firms borrow 
more than they strictly need to cover the cost of their investment project"13.
Further, our wage equations such as expression (11) predict that inter-firm wage 
differentials depend on the returns generated by each firm, as commonly observed14. 
On the contrary, if debt could transfer the whole surplus to the profit share as hinted 
by Perotti and Spier (1993), wages should be unrelated to the firm’s returns.
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3. Implications for Efficiency.
The social optimality condition for investment prescribes that the returns 
generated by the project are not smaller than labour’s and capital’s opportunity costs: 
R> W0+I0. We can rewrite this condition as
R -  WQ -  L0 2. IQ-  L0
When projects which satisfy (13) are not realised, "under-investment" occurs. We 
separate the deviations from (13) into two classes: "Grout-type" and "Hart-Moore-type" 
inefficiencies.
- Grout-type Inefficiency. As in Grout (1984), this type of inefficiency derives 
from the ability of the workforce to bargain over wages once the cost I0 has been sunk. 
A project of cost I0 will be undertaken if, and only if, M(D*) > 0  holds. Using (12), this 
condition is equivalent to:
3 (14)R - W 0 - L 0 ± j ( I 0 - L 0)
Inequality (14) is more restrictive than (13), therefore the entrepreneur will be 
willing to undertake a set of projects smaller than the socially desirable set. If however 
debt had no power to constrain wages (as it happens under Proposition 2) the condition 
for investing would be R-L0-W0>2(I0-Lq}, which is even more restrictive than (14). By 
redistributing surplus to the entrepreneur, debt allows for the realisation of investment 
projects which would have otherwise been unprofitable. Our argument provides a 
possible reason why developed and competitive credit markets may favour the 
investment process15.
The conclusion that high leverage enhances efficiency holds, however, provided 
that workers do not have to make any specific and costly investment as well16. 
Indeed, as pointed out by Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993), if workers had to make some 
costly firm-specific investment ex-ante, strategic debt could reduce efficiency. To 
illustrate briefly this point, assume that the workers’ investment level, e, generates 
disutility g(e) (g’> 0, g ” >0). Returns are given by R(e) (R’> 0, R ” <0) and the 
workers’ utility is equal to W-g(e). With D=D*, workers choose e*, solving 1/3R’(e)~
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g ’(e)=  0. On the other hand, ifZ)=0, workers will choose e0, solving y2R ’(e)-g’(e)=Q. 
Since e0 > e *, the strategic use of debt drives the workers’ investment decision further 
away from its efficient level (defined by R ’(e)-g’(e) =0). We will consider this issue in 
greater detail in Chapter IV.
- Hart-Moore-type Inefficiency. When the entrepreneur is unable to precommit 
not to default on her debt, wealth-constraints may prevent the realisation of profitable 
projects, even when Grout-type inefficiencies are not at work (M(D*)>0). If debt does 
not cover the full cost of the project (D* < I0), investment is unfeasible whenever the 
entrepreneur’s wealth, $ 0, is such that $ 0< I0-D*. This is the same mechanism that 
generates under-investment in Hart and Moore (1994): profitable investment projects 
may be foregone due to the firm’s insufficient financing capacity17.
As made clearer by the following numerical examples, the Hart-Moore-type 
inefficiency and the Grout-type inefficiency need not imply each other. For R-W0= 8, 
L0—0, I0=4, $ 0=0, only the Hart-Moore-type inefficiency is at work. For R-W0= 8, 
Lo= 0 ,1 q =6, $ 0=4, only the Grout-type inefficiency operates.
These results can be summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. An entrepreneur will not undertake a socially efficient investment 
project (such that R >  W0+If) when:
(i) either M(D*) < 0: Even if the entrepreneur takes up as much debt as she can, 
her final payoff will still be negative since workers capture "too much" o f the surplus 
generated by investment (Grout-type inefficiency),
(ii) or $ 0+D* < I0: The entrepreneur is unable to finance the project because of 
wealth-constrains and cannot commit not to repudiate her debt (Hart-Moore 
inefficiency).
However, the use of debt allows for the realisation o f efficient investment project 
which otherwise would have been unprofitable.
The problem relative to the Hart-Moore effect raised by Proposition 3 can be 
much less dramatic if firms can issue equity contracts. This issue is discussed in the 
next Section.
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The inefficiencies we considered only arise if the parties cannot write long-term 
contracts before investment is sunk18. Legislation against strikes that violate previous 
agreements might perhaps provide a "commitment technology" for the workers, as 
Grout (1984,p.450) argues on the basis of the comparison between the US and UK laws 
on industrial disputes. Although the presence of no-strike provisions in labour contracts 
can be relevant, it is unlikely that the under-investment problem can be fully eliminated. 
As Hart (1995) recalls, the inability to precommit not to renegotiate the contract 
conditions at a future date exposes the party who invested to the other party’s 
opportunistic behaviour19. Moreover, opportunism may also explain why a party can 
be unwilling to enter self-restraining commitments, when the other can take actions 
difficult to contract ex-ante, such as the choice of leverage. As Perotti and Spier’s 
(1993) analysis suggests, workers who accept to "tie their hands" by committing not to 
strike expose themselves to the adverse consequences of debt manipulations.
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4. Equity Contracts
We define an equity contract as a contract specifying that a positive fraction 
a £  [0,1) of the entrepreneurial share (7) will be paid out to shareholders who bought 
shares of value E. Thus, with competitive capital markets and net interest rate equal to 
zero, the dividend flow must equate E :
± (R -D -W J = E (15)
In contrast with debt repayments (which impose a constraint on the flow of returns 
generated by the firm), dividends are paid out of the entrepreneur’s share residualty. 
This fact has two consequences. First, equity is not an effective tool in reducing wages 
and, thus, the entrepreneur will still maximise profit by choosing D=D*. As a 
consequence, debt-financing dominates equity-financing (as well as own-financing)10. 
Moreover, an entrepreneur will issue equity only21 when debt (D*) is insufficient to 
cover the cost of investment (I0): in this case, E=I0-D*> 0. Hence, when feasible, 
equity-issues can wipe out the under-investment inefficiency generated by wealth 
constrains (the Hart-Moore effect). These results are consistent with the finding that, 
in contrast with debt, equity issues tend to be associated with relatively low profitability 
(see, e.g., Harris and Raviv (1991)). Here, highly profitable firms not only have no 
need to issue stock to cover the cost of investment, but they will also be able to over­
borrow.
The possibility of equity-issues in the present context remains, however, quite 
questionable. In general, debt repayments are much easier to enforce than dividend 
payments. As it happens in the present model, debtors who are not repaid can appeal 
to a court and get the control over the firm. As emphasised by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1995), shareholders are generally in a weak bargaining position, especially when they 
own minority stakes. For example, when firm’s profitability is not easily verifiable by 
a court, the entrepreneur may successfully divert funds and pay out a smaller amount 
of dividends. Hence, the potential conflict of interest between entrepreneur and equity- 
holders makes it difficult for many firms to access stock markets22. This will be true, 
in particular, for countries (like Italy or Korea) where the legal protection offered to 
shareholders is rather limited23.
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5. Conclusions.
In this Chapter, we examined how the capital structure of the firm can be used 
to affect the division of the surplus between an entrepreneur and his workforce.
The idea that debt can constrain wages has been already explored in the 
literature, beginning with Bronars and Deere (1991). The present approach, however, 
has the advantage of using an explicit bargaining game to model the bankruptcy 
process. Our procedure allows us to identify better the conditions which make debt an 
effective strategic tool. We considered what the workforce and the entrepreneur can 
obtain by "disagreeing”. If disagreement in bilateral wage bargaining lasts long enough, 
the firm is led to bankruptcy. Lenders obtain the control over the firm’s assets and, if 
the entrepreneur is indispensable in production, there will be a three-party bargaining 
over the available surplus. Therefore, a relevant aspect of the model we presented is 
that failure to meet the requirements specified by the contract has a direct impact on the 
structure of the bargaining game to be played by forward-looking agents.
From the point of view of welfare, different sources of inefficiency coexist in 
this model. With regard to Grout’s ”hold-up" problem we showed that, by increasing 
the profit share, debt can reduce under-investment. A second source of inefficiency is 
generated by the limit to the debt capacity of the firm. A wealth-constrained 
entrepreneur may not be able to raise enough money to fund a profitable investment 
project.
The results obtained above apply immediately to any context that concerns 
bargaining between the firm and input suppliers other than the workers.
The themes we treated here are partly re-considered in Chapter IV, where we 
analyse the role of debt not only for what it concerns the level of investment, but also 
with regard to the degree of sophistication of the projects chosen.
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Appendix I
The Optimal Choice of Debt when the Entrepreneur can be replaced 
with Probability 1-a E[0,1].
The motivation for considering the case when the incumbent entrepreneur can 
be replaced with some positive probability in case of bankruptcy comes from the 
empirical observation that the level of turnover of directors and managers in financially 
distressed firms is significantly higher than the corresponding one in firm which do not 
experiment financial troubles. This is the case even when distressed firm are expected 
to remain in business (see Gilson (1989,1990)).
The only relevant case in which entrepreneur’s substitutability matters is the one 
in which D > L0 (for D < L0, Lemma 4 applies). Consider the case when, if bankruptcy 
occurs, lenders have probability 1-aE  [0,1] of finding a new management which has 
the same ability of the incumbent one to run the firm. The incumbent entrepreneur will 
then maintain his bargaining power in bankruptcy only with probability a. When the 
incumbent entrepreneur can be actually substituted, there will be a bilateral bankruptcy 
game between the workforce and the lender. Otherwise, the entrepreneur will keep his 
position and there will be again a three-party bargaining game. Thus, the expected 
workforce’s payoff in bankruptcy (at time, say, t *) is
E W ^  = (1-a) 4(«(f/)-L 0 * Ryl + -L0+2WJ
2 3
while management’s expected payoff becomes EHd^= a (l/3 )(R (tf)-W0-L()
The terminal date t= T r in the management-workforce bargaining game is 
defined by:
T': R (T )-D  = EWrt,, + (A11)(r/) (Tf)
which we can rearrange into the following
R(T) -W 0-L 0 = ( D - L ^ ^ —  (A1.2)
5  -  CL
By using (A1.2) we have that the management P.E. payoff is
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n' = I(i?-o) + |(£nrt- £ ^ )  =
(A1.3)
= - ( f l - R y  + 3(1 ~c \  ~^2±d
2 *  2(3-a ) 0 3 -a
The wage expression (Wf=R-D-UT) takes the form:
W' = - ( R  + RO -  3(1~a )Z-n -  — D (A1.4)
2 v  2(3-a ) 0 3 -a
Thus, when D > L *, profits are given by
M(£>;<*) = R - W '- I 0 =
= - ( K - R y  + 3(1 - ^ -L0 + — D - I 0 
2 *  2(3-a ) 0 3 -a  0
(A1.5)
which is monotonically increasing in D , provided that a > 0. The level of D will be 
therefore set to its upper bound, D**, where
D ** = L& = (1 -a ) |( * + Z , -  Ry + a i(,R +2£0 -  Ry =
(A1.6)
= ±{R + L 0 -  Ry -  a i(* -Z „  -  Ry > ^
(recall that D**>L0 is implied by /0>L 0).
5|C3(CAfter having shown that the optimal level of D is D (if a > 0  and D > L0), we 
want to check that M(a,D**) >M (D\D<Lq) for any a E [0 ,l] , where M(D\D<Lq) is 
the profit level R-W-I0 calculated for the wage level (8). This inequality implies that:
n** & t 0L— D ------  ^ Ln------
3 -a  3 -a
which holds strictly for any a € (0 ,l] ,  since D**>L0.
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The explanation of this result is quite immediate: if managers can be replaced 
with probability one in a bankruptcy state (a=0), they lose any bargaining power in the 
bankruptcy state (the argument here is quite similar to what generates the "walrasian 
case" of Shaked and Sutton (1984a)). It follows that the level of debt repayments they 
contract, D , cannot constrain the wage level: as a consequence, the management will 
be indifferent to the financial source to use to finance the project. This indifference is 
broken when the management has a positive probability of not being replaced (a>0), 
making the maximum level of sustainable debt (here, D**) the optimal choice. (Notice 
that D**=D*, as defined by Lemma 2, for a= l ) .
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Debt D is raised. 
Investment cost I0 is sunk. 
Entrepreneur-workers 
negotiations start.
FIGURE 1 
TIMING
t= T
Bankruptcy occurs. 
Lenders seize assets. 
Entrepreneur and workers 
negotiate with lenders.
t= r
Bargaining ends. 
Liquidation occurs.
Notes
1. With "contract incompleteness" under-investment arises in a variety of economic 
contexts (see Hart (1995) for a comprehensive and detailed discussion). We return to 
these issues in Sect.IV.
2. Hart and Moore (1994) also assume that the entrepreneur has special skills in 
production. However, they use the bargaining outcome between the lender and the 
defaulted borrower to define the set of the viable debt contracts, i.e., those contracts 
which do not induce the entrepreneur to default voluntarily (see also Moore (1992)).
3. The strategic role of debt has been analysed in other contexts than wage negotiations: 
for example, Brander and Lewis (1986) consider the strategic choice of leverage in a 
model of oligopolistic competition.
4. On this point, see also Gilson et al. (1990).
5. Bronars and Deere (1991,Note 4,p.234)
6. The extension of the model to the case of stochastic returns is quite straightforward.
7. Date T  will be shown to depend on the level of D.
8. As discussed in Chapter II, the payoffs’ uniqueness, holding also for a number of 
players greater than two, follows from the finiteness of the time-horizon (r<  oo). By 
contrast, we recall that the extension of Rubinstein (1982) to three (or more) players 
generates indeterminacy, unless stringent restrictions on strategies are imposed (see, 
e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)).
9. If strategies were assumed to be stationary, the application of the Rubinstein’s (1982) 
model to trilateral bankruptcy negotiations would also generate a unique solution (see 
note 7). In that context, however, the players’ outside alternatives would matter, at 
most, as corner solutions ("Outside Options Principle").
10. Lenders would benefit from a bankruptcy process starting at a date t< T, since 
Ld(t)>D. As a consequence, the entrepreneur and the workers would get bankruptcy 
payoffs which are smaller than those obtainable by agreeing and repaying D.
11. Note that the basic result in Proposition 1 holds even if R is taken to be stochastic, 
provided that the firm is economically viable (R>L0+W0). Similarly to Perotti and 
Spier (1993), the debt level can be suitably adjusted ex-post, so to provide a "bargaining 
tool" in wage negotiations.
12. See Appendix I.
13. In contrast with our explanation, Hart and Moore (1994) argue that firms over­
borrow "to provide themselves with a ’financial cushion’".
14. See, e.g., Nickell and Wadhwani (1990).
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15. The positive relation between credit market development and physical capital 
accumulation is strongly supported by King and Levine (1993).
16. In contrast with our result that debt improves efficiency, Perotti and Spier (1993) 
find that issuing debt may reduce efficiency because it exposes (risk-averse) workers 
to more risk.
17. Notice that when D*>I0 (the over-borrowing case discussed in Sect.III) it holds that 
R-L0-W0>3(Iq-Lq) : hence, condition (14) is satisfied. Investment is always feasible (no 
Hart-Moore inefficiency) and profitable (no Grout inefficiency).
18. See for example Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993,p.215).
19. Post-contractual opportunism is what drives Hart and Moore’s (1994) results, since 
the entrepreneur "can always threaten to repudiate the contract by withdrawing his 
human capital” (p.841).
20. Note that, with E > 0 and D —D*, the entrepreneur’s profit, net of dividend 
payment, is still given by M(D*) as defined in (12). This fact can be shown by 
maximising (10) as in Sect.2, noticing th a t£ > 0  (i.e., a>0) has no impact on the wage 
level.
21. As implied by (15), equity-issueperse  bring no net gain to the entrepreneur.
22. The problem of the conflict of interest between manager and shareholders (see the 
literature surveyed in Harris and Raviv (1991)) is not considered in Perotti and Spier
(1993). These authors in fact assume that managers operate financial choices in the 
interest of shareholders.
23. In countries like the U.S.A. or the U.K., the courts have fully accepted "the idea 
of managers’ duty of loyalty to shareholders" (Shleifer and Vishny (1995,p.22)).
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Chapter IV
STRATEGIC EXTERNAL FINANCING AND 
SOPHISTICATION OF THE PRODUCTION PROCESS.
Introduction.
In their 1991 survey on capital structure, Harris and Raviv noted that the 
interactions between financing decisions and product/input markets were quite 
underexplored (see Harris and Raviv (1991)). Since then, research on this topic has 
mainly developed in two directions. The first one has further investigated the role of 
leverage as a commitment device in oligopolistic competition, after the seminal work 
of Brander and Lewis (1986) (see Zechner (1996)). The second direction of research 
has concentrated on inputs, analyzing the role of debt as a "bargaining tool" in wage 
negotiations when labour has specific skills in production and labour contracts are not 
binding (see the literature quoted in Chapter III). Notably, Titman (1984) has offered 
another possible route for research by trying to relate the capital structure with certain 
attributes of output (in his model, production of durable and/or specific goods tends to 
be associated with low leverage). In the present Chapter we focus on the effects of debt 
on the features of production abstracting from the impact of leverage on inter-firm 
competition. In particular, we ask how the strategic use of debt in negotiations that we 
analysed in Chapter III can influence the characteristics of the production process 
chosen in equilibrium. The main result we obtain is that leverage may strongly affect 
the entrepreneur’s decision about the degree of technological complexity adopted in 
production.
The notion of technological complexity used here exploits the underlying idea 
of several works in the economic literature, which range from theories of economic 
development, such as Kremer (1993), to the theory of the firm (see, e.g., Hart and 
Moore (1990)): the adoption of sophisticated production processes requires the 
performance of several tasks, the use of multiple assets, and the hiring of groups of 
specialised workers. For example, successful car companies need a mix of tasks such 
as design, engineering, marketing and assistance. Our model hinges on the distributive 
conflict that arises within the firm when each corporate unit assigned to a task acquires 
specific skills in production. If such a production unit, constituted by a group of 
employees, is indispensable, it will gain some bargaining power over the surplus.
Consider an entrepreneur who has access to a set of projects requiring a 
different number of tasks (for example, the entrepreneur can decide whether to produce 
simple goods, such as bicycles, or complex products, such as jet planes). In this
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perspective, when an entrepreneur decides whether to invest, and which type of project 
to adopt, two kinds of social inefficiencies may arise. The first inefficiency is the same 
as the one analysed in Chapter III, after Grout’s (1984) hold-up problem: the level of 
investment tends to be too low. The second kind of inefficiency, which mainly 
characterises the present Chapter, is what we denote as "under-sophistication": given 
a set of alternative and profitable investment projects, the degree of technological 
sophistication chosen by the entrepreneur tends to be too low.
Under-sophistication originates from the fact that, in our model, the intensity of 
the struggle over surplus distribution is increasing in the measure of technological 
complexity we adopt. Indeed, the adoption of more sophisticated processes has two 
main consequences. On the one hand, a more complex production tends to generate 
higher revenues but, on the other hand, a larger number of tasks has to be carried out. 
Since such tasks are to be performed by groups of employees who form a bargaining 
unit, greater sophistication ends up generating tougher competition over the division of 
the surplus. Thus, from the entrepreneur’s perspective, the benefits from more complex 
productions are likely to be overweighed by the cost implicit in the participation of 
additional players in negotiations. As a consequence, even when it would be socially 
efficient to adopt more complex processes (producing, say, airplanes), the entrepreneur 
will generally choose simpler production technologies (e.g., motorbikes).
A central result of the Chapter is that the extent of under-sophistication is 
reduced when the entrepreneur can borrow from a financial market. Following the 
"control rights" approach to corporate borrowing put forward by Hart and Moore
(1994), we know from Chapter III that debt can effectively modify the agents’ 
bargaining position by imposing additional and credible claims on surplus. When a firm 
fails to meet its contractual obligations, lenders are entitled to take control over physical 
assets and, for this reason, are enabled to bargain over the returns that the project can 
generate. Thus, when liquidation is dominated, defaulting on contractual repayments 
triggers lenders’ participation in bankruptcy negotiations.
In the present model, debt works through two different mechanisms.
First, as already shown in Chapter III, a high level of debt raises the 
entrepreneur’s profit: when debt is sold to competitive lenders, the entrepreneur can 
pocket money today against a future repayment that will have to be borne by all those 
who take part in the project.
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However, debt also works through a second effect, which neatly characterises 
the present model. This new mechanism is a side-effect of the strategic use of debt in 
surplus negotiations: as we show, debt stimulates the choice of more complex projects 
because it reduces the adverse distributive effect brought in by highly sophisticated 
processes. In this perspective, leverage tends to lessen both under-investment (see 
Chapter III) and under-sophistication. As we will demonstrate, debt may also encourage 
the adoption of more complex production methods when financial markets are non­
competitive and the positive effect that debt has on the profit level is destroyed.
The main contribution of this Chapter may then be summed-up as follows: our 
model links, through the analysis of strategic debt in negotiations, leverage 
considerations together with production characteristics. For this reason, the present 
approach gives a new direction of research in the field that was first explored by Titman 
(1984).
The results that we obtain have several implications. Since technological 
complexity (in terms of tasks, assets, corporate divisions) is likely to be related to the 
company’s dimension, our model is consistent with one of the most robust empirical 
findings in corporate finance, the positive correlation between size and leverage (see 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), and the references quoted in Harris and Raviv (1991)). 
Also, if technical progress can be seen, at least in part1, as a process that generates 
increasingly complicated production processes, our model might help explaining why 
an historical trend towards increasing leverage has been observed (see Taggart (1985) 
and Masulis (1988)). Moreover, the availability of a skilled labour force may not be 
sufficient, in contrast with Kremer’s (1993) suggestion, for the implementation of 
highly sophisticated productions: when employees can exercise some bargaining power 
over surplus, developed financial markets may also be necessary. This observation is 
quite consistent with the empirical results found in a series of papers by King and 
Levine (see King and Levine (1993a,b,c)). According to these authors, the degree of 
a country’s financial development is an important predictor of later growth and 
investment. Indeed, cross-country differences in the rates of physical capital 
accumulation seem to be positively linked to two main factors: the size of the financial 
sector, and its propensity to finance private entrepreneurship. Thus, our paper may help 
explaining why "rich" countries, which also happen to have highly developed financial
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sectors, specialise in complicated production processes2, while "poor" countries 
concentrate on primary productions3.
As already mentioned in Chapter III, the strategic use of debt4 as a credible 
threat has been studied in many papers. In particular, Perotti and Spier (1993) examine 
debt-for-equity swaps as a tool to renegotiate wages. Similarly, Dasgupta and Sengupta 
(1993) find a negative wage-debt relation in the context of a firm-union bargaining 
model. However, even if the models developed in Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) and 
in Chapter III conclude that debt may encourage the accumulation of physical capital, 
neither of them analyses the implications of leverage on the characteristics of the 
production process. Two important papers, which abstract from financing issues, 
analyse the relation between bargaining and technological decisions: when labour 
contracts are non-binding, Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) show that employees’ bargaining 
power tends to distort the technology choice of the entrepreneur. The crucial assumption 
of these authors is that the entrepreneur bargains "pairwise" with each of the employees 
who are assigned to a certain task. Stole and Zwiebel find that an entrepreneur has an 
incentive to over-employ: in fact, excess-employment allows the firm to "play a 
workers against the other" during negotiations and, as a consequence, equilibrium 
wages turn out to be equal to the competitive level. Although some implications of Stole 
and Zwiebel’s model have sound economic appeal, their "pairwise bargaining" approach 
has an important limit. As shown by Horn and Wolinsky’s (1988) paper on unionisation 
patterns, workers that are substitutable in production have an incentive to form a 
"coalition" (e.g., a union), so to constitute a single bargaining unit that avoids between- 
worker competition during negotiations. Horn and Wolinsky’s argument eliminates Stole 
and Zwiebel’s over-employment result and it justifies the one-to-one correspondence we 
assume between tasks (performed each by a certain number of employees) and 
bargaining units.
The Chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the basic model and 
discusses, in the absence of capital markets, the inefficiencies generated by the 
distribution process. Section 2 introduces capital markets and Section 3 considers the 
implications of debt over the entrepreneur’s selection of the project. Section 4 analyses 
the case of multiple lenders and evaluates the consequences of public debt versus private 
debt. The presence of a monopolistic lender is considered in Section 5: we find that a
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monopolistic lending institution may even outperform a competitive market in reducing 
under-sophistication inefficiencies. Section 6 extends the basic model to consider 
employees’ effort choice. When employees’ effort is relevant, the positive effects of 
high leverage can be overturned: indeed, the negative effect that debt has on each 
employee’s share can drastically reduce effort investment. For this reason, it can be in 
the entrepreneur’s interest to commit not to use leverage strategically. This observation 
might contribute to explain why companies which undertake large R&D expenditures 
have relatively low leverage (see Harris and Raviv (1991)). In fact, researchers’ effort 
in R&D is likely to be crucial for the firm’s (expected) returns. Section 7 concludes.
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1. The Basic Framework.
We consider an entrepreneur (agent 1) who has the ability of starting-up a firm 
and has access to a set of N  alternative investment projects, which involve different 
levels of sophistication. A project of type n, with tz=1,2,..,N, yields a return equal to 
Y(n) > 0 and costs I(n) >  0. The degree of technological sophistication of the project is 
indexed by n , which is equal to the number of complementary tasks that must be 
performed in order to produce Y(n). Each individual who does not take part in multi­
task productions can implement an autarkic production (n= 1) and obtain Y(l)~ 
1(1) =y >0. Further, the opportunity of undertaking the autarkic production is foregone 
when an agent decides to take part in a project such that n>  1. Thus, participation in 
"sophisticated" productions and "autarkic” activities (such as craftsmanship or farming) 
are mutually exclusive5.
The characteristics of the technology available are such that investment is 
irreversible. Once the cost I(n) has been sunk, the investment made can only be used 
for a «-type production. In other words, we suppose that the cost of converting, say, 
a truck factory into a bicycle or shoe factory is too high to be economically viable. 
Further, a «-type project yields Y(n) with certainty, provided that all the n tasks are 
carried out: however, if even one of the task fails to be performed, returns drop to 
zero6.
For simplicity, we assume that each task is performed by a single employee: in 
this way, a bargaining unit is composed of just one worker. There are at least H > N  
available agents who are sufficiently skilled to execute a task. Also, we assume that 
each individual who participates in a certain project acquires special skills and can be 
replaced only at very high cost. When agents gain project-specific knowledge and 
binding contracts are unfeasible (due, for example, to the inability to precommit not to 
renegotiate ex-post, as in the typical Grout’s problem discussed in Chapter III7), each 
employee acquires bargaining power over the surplus generated by the project.
The timing of the model is the following:
In the first stage (f= l), the entrepreneur decides whether to invest. If she 
invests, she also decides the degree of sophistication, n, to be adopted in the production 
process.
In the second stage (t=2), the entrepreneur decides about the quantity of
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external funds to be raised (z/the firm has access to a financial market).
In the third stage (t=3), investment is implemented and the n agents start 
bargaining over returns. If an agreement is found, production is carried over and 
surplus is shared.
We solve the model by backward induction. Although the functions we consider 
are intrinsically defined only for discrete values of n , it will be sometimes useful to 
treat n as a continuous variable over the interval [2,N], abstracting away from integer 
constraints.
1.2. The Sharing Rule.
Each task gives some monopoly power to the agent who performs it for two 
reasons. First, each of the n tasks is necessary in the production of Y(n) and, further, 
agents’ replacement is very costly, due to the acquisition of special skills. As 
mentioned, since each task is performed by a single agent, we have a one-to-one 
correspondence between bargaining parties (equal to the number of the complementary 
tasks) and employees.
Under the conditions exposed in Chapter II, it can be shown that when n agents 
alternate in making proposals over a pie of value R, agent f  s perfect equilibrium payoff 
is (z = l ,2,..,«):
where st is z’s outside option.
By setting R=Y(n), we can consider the sharing of the returns from an «-type 
project. In what follows, we assume that the outside option available to each agent other 
than the entrepreneur is negligible after entering the project8. During negotiations, 
instead, the entrepreneur maintains the possibility of liquidating the project, obtaining 
as alternative payoff the liquidation value L(n)> 0, where L(n)<I(n). Thus, the 
entrepreneur’s and the employees’ (z=2,..,«;zV 1) payoffs are, respectively:
(1)
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s l  = Y(n)+(n-i)L(n) and S l = m - m (2)
n n
Having characterised the distribution rule, we can illustrate the two main sources 
of inefficiency arising from the model. In order to do this, we abstract momentarily 
from the presence of capital markets: projects have to be entirely funded by the 
entrepreneur herself.
2.2. The Sources o f Inefficiency with No Capital Markets.
- Under-investment (Grout-inefficiency) . Some under-investment generally arises 
when the surplus generated by an agent’s investment can partly be appropriated by 
others. As emphasised by Grout (1984) in the context of bilateral firm-workforce 
negotiations, the equilibrium level of investment is inefficiently low whenever workers 
cannot make credible wage commitments before the investment cost is sunk by the 
entrepreneur (refer to Chapter III). By the same token, consider a project of a given 
degree of sophistication, n. When the entrepreneur is not wealth constrained, the project 
can be undertaken even in the absence of capital markets. However, anticipating the 
outcome of the bargaining process over Y(n) defined in (2), the entrepreneur will invest 
if and only if
or, Y(n) £ ny+I(n) +(n-l)(I(n)-L(n))
In contrast, a project is socially efficient when the following inequality holds:
(4)
Y(ri) £ ny + I(n)
The extent of inefficiency amounts to9 (n-l)(I(n)-L(n))> 0. As shown in Chapter III, 
projects which are socially desirable will not be implemented because, once the 
entrepreneur has sunk the investment cost, the remaining (n-1) agents can appropriate 
part of the surplus that is generated. Note finally that the choice of the optimal 
sophistication level, analysed in what follows, is.constrained to the set of projects which
s l  _ m  = Y(nMn-l)L(n) -1(h) * y = r ( l ) - / ( l ) , (3)n
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satisfy condition (3).
- Under-Sophistication. Suppose that all the available investment projects are 
profitable, which is, that condition (3) is satisfied for any nE  {2,N}. Even when all the 
alternative investment projects are profitable, a new source of inefficiency comes about 
when the choice of n is considered. Without financial markets, the entrepreneur’s choice 
of n solves the problem:
m a x  M ^ / i )  =  m a x  -Y(n)-I(n) ^
U )  {»} n
Suppose that the maximand can be represented as a continuous concave 
function10 over [2,N]. Let us also take sufficiently small values of y, so that choosing 
n —2 always dominates "autarky” («=1). When condition (3) is satisfied for any type 
of project, the entrepreneur selects a degree of sophistication n , rather than (n-1), if11:
YWHn z W n). _ / ( n )  ,  , / ( B _ 1)> („>2)
ft n - 1  ( 6 )
i.e., ¥(n) a  —  F ( n - 1 )  +  n [ J ( n ) - / ( n - l ) ]  -  A
n-1
where A=[(n-1 )L (n)-n (n-2)L(n-1 )/(n-l)]. The level of sophistication n is an interior 
maximum (i.e., tz<N), if it holds \h2XM1(n+ l)< M 1(n).
Turning to welfare considerations, suppose that Y(n)-I(n) is a positive and 
monotonically increasing function of n. Then, social efficiency requires that n is 
preferred to (n-1) whenever:
Y(n) -I(n) *  [ 7 ( 7 1 - 1 ) - / ( * - l ) ] + y ,  (n>2 )  ( 7 )
i.e., Y(n) ;> Y(n-1) +  [ / ( t i ) -I(n-1)] +y
If the level of y is sufficiently small, the social optimum corresponds to N.12 In what 
follows, we normalise y to zero.
The extent of the under-sophistication inefficiency turns out to be equal to13
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$ 0  = + (n-1) [/(»)-/(n-1)] -  A, n'i.l
n-1
(8)
The inefficiency level in expression (8) can be broken into two components. Let us first 
abstract from the project’s cost by setting I(n)=I(n-l)=I(l)=0  and, hence, A=0. For 
any n > 2, the inefficiency measure %0 is a positive quantity14. Under the conditions 
we set, the private choice of more sophisticated projects increases social efficiency. 
However, since £o>0, highly sophisticated projects that are socially desirable may not 
be implemented. Under-sophistication is caused by surplus sharing: in fact, the higher 
the number of tasks required in production, the larger the number of agents who acquire 
bargaining power over the surplus. This kind of inefficiency arises whenever the 
positive effect that higher sophistication has on returns is outweighed by the negative 
effect induced by tougher competition over the division of returns. A similar adverse 
effect on the coalition’s size is discussed by Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray and Sengupta 
(1993), in the context of a multi-party bargaining model with stationarity in strategies 
derived from Rubinstein (1982).
The extent of under-sophistication, as measured by (8), tends to be even larger 
when increasing investment costs are considered. When the liquidation values contained 
in the term A are relatively small, the additional cost that the entrepreneur has to bear 
for a more sophisticated project, AI(n)>0, produces an "incremental" version of the 
Grout-inefficiency that we discussed above. The conclusions we obtained can be 
summarised by the following:
Result 1. (Inefficiency of private choice): (I) Since the agents who take part in 
a project are able to bargain ex-post over its surplus, the level o f investment tends to 
be inefficiently low (Under-investment inefficiency). Further, (II) even assuming that the 
available projects are all profitable (no under-investment inefficiency), the degree of 
technological sophistication selected by the entrepreneur tends to be inefficiently low in 
equilibrium (Under-sophistication inefficiency).
Result 1 implies that when the acquisition of special skills in production creates 
bargaining power, individuals’ skills will generally be under-utilised. In particular, the 
entrepreneur might have undertaken more complicated productions than the one actually
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chosen in equilibrium. As a consequence, capable agents are forced to take up autarkic 
productions when it is socially efficient to hire them in sophisticated projects. 
Differently from Kremer’s (1993) suggestion, then, bargaining implies that the 
availability of skilled workers and capable entrepreneurs may be insufficient to 
incentivate the adoption of advanced production processes.
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2. The Presence of Capital Markets.
As we showed in Chapter III, the strategic choice of leverage can effectively 
modify the distribution of surplus. In what follows, we also show that debt has relevant 
implications for the type of projects that an entrepreneur is willing to implement.
Consider a firm which issued some debt. Exploiting again the control rights’ 
perspective suggested in Hart and Moore (1994), default on debt obligations shifts the 
property of the firm from the current owner (the entrepreneur) to the lender. Under 
default, then, the lender comes to control the firm’s physical assets and, for this reason, 
gains the ability to bargain over the rents that can still be produced (see Chapter III).
The debt capacity of a project is defined as the maximum amount of repayments 
that a debt contract can require without triggering voluntary default15. Let D  define 
the level of contractual debt repayments. When a technology with n agents has been 
implemented, the bargained payoffs depend on whether debt is repaid or not. In case 
that debt is repaid, each of the n agents gets (Y(n)-D)/n, the /2-th fraction of returns net 
of debt repayments. However, each agent has the power to halt production and, by 
preventing the repayment of D, force the firm into bankruptcy. In this case, the lender 
gets control and bargains over Y(n) whenever liquidation, yielding L(n), is unprofitable. 
When the entrepreneur cannot be dispensed with in production, bankruptcy will trigger 
a («+7)-party bargaining game in which the lender gets [Y(n)+nL(n)]/(n+l), and each 
other agent receives a payoff equal to [Y(n)-L(n)]/(n+l). Note also that liquidation is 
always dominated in equilibrium, since Y(n)>I(n)>L(n) implies that 
[Y(n)+nL(n)]/(n+l) > L(n).
The maximum level of D such to make repudiation not convenient solves the 
inequality (Y(n)-D)/n> [Y(n)+nL(n)]/(n+1), and gives the project’s debt capacity, D ’\
D , = Y(n)+nUn) (9)
n +1
Note that D ’ is independent of the competitive regime which prevails in the 
financial market. Similarly to the approach originally followed by Bulow and Rogoff 
(1989a) (see Chapter V), D ’ represents the maximum amount of repayments that a 
lender can be credibly paid back. Also notice that, as empirically observed (see, e.g., 
Harris and Raviv (1991)), debt capacity is increasing the project’s liquidation value, 
L(n).
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3. Competitive Financial Markets.
Consider a competitive capital market in which, for simplicity, the net interest 
rate is zero (ro=0). When the level of repayments specified by the debt contract is such 
thatZ)<Z)\ the share of net surplus Y(n)-D that each agent obtains is (Y(n)-D)/n. The 
payoffs of the entrepreneur (agent 1) and of each agent z, zV l, are equal to, 
respectively:
Since profit MJ(D;n) is monotonically increasing in D , agent 1 will always setD to its 
maximum available level16, D \  When D = D ’, each of the n agents in the game is 
made indifferent between accepting the repayment of debt and triggering default. Since 
bankruptcy does not bring any benefit, we assume that debt is repaid. The payoffs (10)- 
(11) calculated for D —D f become, respectively:
In equilibrium, the lender’s payoff is D \  the amount lent: a competitive lender breaks 
even on the debt contract he offers.
The reason why the entrepreneur prefers debt to self-financing is the same we 
described in Chapter III. Debt creates an additional and credible claim on surplus while 
keeping intact, at the same time, the entrepreneur’s bargaining power (she is 
indispensable in production). Since debt is sold to competitive lenders, the entrepreneur 
can pocket money today against a future repayment, which will have to be borne by all 
the n agents who take part in the production process.
and
= r(fi) D , i=2,3,..,n (11)n
(12)
n+1
and
(13)
n +1
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3.1. Reconsidering Inefficiency with Competitive Financial Markets.
- Under-investment (Grout). We assumed that every agent who chooses to 
participate in a sophisticated project (n > 1) foregoes the possibility of implementing the 
autarkic project. Hence, when there are competitive capital markets, the entrepreneur 
is willing to implement a 72-type project whenever it holds that 
M1(D’(n);n)=2Y(n)/(n+l)-I(n)>y: this condition is less stringent than the 
corresponding condition (3) discussed in Sect. 1.2. Since debt raises the profit that an 
entrepreneur can obtain from any given project, the strategic use of debt increases the 
set of efficient projects that the entrepreneur is willing to implement. As we noted in 
Chapter III, this result is consistent with the empirical results reported in King and 
Levine (1993a,c), according to which both the presence of developed financial markets 
and their propensity to finance private entrepreneurship favour physical capital 
accumulation. Our conclusions are also consistent with the results found by Rajan and 
Zingales (1996) on the base of an international comparison among industrial sectors. 
These authors find that industries that are more dependent on external financing grow 
relatively faster in countries that have more developed financial markets and 
institutions. In particular, they observe that investment in such industries is 
"disproportionately higher" in countries with a better developed financial sector.
A caveat is, however, in order. Better profitability may be necessary, but not 
sufficient, for project’s implementation when y, the payoff from autarkic production, 
is not negligible. Indeed, the (n-1) agents other the entrepreneur are willing to 
participate in a 72-type project when it holds that Af(D ’(n);n) = Y(n)/(n+l) >y, 
/=  1,2,..,N: when this condition is violated, the entrepreneur’s ability to manipulate the 
project’s leverage generates debt-induced inefficiencies (if ex-ante side-payments cannot 
be made to agents 2 ,3 ,..,72). In other words, debt improves entrepreneurial incentives 
but, when y is relatively large, it may discourage others’ participation in the project. 
In what follows, we will suppose that y is sufficiently small to ensure participation in 
a project.
- Under-Sophistication. In order to concentrate on the under-sophistication issue, 
suppose that any 72-type project, 72E {2,N}, is profitable. Since D ’(n) is the amount of 
debt chosen in equilibrium, the entrepreneur selects the level of n solving the following
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problem:
max Ml(D/(ri)ji) 
{«}
2Y(n)+(n-l)L(n) J(ji) (14)max
{«} n+1
As for (5), we assume that MJ(D’(n),n) in (14) can be represented as a concave function 
over [2,N].
The entrepreneur will prefer a «-type project to a less sophisticated (n-1)-type 
project when it holds that M(D’(n),n) >M(D’(n-1),n-1), which is:
where A ' = *6[(n-l)L(n)-(n-2) (n+l)L(n-l)/n]. The level of n satisfying (15) is an interior 
maximum in {2,N} if it holds thatM ^ ’fn+ l);n+ l)<M i (D’(«);«), where n+ l< N .
Compare condition (15), calculated for D = D \ with condition (6), holding for 
D = 0. The use of debt tends to favour the implementation of relatively more 
sophisticated projects in two ways. First, note that the coefficient associated with the 
term P(n)-I(n-1)]= AI(n) is relatively smaller in (15): by spreading the burden of 
greater investment costs also on other agents, strategic debt favours the adoption of 
more sophisticated (and more expensive) technologies. For this reason, debt reduces the 
impact of the Grout-type inefficiency in its Mincremental" version (see Sect.l). This 
result is also consistent with the empirical evidence documenting a positive correlation 
between leverage and expenditure in fixed assets (see Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan 
and Zingales (1995)): in the perspective of the model, relatively complex productions 
which require a large number of physical assets may be scarcely profitable when the 
entrepreneur cannot borrow.
The (positive) effect exerted by debt on the investment cost differential is 
partially compensated by positive liquidation values. Indeed, A’ in (15) is generally 
smaller than A in (6). A sufficient condition for the negativity of A '-A= -L(n-1 )/[n(n- 
l)]-(n-l)[L(n)-L(n-l)]/2 is that AL(n)=[L(n)-L(n-l)]>0. However, the possibility that 
the liquidation value decreases in the level of sophistication of the project (AL(n)<0)
2Y(ri)+(n-l)L(ri) m  ^ 2 7 (n -l)+(/i-2)I(/i-l) _/(/i l)
(15)
or Y(n) k — F(n-1) + — [/(n)-/(n-l)] -  A'
n 2
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has some plausibility. According to Williamson (1988), the more an investment project 
is specialised, the lower is assets’ redeployability and, hence, the lower the liquidation 
value of physical capital.
Even abstracting from investment costs, condition (15) is easier to satisfy than 
(6), since (n+l)/n>n/(n-l). The greater incentive to choose sophisticated projects, 
here, is not directly generated by the re-distributive properties of debt. Here, the lender 
implicitly becomes an additional player in the bargaining game: either he is repaid, or 
he will bargain over the surplus in bankruptcy. Thus, the lender’s presence dilutes the 
share of Y(n) that each agent can appropriate ex-post. As a side-effect, hence, debt 
weakens the adverse distributive effect brought in by the adoption of more sophisticated 
projects. Then, while debt does not affect the gains from a more complicated 
technology (i.e., AY(n) = Y(n)-Y(n-1)), it diminishes the distributive cost implicit in the 
need of additional employees for more sophisticated processes17.
In conclusion, competitive debt financing both raises the profit level M1 and 
shifts its peak rightward. Analogous conclusions are reached when the maximands are 
treated as continuous functions of n,18
We now provide an example which illustrates the role played by debt on the 
technological choice for different forms of the function Y(n).
Example. For simplicity we assume here that the liquidation value of a project, 
L(n), is zero. Consider the following specification for the revenue function: Y(n) =rfi-(l- 
a), where 0>O. The investment cost is linear in n: l(n)=an, with a < l  (notice that 
Y(l)-I(n) = y= 0 , here). Figure 1 illustrates the social net returns from investment, Y(n)~ 
I(n), when a= 0 .2  and 0 takes the values {0.8,1,1.2}.
Problem (5), the choice of n when debt financing is not available, specialises to 
the maximisation of [n?-(l-a)]/n-an. On the other side, the maximand in (14) becomes 
2[n?-(l-a)]/(n+l)-an. The shapes of the profit functions (5) and (14), calculated for 
a =0.2, when 0={0.8,1,1.2} are represented in Figure 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The 
effect of debt on the optimal level of sophistication is particularly evident when the 
function Y(n) is convex. Indeed, when 0 = 1, debt shifts the optimal level of 
sophistication from 2 to n=3 (see Figure 3). When 0=1.2 , debt financing raises the 
optimal it from 3 to 5 "tasks” (see Figure 4).
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Our results are consistent with evidence on the role of financial markets. The 
finding of Rajan and Zingales (1996) that "the scale of firms is related to the 
development of financial markets" (p. 18) is of particular interest here. Since complexity 
in production is likely to be correlated with firm’s size, our model in fact suggests that 
large firms are relatively more profitable only when external finance is available19.
Our results also match the observation (see Kremer (1993,p.563)) that "rich" 
countries - which also happen to have the more developed and private-sector oriented 
financial systems - tend to specialise in complicated products. This remark is consistent 
with the observation of Rajan and Zingales (1996) that developed financial markets are 
a source of "competitive advantage" for industries that are more dependent on external 
finance (p.30-31).
In conclusion, the working of debt financing on surplus distribution emphasised 
here appears to be complementary, rather than alternative, to explanations based on 
non-financial factors. For example, in Kremer (1993) economic advancement is based 
on the matching of high-quality workers in sophisticated productions. As we showed, 
the availability of skilled workers and capable entrepreneurs is a necessary, but 
generally not sufficient, condition to start a process of sustained economic progress.
Finally, it may be argued that the present model is biased towards debt 
financing, rather than equity financing. As a matter of facts, however, Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1996,p. 1-2) report that firms raise external funds mainly in the form of 
debt, which accounts for 85 percent of all external financing. Furthermore, Rajan and 
Zingales (1996) find that "a dollar of market capitalization is not the same as a dollar 
of credit; it has only 40% of the effect on the growth of financially dependent firms" 
(p. 18).
We reconsider now the issue of efficiency. Debt financing increases 
sophistication, even if it is generally insufficient to fully eliminate welfare losses (for 
instance, in the Example given above, the maximum sophistication level N  is the 
socially efficient choice, since it holds that Y(n)-I(n) = (l-a)(n-l)). We can claim the 
following20:
Result 2. Since an entrepreneur tends to choose projects of higher degree of 
sophistication under debt financing (D=D’)f rather than under self-financing (D=0),
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the strategic use of leverage tends to reduce the extent of under-sophistication.
The measure of inefficiency is now:
e Y(n-1) n - l rT/ v r/ 1VI A/ (16)l D> = —---- - [/(n)-7(/z-1)] -A 7
/l 2
which is a quantity smaller than (8), provided that A-A’ is not too large.
Another implication of the model is related to aggregate productivity:
Corollary. By encouraging the implementation of more sophisticated and more 
efficient projects, debt increases the agents' average per-capita productivity.
When debt allows for the implementation of a /z-task project, the n agents 
involved have an average per-capita productivity equal to Y(n)/n. On the other hand, 
if a (fl-i)-task project had been implemented, the average productivity of same n agents 
would have been only [Y(n-l)+y]/n, which is equal to [Y(n-l)]/n when y=0. The 
finding that an active financial system favours higher productivity is consistent with the 
empirical results reported by King and Levine (1993a,c). Moreover, by favouring 
participation in non-autarkic productions, debt allows "low income" individuals (i.e., 
agents who would have otherwise got y) to share the surplus generated by sophisticated 
projects.
In what follows, we will consider three extensions to the simple model discussed 
above: (i) the presence of multiple creditors, (ii) the presence of a monopolistic credit 
market and, finally (iii) the role of effort choice.
I l l
4. Multiple Lenders.
In Sect. 3, we analysed the case when the entrepreneur borrows from a single 
(competitive) lender. Assume now that the entrepreneur borrows from X>  1 lenders 
who, in case of bankruptcy, have the right to impose the liquidation of the project21: 
in case of default then, each lender gains bargaining power over the returns the project 
can generate and a (/z+X)-party bargaining game over Y(n) takes place. If we take for 
simplicity the liquidation value of the project to be equal to zero, each agent gets a 
payoff equal to Y(n)/(n-\-X) in bankruptcy. In equilibrium, then, the maximum amount 
that each lender is willing to concede is Dx*= Y(n)/(n +X) (with \= 1 ,2 ,..,Z ) and the 
firm’s debt capacity is equal to XDx*. Given X , the expected profit of the entrepreneur 
is Y(n)-(n-l)[(Y(n)-'LxDx)/n]-I(n), which is maximised forDX=DX* (\= 1,2,..,X). Thus:
1+X
n+X
(17)
-  m
Profit is increasing in X. At the extreme, when the number of credit relations 
is arbitrarily large, the entrepreneur is able to cash the whole surplus from the project:
lim M l(Dl;n) = Y(n) -  I(n) ( )
Consider now the effect of X > \  on project sophistication, when (17) is 
maximised with respect to n. The analog of condition (15), which was calculated for 
X = l, is now22:
Y(n) a n+L Y(n-1) + —  [7(n)-/(n-l>] (19)
(n-l)+L 1+L
It immediately follows that:
Result 3. The larger the number of credit relationships, X, the higher the degree 
of sophistication chosen in equilibrium.
This result is consistent with the observation that large and complex corporations 
(where multiple tasks are performed) tend to exhibit multiple credit relationships. 
Indeed, according to our model, the creation of several credit links brings a reduction 
of the adverse distributive effect due to higher sophistication. However, when we
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interpret X  as the number of "banks” which lend to the entrepreneur, such a number is 
likely to be relatively small23. Note also that, up to now, lenders were supposed to 
be able to start immediately a negotiation process with the firm in case of financial 
distress. This feature seems to be typical of lending institutions such as banks. 
Empirical observation, however, supports the view that negotiations are more likely to 
fail with dispersed debtholders (see Gilson, John and Lang (1990)). As Rajan (1992) 
puts it: ”bank debt is easily renegotiated, because the bank is a monolithic, readily 
accessible creditor. However, a typical arm’s-length creditor like the bondholder 
receives only public information. It is hard to contact these dispersed holders and any 
renegotiation suffers from information and free-rider problems" (p. 1369). The risks of 
inefficient liquidation created by dispersed creditors have been first emphasised by 
Bulow and Shoven (1978). Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) consider the possibility that 
troubled firms renegotiate with public debtholders: there, the firm can offer a package 
of new securities and cash against the original public debt. However, a free-rider 
problem arises, since debtholders with small stakes have an incentive to "hold out". A 
similar argument is put forward by Detragiache and Garella (1996) in a model with 
privately-informed creditors. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) also show that a higher 
number of creditors makes asset liquidation more costly to stop. For this reason, 
dispersed debtholders seem to be particularly effective in discouraging voluntary default 
(the kind of default we consider here, after Hart and Moore (1994)).
Notwithstanding the possibility of inefficient liquidation created by the presence 
of many dispersed creditors, however, a large number of firms place relevant parts of 
their debt directly on the financial market. Our framework can offer a strategic 
explanation as why such a kind of debt is issued. Suppose that the entrepreneur can 
issue public debt and assume, for simplicity, that the presence of dispersed debt-holders 
always24 leads to (inefficient) liquidation in case of default. Since liquidation implies 
that the n agents involved in production obtain a payoff equal to zero, voluntary default 
will be avoided as far as [Y(n)-D]/n>0. Consequently, the maximum amount that a 
firm can raise through public debt issues is equal to D ”=Y(n). Hence, an entrepreneur 
who issues public debt is able to appropriate the whole surplus from the project since:
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U\D";n) = K(w) -(n-1) K(n)■■■- ■-/(») = F(n) -/(«)
n
(20)
As the entrepreneur’s maximand in (20) coincides with socially-efficient one, 
public debt issues may fully eliminate both the under-investment and the under­
sophistication inefficiencies we discussed above. In particular, the privately optimal 
degree of sophistication will also be socially efficient. This conclusion can be restated 
as follows:
Result 4. When default causes the liquidation o f the project, an entrepreneur who 
issues public debt will choose a degree of sophistication which is socially efficient.
The strong implication we draw from Result 4, however, remains valid if, and 
only if, employees have not to make effort choices. As we argue in Sect.6, the potential 
relevance of effort choices can severely modify some of the conclusions about debt 
reached so far.
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5. Monopolistic Lender.
We now abandon the assumption that the financial market is competitive to 
analyse the opposite case: the working of debt when the lender is a monopolistic price 
setter. The attention to such an extreme case helps understanding whether the effects 
of debt we described so far only depend on the assumption that the credit market is 
competitive.
The sequence of events is as follows. The entrepreneur first decides whether to 
invest and, subsequently, chooses the degree of sophistication, n, of the project. She 
then decides whether to borrow from the monopolistic lender or not (provided that she 
is not wealth-constrained). Finally, investment is implemented and, after reaching an 
agreement over the sharing of returns, production occurs. To simplify, we assume that 
liquidation values are negligible.
Whatever the amount lent, a monopolistic lender is able to set the contractual 
amount to be repaid, Dm. We have now to determine which is the maximum value of 
Dm that the monopolist can be credibly paid back and the maximum interest rate, rm, 
he can set when lending.
By applying the same argument used in Sect. 3, the maximum level of debt 
repayments that the contract can prescribe is (again) equal to Dm=Y(n)/(n+l). Thus, 
a monopolistic lender can only appropriate a part of the surplus from the project.
When the lender finances a fraction <£ E (0,1] of the investment cost I(n), against 
a future repayment optimally set to Dm=Y(n)/(n+l), the entrepreneur ends up 
obtaining:
U '(D myn) = F ( n ) - ( « - l ) - ^ - ^  - 4 . ( l + r J / ( n ) - ( 1 - < { . ) / ( « )
n (21)
= r n  -  a - M n )
n +1
where rm = {[Y(n)/(n+l)]-<f>I(n)}/<t>I(n) is the monopolistic lending rate. We can now 
analyse inefficiency when credit is non-competitively priced.
- Under-investment. When the interest rate on alternative assets is normalised to 
zero, the monopolistic lender will lend as far as Y(n)/(n+l)><t>I(n): if this condition 
holds only for <f>< 1, an entrepreneur who is not wealth-constrained will be willing to
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invest only if Y(n)/(n+l) > (l-4>)I(n). An interesting implication of the present case is 
that an entrepreneur will prefer to borrow from a monopolistic lender (instead of 
financing the project with own funds) whenever it holds that <l)I(n) > Y(n)/[n(n+l)j, i.e., 
when Dm<n<j>I(n): in this case, even if very costly, debt maintains the property of 
spreading the investment cost l(n) over all the agents involved in the project. Then:
Result 5. Even monopolistic credit markets may allow for the implementation of 
investment projects that would otherwise be unprofitable under self-financing.
- Under-sophistication Inefficiency. When the entrepreneur borrows from a 
monopolistic lender, n is chosen in order to maximise (21). Then, a «-type project will 
be preferred to a project of type (n-1) whenever:
m  _ (!-* )/(„) a M .  -  (l-<j>)/(n-l),
»+l n (22)
i.e., Y(n) & — Y(n-1) + (n+l)(l-<t>)[/(n)-/(n-l)] 
n
Such a n is an interior solution to the maximum problem if it holds that 
M1 (Dm(n);n) >M1 (Dm(n+l);n+l), with n+ l< N .
A case of particular interest is the one in which the investment cost is entirely 
covered by debt, which is, when 0 = 1. Recalling that we assumed above that liquidation 
values are negligible, the following holds:
Result 6. When an entrepreneur finances the full investment cost by borrowing 
from a monopolistic lender (<f>=l), the condition for implementing a more sophisticated 
project given by (22) is:
(I) less restrictive than the corresponding condition under self-financing 
(condition (6)) and, moreover,
(II) less restrictive than the corresponding condition under competitive debt 
financing (condition (15)), whenever I(n)-I(n-1) >0.
Result 6(1) states that even monopolistic financial markets preserve the property 
of promoting sophisticated production processes. Further, and quite surprisingly, Result
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6(11) asserts that a monopolistic capital market may outperform a competitive market 
when the incentives to adopt sophisticated processes are considered (algebraically, when 
<£ = 1, monopolistic lending "eliminates" the term in I(n)-I(n-1)). In other words, also 
monopolistic debt financing spreads the incremental cost of investment on the share of 
each agent participating in the project.
A remark, however, is in order. The conclusion that monopolistic lending 
always favours sophistication in production may fail to hold. Suppose that, being I(n) 
sufficiently small, the inequality Dm>nl(n) is verified (we take 0 = 1): then, an 
entrepreneur who is not wealth-constrained will prefer to finance the project with her 
own funds, since she manages to obtain a profit higher than that available by borrowing 
from the monopolist. As a consequence, the high cost of credit can create under­
sophistication "traps". This remark is consistent with the argument put forward by 
Rajan and Zingales (1996). According to them, financial development - which tends to 
increase competition in capital markets - affects investment through lower costs of 
external finance. In the perspective of our model, an under-developed and non­
competitive financial market generates high interest rates for borrowers and it reduces 
the effectiveness of debt as a tool for redistributing surplus.
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6. Effort Choice.
As briefly observed in Chapter III, when effort decisions are considered, the 
conclusions about the efficiency-enhancing properties of debt may end up being deeply 
modified. A very simple example can effectively introduce the argument.
Suppose that a project requires, on behalf of the n agents, a specific effort 
investment equal at least to e* in order to generate positive returns, Y(n,e*). If the 
entrepreneur does not use debt financing, the level e* can be attained as long as the 
inequality Y(n,e*)/n>c(e*) holds, c(e*) denoting the level of effort disutility. However, 
the condition for exerting effort e* may not hold when the entrepreneur borrows. In 
fact, effort e* requires that a more restrictive condition, Y(n, e*)/(n+1)> c(e*), be 
respected. It may then happen that, if the entrepreneur is unable to precommit not to 
borrow, the project can fail to be implemented. This pessimistic conclusion is 
reinforced in the case (discussed in Sect.4) that default implies liquidation. Since the 
whole surplus is captured by the entrepreneur, none of the agents participating in 
production has any incentive to exert costly effort.
In conclusion, there may be cases in which effort is particularly relevant, and 
the possibility of borrowing destroys efficient investment opportunities. In such cases, 
then, the entrepreneur would like to commit not to use debt strategically. This 
observation may offer some hints as why innovative firms, which spend much in R&D 
and rely heavily on their researchers’ effort, tend to exhibit low leverage (see Harris 
and Raviv (1991)).
In what follows, we provide a more general treatment of this issue. Suppose that 
the n agents involved in production have to make some effort investment which is 
specific to the project: a higher level of effort e{ chosen by agent i (i— l,2,..,n) 
increases returns while leaving unaltered the agents’ productivity outside the project.
We consider the following timing of events. In the first stage, the entrepreneur 
decides whether to invest, the degree of sophistication n, and the amount of debt to 
raise. In the second stage, given n, each of the agents chooses the optimal level of 
effort et on the base of the bargaining outcome she anticipates. In the third stage 
bargaining occurs: if an agreement is reached, production occurs and the surplus is 
shared25.
The revenue function takes the form Y=Y(e1,e2,..,en;n), with dY/dei=Yi>0,
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dY/dn = YV> 0, and d2Y/de2 =  Yu<0. Effort et entails disutility equal to c(ej) , with c ’>0 
and c ” > 0.
We can now analyse the consequences of effort on both: (i) the set of projects 
which an entrepreneur is willing to implement and, (ii) the optimal degree of 
complexity in production.
Assume first that D=0. This is equivalent to prevent the entrepreneur from 
resorting to financial markets. Once n is fixed, each agent i (z=l,2,..,«) correctly 
anticipates that her share of Y  will be Y/n. For given e_t, which denotes the effort 
chosen by the remaining (n-1) agents, the optimal level of et solves the following 
problem:
Y(e;,e_iyn) 
m a x ----------------c(e.)
ie) n
Hence, the Nash-equilibrium choice of e°  is defined by
w  0  ^ V °\Y fa  ;e_t,n) = nc'(er)
where o°  =  Yirnc *' < 0.
In a Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (S.N.E.), it holds that ei°=e_i°=e0. Thus, the 
S.N.E. equilibrium level e°, holding for D —0 is implicitly given by26:
(25)
= ncXe0)
Let us now consider an entrepreneur who has the possibility to raise debt. Note 
that, once the entrepreneur has pocketed the funds raised through debt, she gets a share 
of surplus which is identical to the shares obtained by the remaining (n-1) agents: for 
this reason, she has the same incentives to invest in effort as the others.
When D —D" (no matter if the financial market is competitive or monopolistic), 
agent Vs effort choice solves, for given n and e4:
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y(epe^ n) . . (26)m a x ----------------c(ej
(.; n+1
with /=1,2,..,tz. The Nash-equilibrium level e{  solves the condition Yi(ei’;e_i,n) = 
(n+ l)c ,(ei[) (with ai’s Y ir(n+ l)c” < 0).
With D = D \ then, the S.N.E. effort level e ’ solves:
<27)Yfe^e'ff) = (n+ tyc'ie)
Since debt dilutes each agent’s share of surplus, it also reduces the incentive to 
invest in effort, given the others’ choice: as a consequence, the S.N.E. effort choices, 
defined respectively by (25) for D=0, and by (27) for D = D ’, are such that27 e°> e\ 
The adverse effect of debt on effort is magnified when there are "strategic 
complementarities", i.e., when d2Y/deidej = Y^> 0, and reduced with "strategic 
substitutability", i.e., Y(j < 0 (see Cooper and John (1988))28. Independently of the 
kind of strategic interaction among agents’ effort choice, the following holds:
Result 7. Given n, the use of debt reduces the level o f returns a project generates 
by lowering the employees’ effort choice.
From the point of view of social optimality, Result 7 implies that the strategic 
use o f debt makes the private effort choice even less efficient: in fact, the socially 
efficient level of et solves Y fe ^ e ^ ^ —c^ej).
Result 7 has another relevant implication. Since Y(e’,n) < Y(e°,n), the 
entrepreneur would like to commit not to raise any debt whenever Y(e°,n)/n- 
I(n)>2Y(e’,n)/(n+l)-I(n). Such a commitment, however, cannot credible if the 
entrepreneur can access the capital market and borrow after that effort levels have 
already been chosen. This conclusion is reinforced when the entrepreneur can sell debt 
to dispersed debt-holders, so that default is likely to be associated with liquidation (see 
Sect.4): in this case, no agent has any incentive to invest in effort.
Since the redistributive power of debt may have a devastating impact on project 
implementation when effort is relevant, we ask whether there are some arrangements
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which can work as a "commitment technology" for the entrepreneur’s financial choices. 
The answer is positive: a "partnership" may avoid such problems. In other words, the 
entrepreneur can fragment the project’s control (including control on financing 
decisions) among those who participate in production. In this way, project participants 
become equity-holders with equal rights over the use of funds raised through debt- 
issues. This device prevents de facto any redistributive role for debt (debt could be used 
at most to overcome wealth-constraints). Our model thus predicts that control over 
relevant decisions, such as financing, will be dispersed among the "partners" when 
returns are highly sensitive to effort investment. This conclusion, reached from a 
financial point of view, has a flavour similar to the main result in Hart and Moore 
(1990), according to which the property of assets should go to those agents who make 
crucial firm-specific investment.
We now consider how the optimal choice of n is modified by effort investment. 
As shown in Appendix (I.a), it holds that:
de° _ (28)
dn o° + (n-l)Yv
where Yit, = dY/dn>0  and, for S.N.E. stability, it must hold that \a°\ >(n-l)\Yy\, 
where i ^ j  (see Note 26). Then, it follows that sgn(de°/dn)=sgn(Yir-c’). Analogously, 
when one considers e \  as implicitly defined in (27), it holds that de’/dn=-(Yiv- 
cWa’Hn-DYJ.
We assume that there is no financial market (so that D —0), and treat n as a 
continuous variable for mere convenience. Maximising Y(e°(n);n)/n-I(n) with respect 
to n gives the following first-order condition:
/ dY(e°) Y(e°) ] . ] 1 " ~ de* (29)
m e  } IKe } - I  (ri) + - T  YXe°) •—  = 0
n dndn n
With respect to the case without effort decisions, we now have the additional term 
(l/n)'LiYi-(dei°/dn) = Yi-(de0/dn)7 whose sign coincides with the sign of (Yiv-c’). Hence, 
with D = 0, effort investment tends to raise (lower) sophistication when 
(Yiv< c J). When Yiv> c’, a higher n increases the marginal benefit from effort, Yh
121
relatively more than its cost.
Note that the condition Yiv> c ' takes a very simple form when the term in effort 
is m ultip licative  in the revenue function , w hich is, when 
Y(ep e2,..,en;n) =H(ep e2,..,e j-y(n ). Since expression (24) implies that y(n)'Hi=Ji'c\ 
it also holds that Yiv—y ’(n)'Ht=y’(n)-n-c7y(n). Then, the condition Yiv> c’ can be 
written as y ’(n) >y(n)/n: in order to obtain that de°/dn>0, the function y(n) must be 
convex.
Similar considerations hold for D = D ’. Maximising 2Y(e;n)/(n+l)-I(n) with 
respect to n gives:
dY(e)  Y(e)
71 + 1 dn 71 + 1
1 " de
Ti+l frf 1 dn
(30)
As for expression (29), e ffo rt choice adds the term  
[l/(n+l)JLiYi-(dei’/dn)=[n/(n+l)]Yi-(de’/dn). Again, if Yiv > c \  effort investment tends 
to raise sophistication with respect to the case when effort does not matter (see Sect. 3).
We can finally compare privately-optimal sophistication under internal financing 
(D=0) and external financing (D=Dr). Define n° and n ’ the internal solutions to 
equations (29) and (30), respectively.
We claim the following:
Result 8. When the condition (dY(e0;n0)/dn)-(n0-l)Y(e0;n0)/[n0(n°+ l)]> r(n0) is 
satisfied, then n ’ > n°: the presence o f effort investment favours a higher level of 
sophistication in production.
We leave to Appendix (I.b) the proof of this result and further details.
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7. Conclusions.
Consistently with empirical observation, the model we presented supports the 
view that financial markets can be very relevant in promoting both physical capital 
accumulation and the adoption of sophisticated production processes.
The approach we follow provides a novel explanation as to why developed 
financial markets may stimulate economic advancement. More traditional approaches, 
such as Rajan and Zingales (1996), argue that the financial sector has real effects 
because it reduces the transaction costs associated to saving and investment, and it 
lowers the cost of external finance. In our model, the cost of finance is relevant, but 
not necessarily pivotal: here, financial markets are mainly a device to redistribute 
surplus. As shown, the use of debt can effectively modify the distribution of returns 
between the entrepreneur and the employees participating in production. By borrowing, 
the entrepreneur cashes money today against a (credible) promise of future repayments, 
which are going to be born by all the agents taking part in production. Hence, debt 
encourages physical capital accumulation by shifting part of the investment cost onto 
agents other than the entrepreneur. However, as we noted in the case of monopolistic 
credit markets, the relation between debt and sophistication does not work only through 
surplus redistribution (which is, through the profit level). As we emphasised, debt 
stimulates the implementation of sophisticated projects by lessening the adverse 
distributional effect generated by multi-task productions. In general, financial 
development may have deep effects on the structure of the economy, since it makes it 
possible to abandon "autarkic" sectors, such as agriculture or craftsmanship, for more 
complex productions.
With regard to policy implications, the main conclusion we draw here is that the 
presence of capable entrepreneurs and skilled workers may not be sufficient to start up 
a faster process of economic advancement, even in the absence of wealth constraints. 
Much attention, in fact, has also to be paid both to the development of the financial 
system and to its propensity to finance private entrepreneurship. This observation may 
be particularly relevant for the transition process of the Eastern European economies.
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Appendix I. a
Derivation o f expression (28).
Consider the case for D =0. Let us differentiate f  s first order condition (24) 
with respect to et (/=1,2,..,«), e_t (the subscript -i refers to any other agentj ,  withyVi) 
and the degree of project sophistication, n. In symmetric equilibrium, we obtain the 
following system:
o° k k  .. k
k  o° k  .. k
k k k .. o°
where a0 = Yirnc ’’= Yjj-nc ” = .., k=Yij  and x = Yiv-c *—Yjv-c for all i and j ,  i j. By 
applying Cramer’s rule, it can be verified that defdn can be written as the ratio between 
-x-(o0^ )*1'1 (the numerator) and the hessian, -[a°+ (n-l)k] (the denominator).
Expression (28) follows immediately.
de j X
de2 X
• •
f e n X
dn
(A l.l)
Appendix I.b
Proof o f Result 8.
Call h ’(n) the left-hand-side of f.o.c. (30). By definition, the sophistication 
degree n° solves (29), holding for D =0. Calculate h ’(n) for n° and multiply the result 
by (n°+l). Finally, subtract the left-hand-side of (29), which is equal to zero in n°, 
fro m h ’(n°)(n°+l):
h'in®) x (/t°+l) -  zero =
' a y ( e ( / » V ° ) ' /
dn J V
(A1.2)
-v V -  r (e(n V °) -  /'(n°)
/i°(n°+l) )
Since n ’ is such that h ’(n’)=Q, it follows that n ’>n° whenever h ’(n°)>0: this is the 
case when (dY/dn)-(n°-l)Y/[n°(n0+ !)> !’(n°) holds, as claimed in Result 8.
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Figure 2
Entrepreneur’s profit with D=0 and D=D
(beta=0.8,alpha=0.2)
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Figure 3
Entrepreneur’s profit with D=0 and D=Dr
(be ta=1 , alpha=0.2)
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Figure 4
Entrepreneur’s profit with D=0 and D=Dr
(beta=1.2,alpha=0.2)
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Notes
1. See the discussion in Chapter I.
2. See Kremer (1993).
3. Our emphasis on the effects that financial decisions have on surplus distribution 
neatly distinguishes our model from the (macroeconomic) literature on financial 
markets, capital accumulation and growth. Those models mainly focus, in fact, on the 
role that the financial sector has in channelling savings to firms, improving the 
allocation of funds, alleviating information problems, etc. For an overview of the 
literature, see Pagano (1993).
4. The approach we adopt has a bias towards debt financing, especially when financial 
markets are competitive. Our model abstracts from certain issues (such as project’s 
monitoring, management’s incentives, etc.) that may complement the present analysis 
and provide a rationale for the merits of internal financing under certain circumstances 
(see, for example, the theoretical analysis in Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994)).
5. This assumption, made just to make the basic results neater, implies that the autarkic 
production, once forsaken, cannot be a credible outside option in bargaining (see 
Sect. 2.1).
6. This assumption has a flavour similar to Kremer’s (1993) model. There, tasks that 
are inadequately performed in a complex production process may cause project’s 
failure. Our model, in fact, follows Kremer’s notion of tasks’ complementarity in 
sophisticated technologies.
7. See also the discussion in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a).
8. Our assumptions ensure that, once the investment cost is sunk, any project of type 
m which was ex-ante alternative to the currently adopted one, cannot be 
undertaken anymore: as a consequence, when agents are bargaining over Y(n), we 
cannot consider y=Y(l)-I(l) as a credible outside alternative.
9. Inefficiency is calculated from [Y(n)-ny-I(n)]-[Y(n)-ny-I(n)-(n-l)(I(n)-L(n))].
10. If the maximand were convex over [2,N], the optimal choice of n would obviously 
be either n=2 or /z=N.
11. Notice that condition (6) is more restrictive than condition (3), once (as assumed) 
condition (3) holds and L(n) is not too large.
12. This social optimality criterion hinges on the assumption that only the entrepreneur 
can undertake projects such that n>  1. In fact, if agents other than 1 could 
simultaneously implement projects of sophistication equal to, say, 2 and (n-2), it might 
occur that Y(n)-I(n) < Y(n-2)-I(n-2) +  Y(2)-I(2) , even when (7) holds: in such a case, the 
project n would be socially dominated.
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13. The extent of inefficiency is obtained from the following difference: {[Y(n)-Y(n-1)]~ 
/7f>2; ;y-n/7f«; -/r«-^ .
14. Should y > Y(n-l)/(n-l) hold, condition (3), calculated for a (w-i)-type project would 
be violated against our assumption.
15. In the present non-stochastic context, involuntary default cannot take place.
16. As noted in Chapter III, when D ’ >I(n), the investment cost is not greater than debt 
capacity and the entrepreneur borrows more than what is actually needed to implement 
the project. In this case, the extra amount of money borrowed can be used for financing 
activities not directly related to production, such as perquisite consumption, etc. (over- 
borrowing). On the other hand, when D ’<I(n) (borrowing does not cover the whole 
investment cost), project’s implementation requires the contribution of the 
entrepreneur’s own wealth: whenever the entrepreneur’s wealth is less than 7(«)-D’>0, 
under-investment can arise also because of wealth constraints, as in Hart and Moore 
(1994).
17. Notice also that the condition M ^Ow+l) <MJ(0;n) for an internal maximum 
(n< N) in the absence of debt is easier to satisfy than the corresponding condition 
M1 (D’(n+l);n+1) <MX(D’(n);n), calculated under debt financing. Hence, debt makes 
high sophistication levels more likely to be attained.
18. Define by nD=0 the level of n solving the first order condition of problem (5), 
dM1 (0yn)/dn—0. By referring to (14), it is immediate to show that dM1 (D’(n),n)/dn, 
calculated for n=nD=0, is a positive quantity: then, since dM1 (D’(n),n)/dn is decreasing 
in n, the value nD=D, that solves problem (14) is larger than (or equal to, due to integer 
constraints) nD=0.
19. Also, a strong and (almost) universal empirical finding reported in Rajan and 
Zingales (1995,p. 1452-1454)) asserts that firm’s size and leverage are positively 
correlated. In our model, leverage is an instrument to reduce the adverse distributive 
impact implied by multiple bargaining units.
20. We take y  equal to zero.
21. As assumed in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), one may think that debt is secured 
to X>  1 complementary parts of the firm’s physical assets, which can be liquidated by 
each of the X  lenders in case of default.
22. In the present case, the condition for an interior maximum is given by 
Y(n)>[(n+X)/(n+l+X)]Y(n+l)-[(n+X)/(l+X)][I(n+l)-I(n)], with n + l< N, and is 
less easy to satisfy than the corresponding one calculated for X = l.
23. This can be due, for example, to the presence of "restrictive covenants" on debt 
contracts: see Brealey and Myers (1991,p.601-602).
24. The main argument would remain valid if, when default on public debt occurs, the 
firm is liquidated with probability less than one.
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25. The timing relative to the financing decision is not crucial here. Even if the 
entrepreneur raises no debt in the first stage, she always maintains the possibility to 
come back on the financial market after that effort decisions have been made, so to 
condition the bargaining outcome (a similar argument is made in Perotti and Spier 
(1993)). Then, when choosing effort, each agent anticipates the redistribute effects of 
debt independently of the current level of leverage.
26. As in Cooper and John (1988), the stability of such a S.N.E. requires that, in e=e°,
10/1 > (n-l)Y(j.
27. In order to show formally that e ’<e°, one can refer to Appendix (I.a) (which gives 
the explicit expression for de/dri) and note that, since debt financing implicitly adds a 
player to the sharing of the returns from a rc-agent project, the use of debt financing 
(instead of own-financing) implies that Yiv-c’=-c’.
28. As emphasised by Cooper and John (1988), the presence of strategic 
complementarities can lead to multiple S.N.E. ’s: in what follows, we will abstract from 
this possibility.
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Chapter V
FOREIGN DEBT, SANCTIONS AND INVESTMENT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LDCs.
with
Giancarlo Marini
(Dipartimento di Economia e Istituzioni, Universita Tor Vergata, Rome)
Introduction.
The external debt of less developed countries (LDCs) has been widely debated 
in recent years1. As stressed by Cohen (1994), however, it is still not entirely clear 
why LDCs borrow and to what extent foreign debt may contribute to investment and 
growth. These issues are central in order to assess whether the industrialisation process 
in LDCs and Eastern Europe countries can be speeded up by foreign direct investment 
of transnational companies or externally financed domestic investment.
The predominant view on the LDCs’ experience during the Eighties is that high 
foreign debt caused low investment. Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1988), for example, 
argue that debt-overhang enables foreign creditors to appropriate almost entirely the 
additional output generated by capital accumulation2. This negative view on the effects 
of debt is questioned by Bulow and Rogoff (1990,p.36): "During the 1960-73 era, 
before the debt buildup began in earnest, Latin American investment averaged roughly 
20 percent of GDP. The ratio for 1987 was roughly two points lower, at 18.2 percent. 
But the investment ratio for industrialized countries has fallen even more sharply, from 
over 24 percent in 1960-73 to 20.7 in 1987. It is only relative to the peaks of the late 
1970s that Latin American investment today looks so low". Furthermore, the empirical 
evidence reported by Warner (1992) for a panel of heavily indebted LDCs suggests a 
quite optimistic interpretation for the role of debt: debt in fact exerts a positive (and 
significant) effect on investment3. The aim of the present paper is that of providing a 
theoretical rationale capable to explain why it is that foreign debt may stimulate 
investment.
We consider countries where property rights are under threat. Adverse attitudes 
towards private investment (from outright expropriation, down to high tax-rates on 
capital income) seem more likely to emerge in countries characterised by high 
inequality in income and wealth, a major cause of social discontent4. In such 
environments, investors face the risk that an adverse government will come into office 
and take measures that, de facto, deplete their capital incomes5. Investment in LDCs 
may thus be much lower than the socially efficient level: in fact, "political risks" may 
seriously exacerbate the under-investment problem that arises when workers can bargain 
ex-post on investment’s surplus (see Grout (1984)). International trade relations can, 
however, reduce the problems arising from political uncertainty. In particular, the 
violations of international agreements, such as the expropriation of foreign investment,
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can provide the case for the application of trade sanctions. In case of expropriation, 
thus, the threat of costly sanctions may force the domestic government to find a deal 
with foreign investors. As a consequence, sanctions help to preserve the capital share 
and make foreign direct investment more appealing than (self-financed) domestic 
investment. A similar argument applies when foreign debt contracts are repudiated. As 
in Bulow and Rogoff (1988,1989a), the credible threat of sanctions implies that debt 
repudiation will lead to a bargaining process between domestic borrowers and foreign 
lenders. Foreign debt has a particular role in our model. We show that, by borrowing 
abroad from a competitive financial market, a domestic capitalist can obtain a share of 
surplus that is not only higher than the share she would obtain under self-financing, but 
also higher than the share foreign investors can appropriate. Hence, foreign debt may 
dominate foreign direct investment and be the best financing device in order to stimulate 
investment in developing countries. The economic rationale for our result is that 
external debt gives lenders the right to negotiate over the surplus, in case of 
repudiation. The capitalist, who captures the (competitive) lender’s share, can thus 
effectively constrain the behaviour of hostile governments.
Wealth constraints, or consumption smoothing, have typically been advocated 
to rationalise the extensive use of LDCs’ foreign borrowing (see, e.g., Eaton (1993)). 
However, many highly-indebted LDCs are net creditors towards the rest of the world. 
Our hypothesis provides a new interpretation to the role of foreign debt, seen as a 
strategic tool to condition surplus distribution. The present approach has some 
similarities to models, such as Perotti and Spier (1993), Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) 
and ours (see Chapter III), that find a negative relation between corporate debt and 
wages. Those models, however, are conceived for economic set-ups where there is 
certainty about the legal rules that apply in case of breach of the contractual conditions. 
By contrast, as Eaton and Fernandez (1995) emphasise, sovereign entities can generally 
offer little as collateral to guarantee a loan. Moreover, a court’s ability to force a 
sovereign government to comply with its resolutions is rather limited. Thus, the respect 
of contracts between foreign parties can often be obtained only through indirect devices, 
such as sanctions (see also Eaton et al. (1986,p.484)). Furthermore, our analysis of 
investment in LDCs emphasises problems, such as political risks, that give an additional 
role to the strategic use of debt. Other predictions are that foreign debt repayments are 
always renegotiated in equilibrium and investment projects more vulnerable to sanctions
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are likely to be selected. The co-existence of capital flight and high levels of foreign 
debt is also consistent with our approach.
The scheme of the Chapter is as follows. Section 1 presents the basic structure 
of the model. Section 2 illustrates the under-investment problem for economies 
characterised by political uncertainty. Section 3 analyses foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The strategic role of foreign debt and its implications are analysed in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes.
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1. A Simple Model.
We consider a small country with two groups of agents, "workers" and 
"capitalists". Without loss of generality, we assume that there is only one worker, 
indexed by w, and a capitalist, indexed by c. In order to emphasise the links between 
international trade and international financial relations for LDCs, we assume that the 
agents in the economy produce an export good and consume a good imported from 
abroad (see, e.g., Bulow and Rogoff (1988)). Both the worker and the entrepreneur 
have utility function:
U(C) = Cp i = (w,c) (1)
where Cit is agent i ’s consumption of the imported good. The capitalist has access to 
a technology that costs A >0, requires the labour services of the worker and generates 
y units of the export good. Once the decision to invest is taken, the capitalist sinks the 
amount K, that could have alternatively been spent on foreign consumption goods. Each 
unit of the export good can be traded for P units of the import good, so that the 
aggregate level of consumption is equal to C—Py. The capitalistic technology is socially 
efficient, that is C-K> 0. We assume that, once the investment cost K  is sunk, the 
worker acquires specific skills and becomes indispensable for production. As a 
consequence, the worker always retains some bargaining power over the surplus that 
the project can generate6.
We now specify in detail the distribution of surplus, the country’s political 
environment, the working of sanctions and the timing of the model.
- Distribution. We normalise the worker’s and the capitalist’s outside options to 
zero: should either agent abandon the project, her payoff would be zero. The outcome 
of the distribution process over C (the total amount of consumption that is derived by 
producing and shipping abroad the export good) is the N-party Nash bargaining 
solution: St=C/N, where St is agent z’s share of C?
- Political Environment. The capitalist is subject to the risk that a "populist" 
government (type-w government) comes into office once the investment cost has been 
sunk. Such a kind of political risk is likely to be more pronounced in less developed 
countries, characterised by high levels of inequality in income and wealth (see, e.g.,
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Alesina and Perotti (1996)). Once in office, the type-w government will aim at 
maximising the worker’s consumption level, Cw. Such an adverse attitude towards the 
capital share can take several forms: an hostile government can opt for outright 
expropriation of the capitalist’s assets, or it can impose rules which strongly limit the 
capitalist’s "right to manage" her assets. The income from capital can also be heavily 
taxed, so to redistribute surplus in favour of workers8. Here, under a type-w 
government, the capitalist is de facto excluded from the bargaining process over the 
returns generated by her investment. As in Alesina and Tabellini (1989), we assume 
that, once the project has been implemented, there is an exogenous probability (1-p) that 
a populist government will win the elections (or it will overthrow a type-c government, 
more keen on the capitalist’s interests).
- Sanctions. We assume that foreign partners can impose sanctions whenever the 
country considered violates some international agreement. Similarly to Bulow and 
Rogoff (1988), sanctions prevent the country from trading the export good against an 
import good and, hence, from consuming9. When the country’s trade is halted by 
sanctions, the export good is stored until an agreement is found and sanctions are 
lifted10.
- Timing. We consider the following sequence of events: at time t —0, the 
decision of whether to invest or not is taken. When investment is undertaken, the cost 
K  is sunk. At time t=  1, political uncertainty is solved. A type-c government is in office 
with probability p. At time t=2 production takes place and trade occurs, provided that 
actions leading to sanctions have not been taken (see Figure 1).
Eaton and Fernandez (1995,p.2045-2046) criticise the "bargaining with 
sanctions" approach followed by Bulow and Rogoff (1988,1989a) on two grounds. 
First, the creditor is assumed to have considerable power11, since it can impose severe 
costs on the country’s trade. Moreover, the results crucially depend on the exact 
specification of the bargaining game. The limits emphasised by this criticism are 
obviously also relevant for the results of our model.
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2. The Under-Investment Problem.
Suppose that, at t—0, the domestic capitalist sinks the investment cost K  by 
using own funds (K  might have been otherwise spent to purchase consumption goods 
abroad). Depending on the political outcome at f= l ,  the capitalist will either remain 
in control of her assets (with prob. p) or, will be excluded from the division of the 
surplus C (with prob. 7-p). In the first case, the capitalist retains the power to foreclose 
the worker from the access to physical capital. Since both parties must find an 
agreement in order to produce at date t—2 (the worker is indispensable for production), 
there is a bilateral bargaining over C that generates equilibrium payoffs equal to 
SW=SC= ViC. By contrast, if an adverse government comes into office and the capitalist 
is expropriated (or fully taxed on capital income), her payoff is zero while the worker 
obtains the whole surplus C. Under risk-neutrality and common knowledge of p, the 
worker’s and the entrepreneur’s expected shares (at f=0) are, respectively:
ES'„ = -£-C + (l-p )C  = (2)
and
Es'e = £-C  (3)
c 2
Hence, the capitalist’s ex-ante expected consumption, net of investment costs, is:
EC'c = C - E S ' - K  = 2 - C - K
2
The implementation of a project of cost K requires that ECc ’ >  0. This condition, 
compared with the less restrictive "social optimum" rule for investment, C-K>0, 
implies that the country’s physical capital accumulation is generally "too low". As 
emphasised by Grout (1984), under-investment is a standard result when a party can 
capture ex-post part of the rents generated by other parties’ investment. However, the 
under-investment problem arising in the present context is a rather more serious matter, 
since the bargaining power of capitalists in less-developed countries is likely to be 
inherently reduced by political uncertainty (p < l) . In particular, a sufficiently high 
probability of type-w governments coming into office, i-p, implies that no investment 
is ever implemented, even when considerable gains from industrialisation are possible.
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In this case, private wealth is also likely to flee abroad.
In the next section, we examine in detail the case of transnational corporations, 
that is, the case of foreign capitalists who invest under the shelter of sanctions.
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3. Foreign Direct Investment.
Foreign firms can directly undertake the investment project and face, however, 
the risk that an hostile government will come into office. If there is no legal case for 
the application of sanctions, then, the analysis of FDI is equivalent to that of domestic 
investment. On the contrary, should the unfavourable treatment of a foreign company 
qualify as violation of international agreements, the transnational company can demand 
the application of trade sanctions against the breaching country12.
When sanctions can be imposed, the expected worker’s and foreign company’s 
shares are, respectively:
S™  = - C ,  and S™  = - C  (5)
2 2
The result in (5) can be explained as follows. If type-c government comes into office 
(prob. =p), the worker and the company will agree on a partition giving each of them 
half of C. On the other hand, when a type-w government expropriates the foreign 
company (pr.l-p), the application of sanctions enables foreign investors to block the 
country’s international trade and, thus, to bargain over C  with the domestic government 
(acting in the worker’s interest). When an agreement is reached, foreign investors lift 
sanctions and trade occurs. In equilibrium, the bargaining outcome is, again, (ViC^AC). 
The coverage of sanctions always guarantees foreign investors half of the surplus. The 
net payoff in consumption units generated by foreign direct investment, C j DI= ¥zC -K , 
is greater than the net payoff ECc' defined in (4). Consequently, under FDI, the 
sanctions’ threat eliminates the portion of under-investment that is entirely due to 
political uncertainty, (l-p)V2C (the reduction in the extent of inefficiency is calculated 
from the difference (lA  C-K)~(pV2 C-K) ) .
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4. The Strategic Use of Foreign Debt.
In Sect.2, we considered a capitalist who self-funded her own investment. 
However, domestic capitalists may often borrow abroad to finance investment projects. 
In this case, the repudiation of the outstanding debt obligations makes the country’s 
export liable to the application of sanctions13. As a consequence, foreign creditors 
gain bargaining power over the surplus C, since the embargo will be lifted only when 
an agreement between foreign lenders and domestic debtors is reached. We denote the 
amount borrowed abroad and the repayment prescribed by the debt contract by X  and 
D , respectively.
At t=0, the investment is implemented and debt is contracted with a foreign 
(competitive) lender. At /=1, political uncertainty is solved. As before, the capitalist 
remains in full control of the investment project with probability p. Instead, should a 
type-w government come into office (prob. 1-p), the capitalist would be excluded from 
the bargaining process over C. At t=2 production and trade are ready to take place. At 
this stage, the party who has the "right to manage" may decide to default on foreign 
debt. When the capitalist retains control, she may decide to repudiate to maximise her 
share, SCD. When the capitalist loses control, the populist government may default to 
maximise the worker’s share, SWD. The definition of the surplus on which the parties 
bargain depends on the repudiation decision. When repudiation does not occur, the 
parties will bargain over C-D and the lender will be paid D  back. If repudiation occurs, 
the application of sanctions will enable the lender to participate in the bargaining game 
over C. Once an agreement is eventually reached among the parties, trade and 
consumption will take place.
The number of agents taking part in negotiations when foreign debt is repudiated 
depends on the political outcome at t — 1. Since the worker is indispensable for 
producing the export good, repudiation implies that there will be a two-party game over 
C (between foreign lender and domestic government) whenever a type-w government 
is in office. Under a type-c government, instead, repudiation entails a three-party 
game14 among the capitalist, the worker and the lender.
4.1. Strategic Debt Repudiation.
For any given level of contractual repayments, D >  0, the debt-repudiation 
decision is taken to maximise the share of whoever will be in control of the project at
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t= 2 (be the capitalist or the populist government). Default on foreign debt is 
conditional to the resolution of political uncertainty at t—\.
Lemma 1. I f  a type-c government prevails, voluntary default on foreign debt will 
occur for any D > 1AC. I f  a type-w government prevails, voluntary default will occur for 
any D>V2C.
Proof The optimal debt-repudiation strategy for the capitalist, as well as for the 
w-type government, depends on the level of D. Consider two cases. Case (I): suppose 
that a type-c government, keen on the capitalist’s interest, prevailed at t — 1 (an event 
with prob. =p). At t —2, the decision whether to repudiate is taken by the capitalist, 
who controls the project. If the contractual amount D  is paid back, the capitalist, the 
worker and the lender obtain, respectively, (frSc,nrSw,nrS^= (¥ (C-D) , ¥2 (C-D) ,D). If the 
capitalist chooses repudiation, the lender can apply sanctions: a three-party bargaining 
over C occurs, with equilibrium payoffs equal to (rSc,rSw,rS})=(1AC, 1AC, 1A Q . Then, the 
capitalist will default on foreign debt whenever nrSc < rSc, i.e., when D > 1AC. Consider 
now case (II): at t= 2, a type-w government, that prevailed at t=  1, decides in the 
worker’s interest whether to repudiate foreign debt. If debt is repaid, the capitalist, the 
worker and the lender obtain, respectively, (nrSc,nrSw,nrSJ)={0,C-D,D). In case of 
repudiation, sanctions will force the type-w government to bargain with the foreign 
lender. In equilibrium, the following payoffs are offered and accepted:
(rSc,rSw,rSl)= (0 ,]/2C,1AC). Repudiation occurs whenever nrSw< rSw, i.e., when
As a consequence of the Lemma 1, the expected worker’s share at t=0  is equal
to:
Expression (6) can be rewritten as function of the contractual debt repayment D:
D>¥2C.
ES% = p max
(6)
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JB.(C-Z))+(l-p)(C-Z>), i f  D <. I c
At J
(7)
i f  D > - C  
2
The function Ewd (D) is decreasing in the contractual repayment D, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.
4.2. The Country’s Debt Capacity.
From the analysis of the repudiation decision, the expected lender’s share at t=0 
is increasing in D (see Figure 3):
Assume that the international capital market is competitive and, for simplicity, 
that the net interest rate is zero. Risk-neutral lenders break even ex-ante when their 
expected payoff E S f  is equal to the amount lent, X. The country’s debt capacity, i.e., 
the maximum amount that a foreign lender is willing to concede, is defined as follows:
Lemma 2. The country's debt capacity is equal to:
Proof5. Notice from (8) that for any D> V2C, the contractual debt repayment 
will be repudiated. When repudiation always occurs, the lender’s expected payoff is 
equal to (l/2-p/6)C, which is also the maximum share of C that a lender can expect to 
obtain at t —0 (see Figure 2). Hence, (l/2-p/6)C is the maximum amount that a foreign
Note that assuming a positive net interest rate would leave the main result 
unchanged. Denote the gross interest rate by R>  1. The lenders’ break-even condition
+ (l-p)* min ID, —C (8)
(9)
lender can concede at f=0 while still making non-negative expected profits.
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now becomes ESl°=RX. The country’s debt capacity (as defined in Lemma 2) would 
thus be X*,=R:1X*, where X* is defined by (9).
The country’s foreign debt capacity is based on the lender’s ability to impose 
effective trade sanctions in case of debt repudiation. This is consistent with the 
observation that "syndicated bank loans generally involve banks from all the borrower’s 
major trading partners" (Bulow and Rogoff (1989a,p. 175)). The view that countries 
with a high degree of openness to foreign trade have better access to external debt is 
also supported in a recent study by the IMF16. The explanation here, as in Bulow and 
Rogoff, lies in the superior ability of a relevant trading partner to inflict harmful 
sanctions in case of debt repudiation17. However, in case of default, foreign lenders 
do not need to implement sanctions to reach an agreement with forward-looking 
debtors.
The model has another relevant implication. Since X* is decreasing in p, 
equation (9) predicts that foreign lenders are willing to lend greater amounts of funds 
to countries that are more likely to have populist governments. In fact, Lemma 1 
implies that foreign lenders are in a stronger position when bargaining with 
governments that aim at increasing workers’ consumption. This implication is not at 
odds with the experience of some Latin American countries during the Seventies. As 
reported by Berg and Sachs (1988, p.283-284), the governments of Mexico, Argentina 
and Brazil undertook overtly populist policies during the period 1970-1982, in order to 
reduce income inequality and contain social unrest. At the same time, these three 
countries were able to raise, over the same period, huge quantities of new debt from 
abroad. Indeed, the foreign debt of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil grew at a much 
higher rate than that of Chile18, a country that after 1973 was ruled by a military 
government with strong anti-populist attitudes (see, e.g., Sachs (1989)). Further, the 
case of Nicaragua offers some evidence that foreign lenders may have advantages when 
negotiating with governments which are more prone to endorse populist issues. After 
taking power in 1979, the Sandinista government decided not to repudiate the foreign 
debt that had been raised under the Somoza’s regime. According to Basu (1991), 
"Nicaragua’s decision to repay its debt illustrates well the effectiveness of the threat of 
punitive action" (p. 11). Further anecdotal evidence that foreign lenders may do better 
when dealing with governments that are more prone to endorse populist issues comes 
from the comparison between the different management of the Latin America debt
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crises of the Twenties and of the Eighties. In contrast with the Latin American 
dictatorships of the Twenties-Thirties, the democratic regimes of the Eighties reacted 
to the crisis by continuing to service their debts, at least partially: "They did so even 
though those debt obligations loomed much larger -absolutely and relatively- than 
during the previous Great Depression" (Drake, 1989, p.52). According to Roett (1989, 
p.70), both the historical and more recent experience on debt crises has generated the 
perception that U.S. institutions’ interests are better protected when lending to 
democratic regimes, even if such regimes may have stronger incentives to undertake 
populist policies.
Note finally that the political process of our model can be simply re-interpreted 
to generate a positive correlation between amount of debt and political instability. 
Suppose that at t=0, when the investment decision is taken, a type-c government is in 
office. The probability p can thus be considered as the conditional probability that the 
type-c government will remain in office at t = l ,  once in office at t=0. In this case, 
then, p may be seen as a measure of "political stability": the higher p, the higher the 
expectation that the incumbent government will remain in power. Since the algebra we 
laid down still goes through, equation (9) now predicts that larger levels of debt are 
likely to be observed for more "unstable" countries. This prediction is supported by the 
evidence that Ozler and Tabellini (1991) report for the period 1972-1981.
A simple correlation analysis also supports the positive linkage between debt and 
political instability. We calculated the correlation coefficient between the country’s 
measure of political instability provided in Alesina and Perotti (1993) and the 1980-94 
average ratio between foreign debt and GDP (Source: World Debt Tables, World Bank). 
The correlation coefficient for the ten major Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela) is 
equal to 0.684. If Argentina is excluded from the sample, the correlation coefficient 
rises to 0.836.
4.3. Strategic Financial Choice.
We can now show how the strategic choice of foreign debt twists income 
distribution in favour of domestic entrepreneurs, even in political environments which 
are likely to be adverse to capital. Define D* as D = JAC: when the face-value
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repayments prescribed by the debt contract are greater than D*, repudiation will always 
occurs. Also, it holds that X*<D* = ViC. Since the expected worker’s share ESwd(D) 
is monotonically decreasing in D, the capitalist’s expected consumption, ECcd(D) = C- 
ESwd-K, is increasing in D. The capitalist’s payoff in terms of consumption units is thus 
maximised for any D>D*=1AC. When the capitalist borrows from a foreign 
competitive financial market, the amount X that can be obtained against a debt contract 
that requires a repayment greater than D* coincides with the country’s credit capacity 
itself, X*. Hence:
Result 1. The domestic capitalist always borrows from abroad up to full debt 
capacity, X*.
The equilibrium financial choice of the domestic capitalist has an immediate 
implication with regard to the secondary market for foreign debt. Notice first that, even 
with a zero net interest rate on the international capital market, the contractual 
repayment/) would coincide with the principal Xonly when D < 1AC<D*. Hence, when 
debt is optimally chosen, the contractual repayment, D*, is larger than the amount that 
is lent and it is expected to be paid back, X*:
Corollary. Since the debt face-value is systematically larger than its actual 
market value, X*, the foreign debt o f countries subject to political uncertainty trades at 
a discount in equilibrium.
The contract conditions chosen in equilibrium will always be repudiated, since 
D>D*. The actual repayment received by the lender is negotiated at date 2, under the 
credible threat of sanctions19. This feature of our model makes foreign debt similar 
to junk bonds: rational lenders anticipate that the face-value of the debt contract, 
specifying a very high level of interest, will be renegotiated ex-post. According to the 
measure used by Cohen (1992), in fact, "all major debtors (except Brazil) delivered a 
market return to the commercial banks" (p.65)20.
Result 1 is consistent with the fact that LDC residents have been inclined to 
accumulate large amounts of foreign debt in the Seventies21. High levels of debt can 
also be justified by the model of Alesina and Tabellini (1989): there, by borrowing
146
from abroad, the incumbent government insures its supporters against the possibility of 
adverse political changes in the future. Here, differently, foreign debt modifies the 
agents’ ability to negotiate over the surplus. In fact, foreign borrowing constrains 
workers’ bargaining power22: in equilibrium, the worker expects to receive (1/2- 
p/6)C, the lowest available payoff (see Figure 1). The capitalist’s expected consumption 
is, instead,
ECc(D*) = C - E S J D * ) - K  =
( 2  6
C - K  (10)
When contracting a repayment greater than D* at date 0, the capitalist cashes X* 
against the right for the lender to participate in negotiations over C at date t —2. Hence, 
even when political risks are very high (p «0), the capitalist still manages to appropriate 
a share of surplus equal to X*. Foreign debt encourages capital accumulation, since it 
redistributes part of the surplus to the capitalist’s share. This conclusion is consistent 
with the empirical findings of Warner (1992), showing a positive and significant debt 
effect on investment for a panel of highly indebted countries. It must be recalled, 
however, that there are alternative and more obviuos explanations for Warner’s (1992) 
results: one, for example, is that a high return on capital in a country can lead both to 
high investment and high debt to finance it.
The following result also holds:
Result 2. Both the strategic use of foreign debt and foreign direct investment 
yield a net capital share greater than the one generated by domestic capitalist's self- 
financing (i.e., ECc’ in (4)).
This result is consistent with the strong correlation found between foreign debt 
and FDI, on the one side, and LDCs’ growth on the other (see Claessens (1993,p.95)). 
In particular, our model suggests that foreign debt and FDI tend to cause investment 
and growth.
Comparing the net capital share ECc(D*) from (10) with the net share that a 
transnational company obtains through foreign investment, CcFD'= ViC-K , it can be 
noted that:
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Result 3. The strategic use of foreign debt dominates foreign direct investment.
This result is due to the structure of the bargaining game to be played under FDI 
and external debt, respectively. Under FDI, our assumptions always generate a two- 
party bargaining game between the foreign company and its domestic counterpart 
(independently of the political outcome). Consider, for simplicity, the implications of 
foreign debt in the extreme case that p = l. When a domestic capitalist borrows abroad 
and contractual repayments are renegotiated, the bargaining game over C is to be played 
by three parties, since the lender can credibly impose sanctions. If the international loan 
market is competitive, the lender’s expected share, X*, is fully captured by the local 
capitalist. Foreign debt can thus be considered as a "poison pill" (see Brealey and 
Myers (1991 ;p.839)): in our model, in fact, debt works as a "shark-repellent" against 
the aggressive behaviour of the workers (or their political representatives). Result 3 is 
also consistent with the observation that the volumes of foreign direct investment have 
been lower than debt stocks in developing countries. As reported by Claessens 
(1993,p .94), "in 1988 FDI stocks for all developing countries were equivalent to only 
about 11 percent of total debt claims. The average ratio of FDI stocks to gross national 
product (GNP) was 10 percent, while the ratio of debt to GNP was 83 percent."
In the absence of a credible commitment to "tie the hands" of a populist 
government, external debt may incentivate the implementation of socially efficient 
projects which, otherwise, would not have been undertaken. The strategic use of foreign 
debt may thus be an effective device to reduce under-investment and promote the 
capitalistic development.
Foreign debt, however, is not a panacea for LDCs. For example, sanctions that 
apply to international trade are ineffective on projects that produce goods for domestic 
use: such productions may thus be abandoned in favour of socially sub-optimal 
productions. Consider for example two mutually exclusive investment projects, (a,b). 
Project-^ costs K° and produces and export good that can be exchanged for C? units of 
an import good. Project-# costs $  and produces ( f  units of a good that can be directly 
consumed domestically (here, we take utility to be U(C*, C*) = C°+C*). Suppose, also, 
that project-# socially dominates project-0 : Cf-Ef < (f-lP . However, since project-# is 
not liable to foreign-trade sanctions, project- 0  will be preferred whenever (7/2+p/6)Ca-
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K°> lApd-K1’ 23 Furthermore, the preference for projects that produce exportable 
goods may excessively expose LDCs’ economies to international price-variability, a 
major cause of the Eighties’ debt crisis (see, among others, Diaz-Alejandro (1984), 
Eaton (1990), Warner (1992)).
A final implication that is implicit in our model is that the domestic capitalist's 
wealth (when subject to the risk o f expropriation) is likely to be held abroad and 
strategically "re-imported” through the international financial system, which relies on 
the threat o f trade sanctions. Eaton (1990) notes that "for many of the major debtors, 
private claims abroad equal around half of national indebtness. At the extreme, 
estimates for Venezuela show it to be a net creditor" (p.44). Further evidence on the 
co-existence of capital flight with high debt is in Bulow and Rogoff (1990). Our simple 
framework, thus, provides also a strong rationale for the simultaneous presence of high 
levels of foreign debt and capital flight24.
149
5. Conclusions.
The present paper has focused on the incentives to invest in LDCs. In particular, 
we provided an hypothesis for the possible relevance of foreign debt in countries where 
the absence of secure property rights typically results in low investment and growth. 
Although the role of foreign finance in speeding up growth is still debated, Cohen 
(1992,p.99) concludes that foreign debt may play a relevant part especially for countries 
that are Relatively well endowed in human capital and relatively poor in physical 
capital”. Cohen’s observation is consistent with our assumption that there are domestic 
entrepreneurs capable of implementing projects, but they may be discouraged by 
political uncertainty.
Our framework abstracts from many aspects related to such a complex issue as 
foreign debt (e.g., the role of public lending institutions such as the IMF, the issue of 
seniority when there are multiple creditors, etc.). However, this simple model generates 
some new implications on the possible role of foreign finance. For instance, we showed 
that both external debt financing and foreign direct investment twist the distribution of 
the surplus, via the sanctions’ threat, towards the capital share. External debt financing, 
however, can be more effective than FDI in reducing under-investment in less 
developed countries. These conclusion are compatible with the existing empirical 
evidence. According to Warner (1992), foreign debt had positive effects on capital 
accumulation. Also, the implication that foreign debt provides greater incentives to 
invest may contribute to explain why the observed FDI stocks are much lower than total 
debt claims. Other predictions of our model in accord with empirical observation are 
that LDCs’ debt trades at a discount, and capital flights coexist with large foreign debts. 
Moreover, as the Latin American experience has shown, populism and political 
instability do not deter foreign institutions from lending large amounts of funds, whilst 
the advantages of borrowing abroad push LDCs towards high openness to international 
trade.
Although further investigation is in order, our hypothesis on foreign debt 
receives some preliminary support from the existing evidence. Hence, we conclude that 
the design of external debt contracts supported by credible sanctions may be quite 
relevant to promote and speed up the industrialisation process in countries (such as 
many Eastern European ones) that are characterised by insecure property rights, under­
investment and under-development.
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t= 0
Investment cost K is sunk. 
(Foreign debt is raised).
Figure 1 
TIMING
t=l
Political uncertainty is solved.
 1-----
t= 2
Production occurs.
Trade sanctions may be applied.
Figure 2
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Notes
1. See, among others, Cohen (1994), Eaton (1993) and Kletzer (1994).
2. Similar arguments are put forward by Helpman (1988).
3. The overall decrease in LDCs’ investment has to be attributed to the worsening of 
these countries’ terms of trade. Cohen (1993) also finds that large external debt was not 
an investment deterrent in the Eighties, although forced debt service payments had a 
negative and significant, albeit small, effect. Furthermore, by analysing a sample of 20 
highly-indebted countries during the 1980s, Cohen (1992) finds that the stock of debt 
has a positive, although not statistically significant, effect on growth.
4. The relation between inequality and under-investment, leading to underdevelopment, 
is empirically investigated by Alesina and Perotti (1996).
5. See, e.g., Clague et al. (1996).
6. When a worker acquires specific skills in production, she might only be replaced at 
a very high cost. This feature drives Grout’s (1984) under-investment result and, more 
in general, the so-called "hold-up" problem (see Hart (1995) for an extensive discussion 
of this issue).
7. The payoff Sit z = l,..,N , is the (unique) solution to the following generalised Nash 
problem: maximise (Sj) iS J .. iS ^  with respect to {S1,S2,..,SN}, subject to 
S1+S2+-.+SN< C. The Nash-solution for N >2 players can also be obtained as unique 
solution in explicitly strategic contexts, as when the Rubinstein’s (1992) model is 
extended to more than two players under the assumption of stationarity in strategies. As 
shown in Chapter II, the Nash solution also holds in an alternating calls bargaining 
model where the size of the cake decays over time and the parties retain strictly positive 
(even if possibly very small) outside options.
8. In Alesina and Tabellini (1989), a type-w government imposes a tax rate on capital 
income equal to 100%. There several forms of hostile behaviour: as Claessens 
(1993,p. 108) puts it, "creeping expropriation of the earnings of a foreign investment - 
through taxes, union activities, or domestic ownership requirements- is hard to detect, 
making it difficult to measure expropriation properly".
9. The assumption that sanctions can forestall the country’s whole shipment is quite 
extreme; however, Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) show that similar results apply also when 
foreigners can block a fraction of the country’s trade.
10. Bulow and Rogoff (1988,1989a) assume that stored goods decay at a given rate. 
Such assumption, which is similar to the "decaying cake" hypothesis in Chapter II, 
provides the main driving force leading to an early agreement in the strategic bargaining 
game they adopt.
11. By adopting a model where the parties can take actions which strategically 
determine their relative strength, Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) show that creditors 
still have an advantage in renegotiations.
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12. Transnational companies (which traditionally seem to have been highly exposed to 
expropriation risks) have means other than trade sanctions to react to a host country’s 
aggressive behaviour. For instance, a foreign company may repatriate its managers and 
technicians, so to inflict serious losses in production (see, for example, Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1984) and Thomas and Worrall (1994)).
13. Foreign debt repudiation can be costly due to loss o f reputation, preventing the 
country’s future access to international capital markets (see, e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz 
(1981) and Cohen and Sachs (1986)). Such approaches are criticised by Bulow and 
Rogoff (1989b) on theoretical grounds. Alternatively, Rowlands (1993) considers the 
cost o f a country's constitution change, due to exogenous breakdown costs implied by 
debt repudiation. Our analysis, following Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), is centred on the 
presence of sanctions as the main cost of repudiation.
14. As mentioned, Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) have been the first authors to treat debt 
repudiation as an event leading to bargaining between lenders and debtors. This notion 
has been adopted also in Hart and Moore (1994). Bulow and Rogoff (1988) consider, 
in a different context, a three-party bargaining game (foreign government, foreign 
lenders and domestic debtor) following the event of debt repudiation.
15. The argument here is similar to the one in Bulow and Rogoff (1989a).
16. See International Monetary Fund (Ch.3,1991). The vulnerability to sanctions can 
also be due to high technological dependence from abroad. Warner (1992) documents 
the strong technological dependence of highly-indebted countries from abroad.
17. Recall that, here, sanctions can halt foreign trade with probability equal to one. It 
can also be considered the case when sanctions are effective only with a probability less 
than one. In that case, the debt capacity would be increasing in the likelihood that 
sanctions are effective.
18. See, e.g., Bulow and Rogoff (1990).
19. The result in the Corollary arises from the possibility of voluntary default. Debt, 
however, will trade at a discount also when involuntary default may occur (due, e.g., 
to adverse shocks in the country’s terms of trade). The extent of discount on LDCs’ 
foreign debt is documented is Bulow and Rogoff (1990).
20. The conclusion reached by Cohen (1992) on debt returns is however questioned by 
Bulow (1992), who accounts also for currency differentials.
21. As in the model developed in Chapter III, the strategic use of debt can generate 
over-borrowing, which is, X*>K. On the contrary, when X*<K  and the capitalist’s 
wealth is sufficiently low, under-investment may also be generated by wealth 
constraints.
22. A strong concentration of foreign debt in the large industrial groups of Mexico, 
Argentina and Brazil is reported in Maxfield (1989). Large companies generally have, 
indeed, organised and skilled workforces.
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23. Similar distortionary effects in the choice of technology are examined in Eaton and 
Gersovitz’s (1984) expropriation model.
24. In their two-period model, Alesina and Tabellini (1989) motivate the simultaneous 
presence of high debt and capital flight in terms of "insurance" against the risk of future 
taxation.
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Chapter VI
CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND COUNTER-CYCLICAL
MARKUPS.
with
Fabio C. Bagliano
(Dipartimento di Economia, University of Turin)
Introduction.
The evidence of pro-cyclical movements in factor prices relative to output prices 
has long been viewed as a potentially serious problem for theories of the business cycle 
based on aggregate demand fluctuations and perfect competition in product markets. 
However, as shown first by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and then by Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1991,1992), dynamic models of imperfectly competitive product markets 
may generate counter-cyclical markups.
In particular, when firms compete in an oligopolistic market, Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1986) show that the incentive to collude is stronger during periods of relatively 
low demand, whereas (implicit) collusion is harder to maintain when demand is high. 
On the one side, a high-demand state entails the following Mtemptation": by lowering 
its own output price, a deviating firm can obtain a substantial increase in current profits 
at the expense of rival firms. On the other side, the ensuing punishment for deviations 
(which is, the reversion to competitive pricing over the whole future horizon) brings 
to zero the stream of future expected profits. Then, if the rate at which firms discount 
future profits is sufficiently high, implicit collusion over monopolistic pricing cannot 
be sustained during high demand periods: in this case, booms generate "price wars" that 
lead to a counter-cyclical pattern in markup determination1.
More recently, an alternative explanation of counter-cyclical markups has been 
offered by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995,1996), based on the effect of capital market 
imperfections on the pricing decisions of firms which operate in an oligopolistic market. 
These authors start from the consideration that, in models of intertemporal price 
competition where prices may be set below the short-run profit-maximising level, the 
presence of liquidity constraints forces firms to raise prices in order to increase current 
profits and cash-flows. Since financial constraints are more likely to arise during 
recessions, markups tend to display a counter-cyclical behaviour.
Following Klemperer (1995), Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) construct an 
intertemporal model that incorporates "switching costs" for consumers. Firms use a 
policy of moderate prices in order to attract customers and build market share to be 
exploited in the future. However, when external funds are needed, firms end up bearing 
a risk of default (and liquidation) which is particularly high during recessions. Thus, 
since firms are less likely to overcome slowdowns, investment in market share becomes 
less valuable and prices are raised, following a short-run profit-maximisation criterion.
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Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) also claim that, if capital market imperfections 
are relevant, the Rotemberg-Saloner implicit collusion model cannot rationalise counter­
cyclical markups. As they put it:
w[Our] results are inconsistent with the tacit collusion model proposed by 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991,1992). ..these 
models predict that in booms there is a greater temptation to deviate from the collusive 
outcome by cutting prices in an attempt to increase short-run profits. However, adding 
liquidity constraints to their model tends to reverse the prediction of countercyclical 
markups. If firms are more liquidity constrained in recessions, then they will be more 
tempted to cheat on a collusive agreement because they need to increase short-run 
profits. Thus, their model predicts that prices should fall more in busts when firms are 
most cash constrained. By contrast, we find that prices fall few".' (p.705)
In this Chapter we show that this claim on the Rotemberg-Saloner model does 
not hold in general, but only under the rather extreme assumptions made by Chevalier 
and Scharfstein. In fact, the model adopted in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) is based 
on the implicit assumption that a firm has zero probability of surviving a recession. By 
using the Rotemberg-Saloner setup, we assume that oligopolistic firms survive 
recessions with positive probability: under such a milder (but perhaps more realistic) 
assumption, we show that the "implicit collusion" model is still capable of generating 
counter-cyclical markups for non-negligible ranges of the relevant parameters. 
Furthermore, when markups are counter-cyclical, the introduction of "capital market 
imperfections" increases the degree of counter-cyclicality relative to the benchmark 
Rotemberg-Saloner model.
Section 1 presents the model and gives the main results. Section 2 concludes.
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1. The model.
We consider a simple extension of the basic Rotemberg-Saloner (1986) setup, 
as presented in Tirole (1988), where two firms, producing an homogeneous good, 
compete in a market with stochastic demand. In every period, the demand can be either 
"high" or "low", with equal probability. Demand shocks are identically and 
independently distributed over time. In each period, the two firms learn the current state 
of demand before choosing their price simultaneously. Each firm chooses prices so as 
to maximize the discounted value of profits over the entire future infinite horizon, 
earning profits n H ( i y  if a good (bad) realization of demand occurs. In what follows, 
we solve for a pair of prices {pL,Pj£ such that: (i) both firms set the same price ps 
when the state of demand is s , (ii) the pair {pL,pH} is sustainable as an equilibrium 
(i.e., deviating from ps in state s is not privately optimal), and, (iii) the expected 
present discounted value of each firm’s profit, calculated for {pL,pH}, is not dominated 
by any other pair of prices which satisfy (i) and (ii) (i.e., in case there are other pairs 
of prices sustainable as equilibria, both firms prefer the pair {pL,pH} considered)2.
In the model of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), liquidity constraints due to 
capital market imperfections lead to liquidation when low demand states occur: thus, 
a liquidity-constrained firm never survives a recession. These authors justify this 
assumption by arguing that, when the firm has some debt to repay, the only way to 
induce the manager to pay out cash flow is to threaten him to liquidate the firm’s assets 
in case of default3. Thus, when debt is sufficiently high, a recession implies that the 
manager does not have enough cash to make repayments and avoid liquidation.
In the Rotemberg-Saloner framework, the assumption that recessions imply 
firm’s liquidation rules out counter-cyclical mark-ups. Nevertheless, although recessions 
are likely to exacerbate financial difficulties, firms may sometimes avoid liquidation by 
raising fresh external funds. In this perspective, we assume that when a bad realization 
of demand occurs, each firm has a probability 0 < p <  1 of surviving to the next period 
and, conversely, a probability 1-p of being liquidated and cease operations. In so doing, 
we encompass the polar cases of Rotemberg-Saloner (p = 1) and Chevalier-Scharfstein 
(p=0). Therefore, for a firm in period 0, the probability of being operative in period 
t is [(1 +p)/2]t~1 if in period 0 demand is high, and p[(l +p)/2f~1 if demand is currently 
low4.
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Given the probabilities above, we have the following expressions for each firm’s 
profit stream, discounted by a factor 0 < 5 <  1, expected at time 0:
expected profits have smaller weight in the computation of the value of the firm.
If firms adopt a fully-collusive behaviour, prices are set at the monopoly level 
corresponding to each state of demand, pHm and pLm, yielding profits UHm and IILm in 
the good and bad state respectively. For the collusive outcome to be sustainable, the 
future losses when deviating from monopoly pricing must be larger than the (current) 
gains accruing to the deviating firm. Suppose that rival firms adopt a trigger-strategy 
behaviour such that the deviation from collusive (monopoly) pricing in one period 
determines the reversion to the competitive (zero-profit) pricing in all future periods 
(”maximal-punishment principle”). Thus, the gains from deviation amount to either UHm 
or IILm, whereas the losses are given by the second term in the right-hand-side of either
Therefore, for collusion to be sustainable in periods of high current demand we 
must have:
(1)
when demand is currently high, and
(2)
2Pa ( V  +
2 -  8 ( 1  + p )  {  2  2  j
when demand is currently low. Note that the ”survival probability” p is such that future
(1) or (2).
(3)
yielding the following condition on the discount factor 5:
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 ±--------- (4)
K n + (2 + p)
where K™=ULm/n.Hm is the ratio between the level of monopoly profits in the low and 
high demand states, proxying for the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations ( 0 < ^ ”< 1). In 
periods of low demand collusion is sustainable if:
n? s  p.® (ns + nr) (5)
1 2 -  8(1 + p) ' 1
implying the following condition on 5:
A A 2 K m  (G\6 ^ 6 . =    (6)
(1 +. 2p ) Km .+ p
From (4) and (6) we see that a lower probability of avoiding liquidation in periods of 
low demand raises the critical values 8H and dL necessary to sustain collusion: in both 
cases the future loss to the deviating firm is reduced by a lower p. Thus, a higher 
discounting factor 5 would be needed to compensate for the resulting greater incentive 
to deviate.
The case for p = l  (certain survival in low demand states) yields the original 
Rotemberg-Saloner result: for 8L<8<8H collusion is sustainable only in low-demand 
states and mark-ups display counter-cyclical behaviour. As shown in Figure 1(a), the 
range of values for the discount factor yielding counter-cyclical mark-ups (the shaded 
area in the figure) is wider the lower is A™: when the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations 
is large (A™ tends to 0), current profits are high in favourable states, yielding a greater 
incentive to deviate, whereas profits are low in bad states, making collusion more 
likely. Indeed, when the firm incurs no liquidation risk in either state, it becomes easier 
to enforce monopoly prices in recessions, when the gain from deviation is relatively 
low. Note also that, if there are no cyclical fluctuations (A™=1) collusion is sustainable 
in both high and low demand states if 8 >  1/2, as in Friedman (1971).
In the above setting, the assumptions in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) - based 
on management’s moral-hazard problems - lead to the termination of the firms with 
certainty if a low demand state occurs, corresponding to p=0. In this case, 8L is always 
greater than 8H, which rules out the possibility of counter-cyclical mark-ups. Hence,
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under the extreme Chevalier-Scharfstein assumptions, the Rotemberg-Saloner setup is 
unable to rationalize counter-cyclical markups; instead, it may even generate pro­
cyclical mark-ups if bH<b<bL, as shown in Figure 1(d).
We now come to the central contribution of the present Chapter. In the less 
extreme case of a positive survival probability for firms in low demand states 
(0 < p <  1), mark-ups may display counter- or pro-cyclicality according to the 
magnitudes of p (capturing the relevance of financial constraints) and A™ (the amplitude 
of fluctuations). The following proposition summarizes the main results:
Proposition 1. With p E (0,1), mark-ups are counter-cyclical whenever bL<b<bH
holds, and pro-cyclical if bH<b<bL.
The proof goes as follows. From (4) and (6), the direction of the inequality 
between bL and bH depends, for any given p, on the value of Kf1. Denoting by K* the 
(admissible) value of K"1 which solves the equation SL = SH’ it turns out that K*=p. 
Then, if K<K*, bL< bH: as in the Rotemberg-Saloner’s original model, if bL<b<bH 
collusion at monopoly prices is sustained only in low demand states, whereas in high 
demand states the price is pH*, lower than the corresponding monopoly level pHm, so 
that the following condition is satisfied:
s ------------ -----------
^ > +(2 + p) (7) 
ni(ri)
On the other hand, if K>K*, 8L>8H: thus, when 8H<8<8L, collusion occurs only in 
high demand states (Ph=Ph *)> whereas in low demand states the price is pL*, lower 
than the corresponding monopoly level pLm, such that:
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(1 + 2 p )
K ( p ' l)
m  /  n i \
b (Ph )
K ( p D
6  5 M   (8)
nScrf)
Figure 1(b) and 1(c) illustrate examples with p < l ,  showing the ranges of 5 
implying counter and pro-cyclicality of mark-ups. (Recall also that, if 8>(8L,8H), firm 
always collude on monopoly prices (pj^yPjj1). On the contrary, when 8<(8l,8h), firms 
collude in neither state of demand.)
The relevant implication of Proposition 1 is that, in contrast with the argument 
put forward by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), the introduction of a "survival 
probability" in the Rotemberg-Saloner set-up does not destroy in general the possibility 
that mark-ups remain counter-cyclical. As the graphs show, the possibility of counter­
cyclical markups is crucially related to the magnitude of the survival probability p, 
which measures the rate at which oligopolistic firms escape liquidation during 
recessions. One may also argue that, since oligopolistic firms are in general relatively 
big, their liquidation risk is rather small: in this perspective, the Rotemberg-Saloner 
explanation to markup counter-cyclicality may look more appealing than the liquidity- 
constraint explanation put forward by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996).
Interestingly, "survival probabilities" may play a specific role also in the 
implicit-collusion model. Rather surprisingly, one can also show that, when counter­
cyclical behaviour occurs, the degree of mark-up counter-cyclicality is even magnified 
with respect to the standard Rotemberg-Saloner case, holding for p = l .  The following 
proposition holds:
Proposition 2. Consider the case with counter-cyclical mark-ups (8L<8<8H). 
It holds that: (i) The price set in low demand states is equal to pLm (the 
monopoly price), independently o f p. (ii) Denoting as pH* the price set in a high 
demand state when p < l, andpH*’ as the price set when p = l (the standard 
Rotemberg-Saloner case), it follows that Ph*<Ph* '
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The proof of part (i) of Proposition 2 is rather immediate, since pLm maximises 
current profits in low demand states (recall that the current period profit function is 
independent of p). As for part (ii), the argument goes as follows. In a high demand 
state, expression (7) must hold: thus, the lower p, the higher the ratio ULm/n.H*. As a 
consequence, given IILm, a p smaller than one implies a lower II#* and, hence, a pH* 
lower than pH*’ (the positive relation between p H and II# is ensured by the fact that 
prices higher than the monopoly level, p # ”, would always make undercutting profitable: 
see Tirole (1988, note 17, p.249)).
The rationale for this result can be found by recalling that, according to (3), 
uncertain survival decreases the potential future loss for the deviating firm, enhancing 
the incentive to deviate in high demand states. Therefore, prices must be relatively 
lower in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 has an empirically relevant implication. Since liquidation risks can 
offer a specific contribution to the extent of counter-cyclicality in markups also in the 
Rotemberg-Saloner model, it becomes quite difficult to sort out the implicit-collusion 
approach from the Chevalier-Scharfstein approach on the base of regressions that test 
for the mere significance of liquidity-constraint variables on pricing behaviour.
2. Conclusions.
In the present Chapter, we considered the basic ingredient leading to 
countercyclical markups in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) (which is, firms incur very 
high liquidation risks during recessions), and used it in Rotemberg-Saloner’s "implicit 
collusion” framework. We found that the results obtained by Rotemberg-Saloner are 
quite robust to such a modification and, furthermore, liquidation risks may even 
strengthen the degree of counter-cyclicality in markups.
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M ian a  countercyclical markup firmSsryl procyclical markup
Figure 1: Combinations of 6 and K m yielding counter- and procyclical markups
for different values of p.
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Notes
1. A relevant assumption in the Rotemberg-Saloner setup is that output demand is 
driven by i.i.d. shocks. Extensions of this framework to serially correlated demand 
disturbances are provided by Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) and Kandori (1991).
2. See Tirole (1988,p.248).
3. See Hart and Moore (1989).
4. The calculation of these probabilities is rather trivial. Suppose, for example, that at 
t —0, the demand-state is good. The firm will survive to period t — 1 with prob. = l. 
Either a bad or a good state can occur at t — 1, each with prob. = lA: in the former case, 
the firm will survive to t —2 with prob. —p. In the latter case (good state at £=1), the 
firm will survive to t= 2 with prob. = l, etc. Hence, the probability of "being around" 
at t= 2, conditionally to a good state realised at r=0, is equal to [(l+p)/2].
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